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ABSTRACT 
Plutarch’s views on women are significantly influenced by Plato’s metaphysics 
and virtue ethics, while he draws from other traditions as he sees fit. The 
theoretical-philosophical works of the Moralia conceptualise Woman as Man’s 
equal in terms of moral ability, but more susceptible to irrationality and thus vice. 
To correct this inherent weakness, Woman needs the guidance of the male 
principle, which will guide her towards reason and virtue. The popular-
philosophical works share the assumptions of this metaphysical basis in 
Plutarch’s psychagogy for women. These texts show a desire to control women 
by rendering them completely subservient to their husbands. An extensive list of 
virtues and vices of women is discussed in the four works that form part of this 
psychagogic programme: Conjugalia praecepta, Consolatio ad uxorem, Mulierum 
virtutes and Lacaenarum apophthegmata. Plutarch uses these same virtues and vices 
to judge the female characters of his Lives, who are presented according to the 
virtue-vice binary, unlike his male characters. These historical women are written 
in such a way as to serve as exempla for his female audience. The image of Woman 
that emerges from the Moralia and the Lives is reactionary, based on a belief that 
social values were deteriorating. The literary and material records show that 
women of the early Imperial Period gained much in terms of social rights and 
public participation, and therefore they have little in common with Plutarch’s 
ideal Woman. 
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OPSOMMING 
Plutarchos se siening van vroue is aansienlik beïnvloed deur Plato se metafisika 
en deugsetiek, met aanvulling vanuit ander tradisies soos hy voel nodig is. Die 
teoreties-filosofiese werke in die Moralia konseptualiseer die Vrou as Man se 
gelyke i.t.v. morele vermoë, maar meer vatbaar vir irrasionaliteit en dus ondeug. 
Om hierdie inherente swakheid reg te stel, benodig die Vrou die leiding van die 
manlike beginsel, wat haar na die rede en deug sal begelei. Die populêr-filosofiese 
werke deel in die aannames van hierdie metafisiese basis vir Ploutarchos se 
psigagogie vir vroue. Hierdie tekste toon ‘n begeerte om vroue te beheer deur 
hulle totaal onderdanig aan hul man te maak. ‘n Omvangryke lys van deugde en 
ondeugde word in die vier werke wat deel vorm van hierdie psigagogiese 
program bespreek: Conjugalia praecepta, Consolatio ad uxorem, Mulierum virtutes en 
Lacaenarum apophthegmata. Plutarchos gebruik hierdie selfde deugde en ondeugde 
om die vroulike karakters van sy Vitae te beoordeel. Anders as die manlike 
karakters, word hierdie vroue word volgens die deug-ondeug binêr voorgestel. 
Die historiese vroue is so geskryf dat hulle as exempla vir Plutarchos se vroulike 
gehoor kan optree. Die beeld van die Vrou wat uit die Moralia en Vitae te voorskyn 
kom is reaksionêr, gebaseer op die geloof dat sosiale waardes besig was om af te 
brokkel. Die literêre en materiële rekord wys egter dat vroue in die vroeë 
Keisertyd groot winste i.t.v. sosiale regte en publieke deelname gemaak het, en 
dus het hulle min in gemeen met Plutarchos se ideale Vrou. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
All abbreviations are from the SBL Handbook of Style (2nd ed.), supplemented by 
the Oxford Classical Dictionary (4th ed.), except for the following: 
 
Catullus 
 Carmina    Carm. 
Livy 
 Ab urbe condita   Ab urb. cond. 
Plutarch 
 Lacaenarum apophthegmata Lacae. apoph. 
Polybius 
 Historiae    Hist.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Plutarch has never not been popular. In the history of Plutarch scholarship we 
can only pinpoint times when he is more or less so. Currently he is experiencing 
a major revival, and finally Plutarch is being studied as valuable in his own 
right, and not just as a source for other, more interesting, men and women. 
Plutarch has especially gained ground in the study of his non-biographical 
works, the collection of texts known as the Moralia. This selection of works is 
by no means homogeneous, and in fact encompasses a variety of genres and 
topics, for which the name Moralia is a somewhat generic marker.1 In recent 
years especially, Plutarch has garnered a reputation as a philosopher in his own 
right, rather than as a commentator on the philosophical tradition. It remains, 
however, the case that Plutarchan scholars tend to remain within the 
boundaries of their chosen genre, and as a result it has become the tendency to 
see these genres as independent bodies of work, as in the case of Dillon, who 
considers the theoretical-philosophical texts to have a different philosophical 
framework to the popular-philosophical texts (2014: 63).2 
Furthermore, many studies on theoretical or popular philosophy focus solely 
on aspects of the texts aimed at a male audience, and gloss over or in some cases 
ignore the possibility of a female audience, even when such an audience is 
                                                
1 Cf. Ziegler (1951: 768-825), who subdivided the Moralia into categories according to the 
content of the work. His recategorisation was influential and immensely valuable, but by no 
means faultless. 
2 ‘Popular philosophy’ is philosophy aimed at the moral advancement of a large group of 
people (who may in some ways be characterised as ‘students’) by using principles from 
theoretical philosophy and applying them in practical ways to daily life. It has become 
common to identify ancient ethics with this goal (Miller 2011: 1570; Oikonomopoulou 2012: 
449). For a full discussion of popular philosophy and related concepts in the ancient world, 
see chapter 3. 
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explicit.3 Plutarch’s women thus occupy a liminal space in current scholarship; 
they have not yet become subjects worthy of study as subjects-in-themselves, 
and yet they are no longer visible only by their proximity to their men. A few 
recent studies have brought them briefly into view. Of these the most 
misleading has been that of Walcot (1999), whose attempt to do a survey of 
Plutarch’s views on women resulted in an excessively negative view that failed 
to capture the nuance and contradictions of Plutarch’s writings.  Buszard takes 
note of the limitations of Plutarch scholarship on women, especially those 
studies which has been broad in scope (Buszard 2010: 83n3).4 His own study 
focuses on the speech of women in the Lives, who he argues are depicted as 
highly intelligent and focused on civic duties. Even so, he shows an awareness 
of the dangers of imposing a progressive view onto Plutarch, and admits that 
his study includes only women who are elite, who speak not for themselves but 
for their (mostly male) relatives, and who are mobilised only by the 
extraordinary circumstances in which they find themselves (2010: 112). 
Buszard’s study is valuable as an analysis of the role Plutarch allows elite 
women to play in the Lives, but it does not attempt to reconcile these views with 
his views elsewhere in the Moralia, and it misses the crucial point that most of 
the women that make speeches in the Lives act as arbiters of peace. 
While there is certainly value in narrow studies such as Buszard’s, broad 
studies that span a range of texts in Plutarch’s oeuvre are necessary in order to 
gain a full understanding of his philosophy in theory and in practice. In this 
vein studies such as that of Beneker (2008, 2014) have been influential. Beneker 
                                                
3 Cf. Dillon (2002, 2014), Hadot (1995), Hägg (2012), Malherbe (1986), Nussbaum (1994), 
Opsomer (2007a, 2007b), Pelling (2011), Rabbow (1954), Rist (2001), Roskam & Van der Stockt 
(2011), Russell (1973), Trapp (2014), van Hoof (2010, 2014). Plutarch’s audience is further 
discussed in chapter 2. 
4 Buszard (2010: 83) gives a good overview of some of the recent scholarship on Plutarch’s 
women. 
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has argued that Plutarch considers erōs a necessary prerequisite for a successful 
marriage within which philia and virtue can flourish (2008: 689). He sees the 
philosophical groundwork for this argument in the Amatorius (cf. Rist 2001) and 
the practical application in the Lives, particularly the Brutus and the Pompey 
(2008: 697-98). His arguments hold that Plutarch considers a legitimate 
marriage one that is contracted at the right time between two sensible people, 
and it is this which allows him to condone the marriage of Ismenodora and 
Bacchon in the Amat. (2008: 698; 2012: 32). Beneker’s research does not consider 
what these views mean for women, but rather what they mean for men (cf. 
Beneker 2014). Consequently, he assumes certain things about Plutarch’s 
Woman that are problematic in the broader context of Plutarch’s works and the 
social context of the 1st century CE. As a result of his broad view of the Lives 
but narrow consideration of the Moralia, he rarely touches on the Conjugalia 
praecepta or the Consolatio ad uxorem in his analyses of Plutarch’s view of the 
role of erōs in marriage. 
Some other studies fill this gap in the scholarship, but have distinct 
shortcomings nevertheless. Pomeroy’s (1999) edition of the Conj. praec. and 
Cons. ux. has been an important addition to the study of Plutarch’s women, and 
many of the essays contained within the volume are careful and considered. 
Stadter’s (1999: 173-82) essay on Plutarch’s view of women is especially 
valuable, since it takes a broad view of Plutarch’s works, including not only 
some of the popular-philosophical works in the Moralia, but also De Iside et 
Osiride and some evidence from the Lives. As a result, he comes to the rather 
sensible conclusion that Plutarch expects the wife to apply her philosophical 
knowledge in the household, and that the couple should act as a unit with the 
husband as its leader (1999: 182). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 4 
Few other works have attempted to confront Plutarch’s women directly,5 
preferring instead to include them in studies of themes such as love (Rist 2001; 
Beneker 2008; Tsouvala 2014), marriage (Goessler 1962, 1999; Beneker 2008; 
Tsouvala 2014), and sex (Walcot 1998; Beneker 2014), that consider them in 
relation to their men rather than on their own.6 The most common view that 
persists in these studies is that Plutarch places great emphasis on the conjugal 
relationship as one of affection and reciprocity. Along these lines Patterson 
declares that Plutarch pays the “larger social, political, or cosmic purposes” of 
the marriage very little mind, as he focuses rather on the relationship between 
the husband and wife itself (1999: 129). Goessler similarly lauds the Cons. ux. 
for revealing “the close emotional union of the couple, the harmony of their 
marriage, and their shared spiritual life, their perfect unity (symbiōsis) in every 
respect” (1999: 115). Despite the obvious double standards of some of Plutarch’s 
writings,7 the major scholarly opinion remains that he “concentrates on the 
equal status of the conjugal partners, on the positive evaluation of erōs (both 
physical and spiritual-philosophical), and on the reciprocity and the sharing in 
the marital relationship” (Tsouvala 2014: 191). 
Many of these studies draw from the work of Michel Foucault, in particular 
volume three of The History of Sexuality (The Care of the Self), which relies heavily 
on analysis of some of Plutarch’s works, amongst others Conj. praec., and which 
has been quite influential in the renewed interest in Plutarch in recent years. 
                                                
5 Beneker (2008: 689) sums up this tendency quite well: “Some scholars have studied the 
societal aspect of marriage in Plutarch’s works, raising questions about women’s role in the 
household, in the community, and especially in their interactions with men…”. For studies of 
Plutarch’s women, see also Blomqvist (1997), Castellani (2002), Håland (2011), Le Corsu (1981), 
and McInerney (2003). 
6 Cf. Rabinowitz’s (1993: 11) criticism of this tendency in Classical scholarship in general. 
7 These are discussed in detail in chapter 5. 
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Most of these studies do not take into account the practice of psychagogy,8 
leading the soul to virtue, in Plutarch’s works, despite the fact that psychagogy 
became a focal point of Foucault’s other work (2005, 2015), and therefore never 
quite catch sight of what Plutarch might hope to achieve through his popular 
philosophy, or how he might try to support his ultimate moral goals for women 
through his theoretical philosophy.  
The apparent contradictions in Plutarch’s views become even more manifest 
when taking into account the Lives, Plutarch’s biographical works, which are 
sometimes treated as related to popular-philosophical practice (e.g. Duff 1999; 
cf. Tatum 2013: 5365), but are too often cited as sources for the historical 
circumstances of women’s lives.9 Scholars of biography are generally convinced 
that Plutarch remains removed from his subject material and presents his 
characters as objectively as possible, leaving moral judgement to his readers 
instead of imposing it on the text himself.10 This is of course not mutually 
exclusive with the possibility that the Lives have a moral agenda, as is readily 
admitted. This admission often has a caveat that still allows for Plutarch’s 
moral objectivity despite his psychagogic/pedagogic aims. Duff, for example, 
                                                
8 Psychagogy aims at leading the student to a life of fulfillment through the practice of 
philosophy. The concept is also commonly known in German as Seelenführung (Rabbow 1954) 
or Seelenleitung (I. Hadot 1969). For a full discussion of the practice of psychagogy, see chapter 
4. 
9 E.g. Pomeroy (1975: 181 & 246n108, 155 & 246n17), Brulé (2003: 140) and Fantham et al. (1994: 
74, 390, 144). Cf. Tsouvala (2008: 701-02): “The historicity of Plutarch’s Lives has not been 
refuted by modern scholars… One, therefore, can no longer doubt the historicity of the Lives 
and the Moralia as primary sources for the history of provincial Greece in the first and second 
centuries CE, for that suggests scepticism about Plutarch as a historical person and his self-
portrayal as a Greco-Roman aristocratic statesman, a Delphic priest and a diplomat.” 
10 Cf. Goessler (1962: 12); Duff (1999: 5); Whitmarsh (2001: 34); Hägg (2012: 249), and van Hoof 
(2010: 10). Russell’s (1966) article on Plutarch’s moral aims in the Lives is excellent and 
insightful, yet still leaves the impression that Plutarch at a fundamental level did not judge 
his subjects. 
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distinguishes between the Moralia as “works of moral theory” and the Lives as 
“works in which the theory is examined – and questioned – in practice” (1999: 
5), while Beneker sees Plutarch as presenting the material in the Lives in a 
morally neutral way: “[frequently] Plutarch does not apply labels at all when 
he narrates examples of sexual behavior, preferring to let his readers evaluate 
actions for themselves, and then to draw conclusions about character and to 
anticipate the course of future events” (2014: 507). Even those scholars who do 
take Plutarch’s women into account generally agree; Walcot also seems to hold 
the opinion that the Lives can be considered to be historically accurate and 
generally free from Plutarch’s moral convictions: “…what does Plutarch isolate 
in the Moralia and confirm by the Lives as the particular faults of women?” 
(1999: 167). 
The Lives and the popular-philosophical works of the Moralia cannot be strictly 
divided by Plutarch’s own account, as he states that a study of virtue and vice 
(with reference to Plato, no less) is the main aim of the Lives (Demetr. 1.4-6). In 
the popular-philosophical works Plutarch aims to educate his readers on virtue, 
in order to lead them to a life of fulfilment through the study of philosophy. In 
order to do so, Plutarch must necessarily select suitable material for his 
audience. If this general psychagogic goal is present in the Lives too, we must 
ask to what extent the author did, and really is able to, eliminate his own 
judgement from his writings.  
1.1. ETHICAL SUBJECTIVISM 
The question of ethical objectivism vs. ethical subjectivism has been one of the 
most important questions of 20th century philosophy, and remains a contentious 
issue. According to Ayer, moral statements are by definition not factual 
descriptions of objective facts. Ayer argues that moral statements are 
fundamentally unempirical, since it is impossible to analyse them according to 
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the criteria for empirical facts. Moral concepts do not add any information 
about the factual basis of a statement, but rather voices the speaker’s/author’s 
moral approval or disapproval. Ethical statements are thus first and foremost 
emotive responses to actions (1936: 107). The earliest version of this type of 
argument was put forth by Hume in the 18th century, who argued that moral 
statements are emotional responses and are not based in reason (Fieser 2000: 
124). Ayer takes the argument further by claiming that ethical statements have 
no basis in fact. He then expands on this theory by arguing that ethical 
statements are not only emotive, but also hortatory: in one sense they express 
feeling about an action, and in another sense they arouse feeling in others about 
that action (1936: 108). In doing so the speaker/author lets others know that they 
approve/disapprove of an action, and would like to encourage them to act 
accordingly. The author may choose to do so explicitly, by simply making a 
command, or implicitly, by sharing a moral statement with others. 
Like Ayer, Stevenson also considers ethical statements fundamentally 
“extrascientific”, that is to say they differ from scientific statements in that they 
aim to influence the behaviour of others (1944: 20). Stevenson argues that the 
implicitness of moral statements has the benefit of modifying the behaviour of 
others instead of creating an immediate awareness of the inability to obey an 
explicit command (1944: 22). Ethical terms can and do act in two ways: in the 
first, they are descriptive, in the sense that they describe the act in terms of its 
natural purpose. This is their most important function. In the second they are 
emotive, not only in the sense that they describe the speaker/author’s attitude 
towards an action, but also in the sense that they suggest a course of action or 
a manner in which one should conduct oneself (Stevenson 1944: 206). 
According to Stevenson, ethical terms carry both a descriptive and an emotive 
meaning that cannot be easily untangled. Although vague, ethical terms are not 
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simply arbitrarily used, and cannot be replaced with non-ethical terms (1944: 
207-08). 
Theories such as Ayer’s and Stevenson’s have been influential, and follow in an 
anti-realist tradition which refutes the idea that truth has an intrinsic nature. 
Theorists in this tradition claim that the distinction between opinion and 
knowledge is unnecessary. Instead they claim that well-justified beliefs may be 
described as true, but they do not claim that they therefore are true (Rorty 1991: 
24). Ethical subjectivism is fundamentally concerned with the relationship 
between ethics and communities, and rejects the ahistorical search for objective 
knowledge in favour of what Rorty calls “solidarity”. Those who hold these 
views regard the beliefs they hold “so well justified that, for the moment, 
further justification is not needed” (1991: 24). Even so, subjectivists11 admit that 
at any time they might be confronted with a belief that opposes their own and 
is better-justified, and that it might be necessary to adjust accordingly (Rorty 
1991: 23). 
Theories regarded as subjectivist focus on the use of moral language to 
determine the value and progress of ethical judgements (cf. Rorty 1991: 28-29). 
In order to determine the moral value of Plutarch’s Lives we will therefore have 
to pay close attention to their linguistic content, particularly the presence or 
absence of ethical terms. We will give him the benefit of the doubt, and start 
from the assumption, which is current in contemporary Plutarch scholarship, 
that he remains morally removed from his characters and adopts a persona of 
Platonic interest in the personal and historical circumstances that gave rise to 
their greatness. 
                                                
11 Rorty uses the term “pragmatist” to describe this position, which he argues is often misconstrued 
as relativism (1991: 23). 
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Does Plutarch give us reason enough to believe that he does not pass judgment 
on the characters whose lives he writes, that is to say that he merely presents 
historical persons for his students’ moral consideration, rather than 
constructing these characters in such a way as to suit his psychagogic purposes? 
And furthermore, is he as careful with the characters of women as he is with 
men? The crux of the problem, and therefore its solution, thus lies at the 
intersection of these three genres: theoretical philosophy, popular philosophy, 
and biography. 
1.2. INTERSECTIONS AND GENERIC BOUNDARIES 
The Lives, however, deal primarily with powerful men, while women are 
secondary characters who support them.12 In the theoretical- and popular-
philosophical works of the Moralia, this is not always the case; Ismenodora in 
the Amat. is a rather curious example of a woman acting independently. There 
are other works in which women are the primary characters as well. The Conj. 
praec., a collection of chreiai and gnōmai intended to guide the husband and wife 
through their marriage and towards a virtuous union, has a clear psychagogic 
aim that is intended mostly for women, though some parts are intended for the 
husband or for the couple as a unit. The text, written in the form of 
comparisons, gives practical advice on common problems the couple may face, 
such as anger, distribution of financial assets, and sex. How these precepts will 
have reached women in the ancient world is an important question, as is the 
scope of the audience and the author’s intent. Similar questions may be asked 
of the Cons. ux., a published letter from Plutarch to his wife, Timoxena, which 
focuses specifically on how to deal with grief and the loss of a loved one. Two 
                                                
12 Cf. Buszard’s (2010) study on the speeches of women in the Lives, which raises some 
important points: 1) the women who speak are all from elite families; and 2) they only speak 
when given no other option, or when their men fail to act appropriately (2010: 112). 
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other texts with less clear psychagogic aims are the Mulierum virtutes and the 
(spurious) Lacaenarum apophthegmata, both of which present collections of 
women’s deeds and sayings that ought to be considered brave and admirable. 
These are four works that directly relate to the lives of women and in which 
women are the main focus of the text, though other popular-philosophical 
works that are traditionally read as applicable to the male sphere can easily be 
brought in relation with them as texts on general psychagogic practice (e.g. 
Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur, De virtute et vitio, An virtus doceri possit, and 
De virtute morali). Narrowing down the audience of the predominantly male-
oriented texts in Plutarch’s oeuvre is a rather easier task than saying anything 
at all about the audience of female-oriented texts, given what we know about 
women in the ancient world. It is however necessary to attempt to delineate 
Plutarch’s audience before we proceed, in order to gain a clear idea of the type 
of woman Plutarch was writing for. 
1.2.1. Plutarch’s (Female) Audience 
The question of Plutarch’s audience may seem an easy one to answer, but recent 
suggestions on the topic are quite divergent and merit at least some cursory 
discussion. It may be useful to start from the position of the texts as literary 
works and thereby deduce that only those with access to both education and 
the text itself (i.e. members of the Greek-speaking male elite and a small group 
of wealthy women; cf. van Hoof 2014: 142; Thom 2012: 284-85) can be 
considered audience members, but this assumption rules out the spirit of 
popular philosophy, which aims at educating the public through philosophy. 
Thus, the scope and the demography of the potential audience expands 
immediately upon learning that Plutarch often travelled around areas of the 
Roman empire (and in fact was given Roman citizenship) to deliver public 
lectures (Beck 2014: 6; Karamanolis 2014; Perrin 1914: 1). Such lectures appear 
to have been quite popular in the Roman world as a form of entertainment 
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(Huizenga 2013: 52), though we cannot say what benefit the audience gained 
from listening to them. On the basis of this some, like Fantham, have argued 
that the oral tradition informed and shaped the literary tradition (1996: 214). 
Letters appear to have been one of the most popular genres, judging by the 
number of them that are extant (Huizenga 2013: 53). Plutarch’s Conj. praec. and 
Cons. ux. are thus both most likely public letters that were written with a larger 
audience in mind, or at the very least edited after the initial private 
correspondence and then published. 
As for the audience Plutarch himself had in mind, some of the texts examined 
here are addressed to women (Cons. ux., Mulier. virt., Is. Os.), some are 
addressed to men (the Lives), and some are addressed to either both or to 
neither sex explicitly (Lacae. apoph., Conj. praec., Amat.). All of the works take 
special interest in women’s words and actions, and the effect this has on the 
men in their lives. This seems to be a central concern for Plutarch, and from this 
we may deduce that a female audience was expected even for those works that 
were aimed primarily at a male audience. The inclusion of women in male-
oriented texts may also serve the purpose stated explicitly in Conj. praec.: “for 
your wife you must collect from every source what is useful… carrying it within 
your own self impart it to her, and then discuss it with her, and make the best 
of these doctrines her favourite and familiar themes” (145c; tr. Babbit 1928). 
Plutarch says the husband must be a καθηγητὴς καὶ φιλόσοφος καὶ 
διδάσκαλος (145c) for his wife, and he provides ample material to choose from 
in both the Moralia and the Lives. Huizenga comes to the same conclusion with 
regard to the female Pythagorean letters, stating that while the audience must 
ultimately be female, since they focus on the regulation of women’s behaviour, 
we cannot say that they didn’t sometimes reach their target via a male 
intermediary (2013: 54-55). Even so, a directly female audience is not 
completely out of the question. It is possible, for example, that women heard 
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these texts read aloud to them while they were engaged in repetitive domestic 
activities such as weaving, as women’s entertainment after dinner, or as 
“educational entertainment” at a bridal shower (Huizenga 2013: 55).  
Such an expanded audience, freed in some sense from the limitations of 
literacy, creates opportunities for speculation on just how far these works may 
have travelled down the social hierarchy. Morgan suggests that “popular 
philosophy” was popular by virtue of being in wide circulation and available 
to many citizens across the social spectrum (2007: 1-2). Despite the small 
audience for literary works in the ancient world, she argues that the texts were 
disseminated by other means, most notably orally, referring to Homer as a case 
in point, and deduces that popular philosophical texts with a moral aim had a 
“mass audience” (2007: 4). 
To delineate Plutarch’s audience, where do we then draw the line, if we draw 
one at all? I would suggest that the texts function on two levels, and thus that 
it would be useful to categorise the audience as ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’. The 
primary audience is the audience that Plutarch has in mind when he writes a 
work, i.e. the literate elite and especially those with prior knowledge of 
philosophy. Given the rise of the new middle class (equites) in the 2nd century 
BCE, it is probable that they too form part of the primary audience. Members 
of this class were literate and upwardly mobile, and therefore probably 
interested in learning how to live in the socio-political climate populated thus 
far almost solely by the aristocracy. 
In contrast to the literacy and relative wealth of the primary audience, the 
secondary audience is most likely an incidental audience that does not figure 
into Plutarch’s consideration when he composes the text. This audience gains 
access to his work through oral performance – perhaps Plutarch’s own public 
lectures or perhaps the performance of the work for entertainment purposes in 
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a private setting – and has little or no prior knowledge of philosophy, especially 
not technical knowledge. Some of the text’s content and aim is therefore likely 
to be lost on the secondary audience, but we cannot say that they will gain 
nothing from it. The secondary audience serves as an expansion of the primary 
audience, but I do not agree with Morgan that popular philosophy has a “mass 
audience” that includes slaves and the lowest classes, except in extraordinary 
circumstances where they came into contact with Plutarch’s work through a 
member or members of a higher class. Even so, the nature of Plutarch’s texts 
and the ease with which the majority of them can be read does indicate an aim 
at a larger audience, instead of indicating a lack of skill or shortage of 
imagination. In fact, most of the texts are highly rhetorical and Plutarch 
reminds us frequently that he has extensive philosophical knowledge, which 
we can see him display in Amat. and Is. Os. It is probably not by accident that 
of the texts in the Lamprias Catalogue that are lost, many are those that deal 
with especially high-philosophical themes.13 Fortunately, there are some 
theoretical-philosophical works extant that support the popular-philosophical 
works. 
1.2.2. Methodology 
Two other works from the Moralia are pertinent to the study of Plutarch’s 
psychagogic programme for women: Is. Os.  and Amat., neither of which can in 
good conscience be classified as popular-philosophical. Instead, they fall under 
Plutarch’s theoretical-philosophical works. Is. Os. is a complex text that 
incorporates elements of Egyptian religion as a vehicle through which Platonic 
metaphysics on the orgin of the cosmos can be explained.14 In Amat. Plutarch 
expounds on the Platonic theory of love, and adds his own philosophical 
                                                
13 For a discussion of Plutarch’s lost philosophical texts, see chapter 3. 
14 Richter (2001: 191-92) discusses the reception of the text by scholars. 
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expertise in order to counterbalance the view that Platonic love is homoerotic 
(cf. Rist 2001). Both works deal (in part) with the metaphysics of Woman. As 
such they form the metaphysical basis of the psychagogy that appears in 
Plutarch’s popular-philosophical works, as well as in the Lives, and in the 
image(s) of Woman that results from it. A close reading of these texts will reveal 
that they have much more in common than meets the eye; not only are all of 
them concerned with women, they all consider women’s place in the lives of 
men and how they might influence the circumstances they find themselves in. 
We are, however, ultimately also concerned with the details of the historical 
woman’s life in the ancient world. It is therefore necessary to distinguish 
between Woman as a theoretical and theoreticised entity and the woman as the 
individual who exists in the world and experiences herself as a subjective being. 
Rabinowitz rightly criticizes the tendency in classical scholarship to treat 
‘women’ as “some pre-existent singular entity” (1993: 8). Similarly, ancient 
philosophical theory treats Woman as an essential being,15 and it does not allow 
for differentiation with regards to race, class, sexuality, and other relevant 
factors.16 While this approach is by no means surprising given the nature of the 
production, dissemination and preservation of ancient texts, whose processes 
favoured elite men, it is problematic for the historian who hopes to learn from 
the literary record about the lives of women in the ancient world. 
For these reasons it is necessary to contextualize the philosophical and 
biographical work of Plutarch, in order to create a framework against which to 
                                                
15 It should not be assumed that Man is exempt from this essentialist treatment. 
16 The acknowledgement of the complexity of identity formation and structures of oppression 
has been an important tool for feminist criticism. According to the theory of intersectionality 
the identity of a woman (or any person whatsoever, in fact) is fundamentally shaped by the 
intersections of her experiences with race, class, sexuality, nationality, etc. (Nash 2008: 2-4; 
Garry 2011: 827). 
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measure the author and his views. Plutarch, one of our most important literary 
sources for the lives of women in the early Imperial period, is here under 
question, and thus it stands to reason that other literary sources should be 
treated with like caution. In order to properly contextualize Plutarch an 
approach that gives the material record its due diligence is needed. An image 
of ancient women’s lives and the socio-economic changes they experienced 
between the time of Plato and Plutarch, however vague, should be drawn, with 
which Plutarch’s Woman can be compared. 
The Woman presented in the popular-philosophical works of the Moralia is at 
first glance a contradiction. Plutarch’s views on women are peculiar, to say the 
least. Yes, they are conservative, and at times even incompatible. In the Conj. 
praec. Plutarch suggests that a woman should be educated and should study 
philosophy (145c-d), but that she ought not to make any friends of her own 
(140d). Yet it is hard to doubt that Plutarch was unfamiliar with the 
philosophical tradition’s scepticism of the ability of written material to convey 
philosophy (Hadot 1986: 448), which went as far back as Plato, whom we know 
Plutarch was very well acquainted with. It was best for the psychagogue to be 
a philosopher and a friend with whom the student could converse (Hadot 1986: 
445; Glad 1995: 60). He also says in Mulier. virt. that he disagrees with 
Thucydides who says that “a good woman… ought to be shut up indoors and 
never go out” (242e), but in Conj. praec. he says that a good wife ought to “stay 
in the house and hide herself when [her husband] is away” (139c). There are 
also various incidents in Lacae. apoph. and Mulier. virt. in which women were 
not only seen in public, but seen baring their genitals in order to shame their 
sons. In the same texts women also often act with “manly” courage. These 
women are not only Spartans, and therefore the argument that different rules 
apply does not stand. These tensions may leave the reader with an incoherent 
idea of Plutarch’s views on women, and the resulting conclusion may be that 
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Plutarch himself simply did not follow a strict paradigm when it came to his 
female students. This is not the case.  
Bound within the tensions of the Moralia and the Lives, I will argue that there is 
a Woman to be found. The major texts on which this study focuses include the 
following: Conj. praec., Mulier. virt., Cons. ux., Lacae. apoph., Is. Os., Amat., Caesar, 
Alexander, Antony, Pericles and Tiberius & Caius Gracchus. The rationale for the 
works from the Moralia has already been discussed – these are works that deal 
especially with issues related to women – while the selection from the Lives 
features some of the most prominent women in Graeco-Roman biography: 
Aspasia, Olympias, Cornelia, Octavia, and Cleopatra.17 These women occupied 
a range of public and social spaces and as such are the closest to a representative 
example of womanhood we can hope to get from Plutarch. Where necessary, 
additional texts are consulted in the hopes of gaining a clear picture of 
Plutarch’s Woman. The texts will be examined and analysed thematically.18 In 
addition to a thematic analysis a close reading of each text will be done. Close 
reading emphasises the dependency of literary texts upon their socio-cultural 
contexts, and pays careful attention to the texture of the text, i.e. its structure 
and use of language (Whitmarsh 2004: 7; van Hoof 2012: 8-9; Nussbaum 1994: 
7). Close reading takes into account various aspects of a text that together form 
part of the complete work; these aspects cannot stand alone, they interact with 
one another, and close reading takes this into consideration. One of these 
aspects that in theory ought to be particularly prominent in the Moralia is the 
“language of morality” (Morgan 2007: 191-206). In the language of morality, 
                                                
17 It is worth noting that women have no single chapter dedicated to them in the much-
anticipated Blackwell Companion to Plutarch (Beck 2014), and that none of these women are ever 
discussed in detail (if at all), and very rarely not as an accessory to a male character (cf. Beneker 
2014: 507; Frazier 2014: 498; Nikolaidis 2014: 364; Schmitz 2014: 38). 
18 Recently several studies have been done on themes such as anger, enthusiasm, religion and 
education within Plutarch (van Hoof 2010: 4). 
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certain words are associated with particular actions or characteristics over a 
sustained period of time and in many instances. Words that often appear in 
conjunction with other words may be used as synonyms or may indicate a 
moral condition (Morgan 2007: 195). The presence or absence of words that 
have particular moral connotations in Plutarch’s Moralia may also serve as 
indicators of authorial imposition on the text where they appear in the Lives. 
A further methodological consideration is the bridge between Plutarch’s 
theoretical-philosophical and popular-philosophical works, and the extent to 
which Plutarch’s Platonism gives way to the influence of “eclecticism” in the 
latter. How much he borrowed ideas from different schools with which he had 
come into contact as part of the formation of his own thought (cf. Malherbe 
1992: 277) cannot be ignored, nor can the influence of Plato’s works on 
Plutarch’s philosophy. Both Is. Os. and Amat. show a strong Platonic influence 
and lend themselves to an interpretation which favours a Platonic-Stoic 
framework above all else. This philosophical framework undoubtedly 
influenced the formation of Plutarch’s ideal Woman. 
The final question we must raise concerns the historicity of Plutarch’s Woman, 
and the possibility of success for his psychagogic programme in the socio-
economic environment of the 1st century CE. Whether or not his pedagogic aims 
were tenable in the physical world is a central aspect of this study, as it finally 
determines the level of validity of Plutarch as a source for the historical 
circumstances for the lives of women in the ancient world.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
WOMEN IN SOCIAL CONTEXT 
Any study of the socio-economic position of women in the ancient world can 
become very broad, and so it is necessary here to impose some restrictions even 
before attempting a summary. Firstly, it must be noted that ‘women’ as a 
category is not uniform19 and as such speaking of their social situation as a 
single irrefutable fact of existence is impossible. In a single society, say Athens, 
at any point in time there are different social classes divided by social and 
economic factors, and so we have to account for upper classes and lower 
classes, citizens, slaves and metoikoi, hetairai and pornai, all of whom would lead 
considerably different lives.20 Not only is there a marked class distinction, there 
is also a fluctuation in the socio-economic and political position of women in 
different eras in the ancient world that needs to be taken into account when 
studying their lives. The issue is further complicated by differences between 
city-states and geographical areas; for example, for the lives of women in the 
Classical Period our sources are overwhelmingly skewed towards the Athenian 
record, especially when it comes to literary evidence. 
                                                
19 Cf. Rabinowitz (1993: 8), who notes that it has long been a tendency in classical scholarship 
to treat ‘women’ as “some pre-existent singular entity”. In recent scholarship, especially that 
of feminist classicists, much work has been done to abolish this idea and move towards a more 
complex understanding of the ancient female population. Even so, studies of homoeroticism 
tend to focus on male homosexuality and especially pederasty, while similar studies of 
lesbianism are in short supply; Rabinowitz says that feminist classicists have turned to gender 
studies, because “it is safer; by never studying women without men, such studies avoid the 
specter of lesbianism” (1993: 11). 
20 This important distinction was already recognised in 1975 by Pomeroy: “the women who are 
known to us from the formal literature of antiquity are mainly those who belonged to or 
associated with the wealthy or intellectually elite groups of society… I have felt that my task 
was to examine the history of all women…” (1975: xi; my emphasis). 
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The question of sources poses a further problem. The literary record has been 
generated almost exclusively by the male elite; this is true of any era in the 
ancient world. What was written by women is largely lost to us, and what is 
extant is often fragmentary or problematic for other reasons (e.g. in the case of 
the Pythagorean women’s letters, where the question of authorship has been 
posed repeatedly). Literature is by no means a straightforwardly reliable 
source, even when it is without a doubt written by women on/for women. 
Working with literary sources poses the danger of interpretation, around which 
we must tread carefully. Who wrote the source, for whom, when, and why? 
Genre is often but not always helpful as a starting point to answer some of these 
questions. 
We cannot however glean everything about women’s lives in the ancient world 
from literary sources alone. In order to build a comprehensive view of what a 
woman’s life may have been like and how she may have experienced it, it is 
necessary to look towards other types of sources. In this case material culture 
is especially helpful, as it can tell us a lot about women’s lives and possessions, 
as well as about their ideological place and function in their societies. Grave 
sites, epithaphs, murals, statues, graffiti and inscriptions all offer views that 
may not be available or may be distorted in the literary record. 
When we look towards the lives of women in the ancient Mediterranean, it is 
useful to keep in mind our objective: to establish to what extent Plutarch’s ideal 
Woman can function in the socio-economic and political atmosphere of 1st 
century CE. I would like to extend the question somewhat to include the 
Classical Period, in particular Athens, to pose the question whether Plutarch’s 
ideal Woman would be able to function in the most conservative city-state we 
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know of.21 In order to do so we must establish what the lives of women in the 
ancient world were like between the Classical Period and the 1st century CE by 
considering both the literary record and the material record. The literary record 
will be treated carefully and for the most part as a source of ideology rather 
than historical fact. A variety of genres will afford us a more nuanced view of 
the lives of ancient women, as is also the case with material culture. Focusing 
on only one genre or limiting our sources to only literary or material will 
necessary limit our view of women’s lives in the ancient Mediterranean. It is 
our aim to gain as honest and representative image of the ancient woman as is 
possible. This overview is however of necessity less extensive than the sources 
may allow it to be, and should serve only as a brief introduction to the study of 
the socio-economic and political position of women in the Graeco-Roman 
world. It would be impossible to give a simple and brief account of the lives of 
women here, nevertheless, the attempt should be made. What follows is 
intended as an overview of the socio-economic status of women in the ancient 
world, and the changes they experienced between the 5th century BCE and the 
1st century AD. 
2.2. THEORY AND THE BIOLOGY OF WOMEN 
In the ancient world women were regarded as wild and ungovernable.22 They 
are characterised by ancient authors, philosophers and medical practitioners as 
the opposite of man (Parker 2012: 107). These arguments come to rest largely 
                                                
21 In chapter 3 the intent of this question will become even clearer when we consider the 
influence of Plato’s philosophical views on women on Plutarch. 
22 This was apparently symbolised by the rites of the arkteia in Athens during which they 
dressed up as bears (Lane Fox 2006: 180), though the full details and meaning of the ritual are 
largely unknown to us (Stehle 2012: 197-98). Aristotle says wild animals are naturally inferior 
to tame animals, and he follows this with the statement that woman therefore is inferior and 
subject to man (Pol. 1254b5-12). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 21 
on a biological basis of the difference between Man and Woman, an idea that 
endured and found new proponents in the sixteenth century.23 According to 
these theories, the womb is what distinguishes Woman from man and thereby 
what makes her inferior to him. Ancient theory took many views of Woman’s 
intrinsic nature, almost all based on this basic difference, and sought to clarify 
what the womb was and how and why it functioned in the body of the woman. 
The Pythagorean Table of Opposites sees Woman as empty and unfulfilled in 
direct opposition to Man, who is perfect and unchanging (Aristotle, Metaph. 
986a21-6):24 
Bounded Unbounded 
Odd  Even 
One  Many 
Right  Left 
Male  Female 
Resting Moving 
Straight  Crooked 
Light  Darkness 
Good  Bad 
Square Oblong 
This opposition of male to female, which places the Woman on the wrong side 
of the categorical divide, held the imaginations of philosophers for centuries, 
but it is perhaps Aristotle who most clearly attempts to describe why Woman 
is different/inferior to Man. In De generatione animalium he describes Man as the 
active life force, while Woman is the passive receiver of seed through which life 
is generated. Aristotle draws this conclusion from the man’s ability to produce 
                                                
23 Medical practitioners of the middle ages argued that the difference between Man and 
Woman was essential for their practice. According to Paracelsus, the sexes are ruled by 
different elements, and Johann Baptist van Helmont agreed that the element that rules the 
female is the womb (Stolberg 2003: 289). Simone de Beauvoir quotes the phrase tota mulier in 
utero in The Second Sex, but does not attribute it to anyone in particular (2010: 1). 
24 cf. Parker (2012: 107) for a more detailed discussion of the Pythagorean Table of Opposites 
and Woman’s position therein. 
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semen, which he believed to be superior in Man because of its ability to create 
something outside of itself (Gen. An. 716a2-18). Semen in Man and Woman is 
different, and therefore conception does not occur from the mixture of two 
semens. He also argues that the Woman who derives no pleasure from sex will 
not conceive because she has no nourishment for the dynamis to draw on, but 
the Woman who does have pleasure will also not conceive because the 
‘menstrual liquid’ will wash the semen away. Instead he suggests that she 
conceive only “after the evacuation is over”. The remaining menstrual fluid 
then develops into the foetus (727b7-34). Because Man is by nature hotter than 
Woman he has the ability to create sperm, which contains pneuma (air/breath), 
while Woman lacks this ability and therefore can only contribute raw matter 
(i.e. menstrual fluid) to conception (729b15-21). Life and animation (the 
dynamis, “the active and efficient ingredient”) comes from the Man, who 
therefore must be superior: “regarding the male qua active and causing 
movement, and the female qua passive and being set in movement” (729b13-15; 
tr. Peck 1963). 
Woman’s role in conception was a hotly debated topic in ancient scholarship, 
and in fact there were some who contended that Woman does contribute seed 
to conception. The debate revolved primarily around the question of which 
fluid in Woman corresponds to semen in Man. The theories in this regard are 
especially intriguing given that the mammalian ovum was only discovered in 
the 19th century. Ps.-Aristotle, for example, suggested that twins are born when 
both the Man and the Woman emit more seed than is necessary; the second 
foetus is formed from what remains after the first one is formed, and it forms 
in a different part of the uterus. He also suggested that women have a tube 
similar to the penis but inside the body from where the seed is emitted (Hist. 
an. 10, 636b15-37b7), while Empedocles posited the seeds of the mother and 
father as two incomplete pieces that create a whole when put together (frs. 57-
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65). Many of these theories take the stance that female pleasure is necessary for 
conception (Parker 2012: 115-17).25 
Other medical-philosophical literature26 refers to Woman as sponge-like and 
therefore naturally more moist than Man: 
I say that a woman’s flesh is more sponge-like and softer than a man’s: since 
this is so, the woman’s body draws moisture both with more speed and in 
greater quantity from the belly than does the body of a man. 
   (Hippoc. Mul. 1.1; tr. Hanson 1975) 
Being “wet” is not a good thing for the Woman, as excess fluid in the body can 
cause all sorts of diseases connected to the menses (Hippoc. Nat. puer. 495-96).27 
During menstruation she also expels heat along with excess moisture, and this 
makes her cooler than her male counterpart (Parker 2012: 110). Expelling excess 
moisture is good, but the same cannot be said for excess heat when being hotter 
is deemed the “better” of the two conditions. It is, after all, where men gain 
their generative power from.  
At the same time women are said to leak because their flesh is more porous. 
Unlike men, they “leak” menstrual blood, sexual lubricant, lochial discharge 
after giving birth, and yeast infections (Parker 2012: 111). Plato compares this 
tendency of the Woman to leak to the weak, ignorant, irrational soul: 
... the part of the soul where the desires are, the unrestrained and leaky part, 
he compared to a perforated jar, because it cannot  be filled. 
      (Gorg. 493b; tr. Lamb 1925) 
                                                
25 The stance, though at first glance beneficial for women’s sexuality, is not without its 
problems. Parker briefly mentions the implications of the need for pleasure in conception in 
the case of rape (2012: 116-17), but does not elaborate. The impact of this theory can still be 
seen in contemporary discourse surrounding rape. 
26 Many medical texts have a philosophical basis that aims to apply the theory practically, 
while others, such as Aristotle, approach questions of biology philosophically. It is therefore 
not quite as easy to say of a medical text that it is strictly speaking not philosophical. 
27 At the same time, being “too dry” is also not good, as it causes the semen to wither away 
and fall out before the proper time (Ps.-Arist. Hist. an. 636b11-19). 
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This constant discharge from the Woman, specifically from the womb (though 
again, the two can hardly be separated at this point), thus leaves the Woman 
hollow and in need of being filled. The truth of this statement can be no more 
obvious than in the myth of Pandora’s box, which Parker reminds us is actually 
a jar (2012: 112; cf. Hes. Op. 94). In fact, some images visualize the womb as an 
upside-down pithos, which was directly connected to the mouth (Parker 2012: 
112). This idea is reinforced by fertility tests that place a strong scent near the 
vagina. If it can be smelled on the woman’s breath, she is fertile (Hippoc. Nat. 
mul. 96).28 
All of these perceived irregularities within Woman, bound up with the womb 
and placing her in direct opposition to man, inevitably cause problems.29 
Because she is restless, imperfect and in need of being filled, the animal that 
drives her to sex (the uterus)30 starts to wander around the body if she does not 
conceive within the proper time (Pl. Tim. 91a-c). In doing so the womb prevents 
the Woman from breathing and causes madness (hysteria); the cure is regular 
intercourse and pregnancy (Hippoc. Mul. 1.7; Nat. mul. 3, 8, 44; Ps.-Arist. Hist. 
an. 582b23-5). 
All of this leads to the crux of the matter: according to the medical-
philosophical view, Woman’s role in society is primarily, though not solely, 
reproductive. If this is the case, then the best way to deal with a woman, 
                                                
28 Cf. Parker (2012: 112) for more ancient fertility tests. 
29 According to Hippocrates, the womb is the cause of all “womanly” (γυναικεῖα) diseases (Loc. 
hom. 47; tr. Potter 1995: 94). See also Nat. mul., which treats the diseases caused by the womb 
extensively throughout the text. 
30 In Plato’s account there is a cognate animal in men’s bodies, but it causes little or no trouble 
(Tim. 91a). History soon forgets this animal in favour of the more troublesome female animal. 
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particularly a citizen woman,31 is to tame her through marriage and cure her of 
hysteria through constant pregnancy. The latter can only be achieved through 
the former; if one of Woman’s central roles is reproductive then she is expected 
to bear citizen sons and heirs (Pomeroy 1975: 60, 62). As a vessel, she thus 
becomes politicised and keeping her under control is of vital importance, not 
only for the household, but also for the state. 
Despite the rather dreary picture of women’s biology as perceived by men this 
paints, it is certainly not all as black and white as that. Philosophical work such 
as that of Aristotle takes a largely negative view of the biology of Woman and 
how this influences her well-being and social position in relation to Man. 
However, there is ample evidence in the practical medical texts (even those 
with a philosophical basis) themselves that women were considered 
knowledgeable where their own bodies are concerned; several practical 
medical texts state a shared belief that women knew almost instantly if they 
had become pregnant (Ps.-Arist. Hist. an. 582b10-12; Hippoc. Nat. puer. 490; Gal. 
Nat. fac. 3.3.150). In some cases the doctor was even required to “defer to 
women’s superior knowledge” (King 1995: 141). Parker briefly discusses the 
aim of ancient medical texts on Woman, identifies in them genuine concern for 
the well-being of the female patient, and deduces that Woman is not seen 
simply as a tool for reproduction. He also writes that women were frequently 
well-respected medical practitioners themselves, so much so, in fact, that 
statues were erected in their honour (2012: 122-23). 
2.3. THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONTEXT: CA. 500 BCE-100 CE 
                                                
31 The citizen woman should not be confused or conflated with the citizen man; in the citizen 
woman the rights of the citizen are not conferred to the woman but through the woman (cf. 
Henry & James 2012: 85 on the legal rights of citizen women). 
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2.3.1. Greece 
The social position of women in the classical world is often presented as being 
only slightly above slaves, and quite far beneath men. This opinion is so 
pervasive that women are often treated in the same broad category as slaves 
and servants.32 Both women and slaves are after all disenfranchised groups, in 
some ways similar, though simultaneously distinctly different. The prevailing 
view remains that women, like slaves, were property that in some sense could 
be sold.33 This view comes largely from our sources of Athens, many of which 
are literary. In reality a free Athenian woman in the Classical period could only 
be sold into slavery by her guardian (kyrios) if she was unmarried and unpure 
(i.e. she had lost her virginity; Pomeroy 1975: 57). Characterising a woman as 
the rightful property of a free man has a certain sense of truth behind it, as she 
would always be under the guardianship of her nearest male relative, whether 
that be her father, her husband, her brother or her son. Indeed, her husband 
(her kyrios at the time) had the right to pass her along to a new husband when 
he felt the time was right (Brulé 2003: 118). That a woman had very little control 
over the course of her own life is by now an old and tired refrain (cf. Pomeroy 
1975: 61; Brulé 2003: 121), but its truth seems to be wearing thin. 
By treating women as a homogenous group akin to slaves we risk losing sight 
of the complex gender, class and racial power dynamics that inform and shape 
social norms. The free Athenian woman in all likelihood saw fewer similarities 
                                                
32 Examples of this sort of treatment can be found in Pomeroy’s massively influential book 
Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves: Women in Classical Antiquity (1975) and Joshel & 
Murnaghan’s compilation Women & Slaves in Greco-Roman Culture (2001). The latter includes 
several useful discussions of the conceptual relationship between the Woman and the slave, 
and their (shared) relationship to the free Man. 
33 It might be more accurate to say that women are vessels through which property can be 
transferred from one (male) generation to the next (Henry & James 2012: 87; Levick 2012: 100); 
it is from this that the daughter in Athens gains the name epiklēros (Pomeroy 1975: 61). For 
more on the analogy of women as vessels, see above and Parker (2012: 112). 
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between herself and the slave woman who served her than she saw between 
herself and her male relatives. As Schaps notes, not being enslaved and not 
being barbarian puts a free Athenian woman on the right side of two out of 
three dichotomies: human-male-free : beast-female-slave (1998: 162-163). An 
Athenian woman born free therefore most likely did not consider herself 
enslaved or disenfranchised to the same extent we do today.34 Perhaps that is 
because she had more freedoms than we are wont to assign to her; certainly the 
literary record paints a bleak picture, but the material record adds dimensions 
that expand our understanding of the life of the free Athenian woman as rich 
and in all probability quite fulfilling. 
In Athens the telos of every free woman was to marry, and it was her duty to 
fulfil her role as a citizen woman by being a faithful wife and a loving mother 
(Pomeroy 1975: 62). In Sparta something of the opposite is true: a tax was 
imposed on bachelors, which lead to the practice of polyandry.35 More married 
men meant the birth of more sons, emphasising again the role of the woman as 
childbearer,36 but moving the focus away from the dangers of female sexuality 
                                                
34 Schaps describes what distinguishes the free woman from the slave: she cannot be sold, she 
cannot be detained, she does not get beaten, the wealth attached to her affords her certain 
benefits within her family and marriage, she has freedom of speech and judgment, she is 
protected from sexual abuse, and she probably had slaves (1998: 167-176). Some of these points 
are discussed in more detail below. 
35 Conversely, the Athenians legalised polygamy after the Peloponnesian war due to the lack 
of men, making it lawful for a man to have children by more than one woman, provided only 
one them is a citizen woman (Diog. Laert. 2.5.26). 
36 Focusing on the woman as childbearer is a significant factor in the study of women in the 
ancient world, as it often excludes post-menopausal women. As a result of the focus on 
women’s duties as childbearers, it has been suggested that older women had a greater amount 
of freedom, as their sexuality no longer posed a risk to society (Bremmer 1987: 192; Garland 
1990: 244). In contrast, Pratt (2000: 43-49) argues that older women did not necessarily lose 
their social value along with their ability to bear children, but rather that their social function 
changed. The value of old women (and women in general) in ancient Greece is therefore much 
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the Athenians were so keenly aware of. Removing children from maternal care 
at age seven meant that Spartan women’s lives looked quite different to 
Athenian women’s (Schaps 1998: 184). The Spartans uniquely also believed that 
a woman who exercises will bear healthier children (Brulé 2003: 139-40), and 
they allowed their women to exercise in the nude, a custom the Athenians did 
not approve of (Schaps 1998: 180). Sparta’s attitude towards women was far 
more relaxed than at Athens, but we should by no means assume that it was an 
egalitarian society (Schaps 1998: 180). 
The Classical Athenian woman typically had no choice in her betrothal, and as 
a wife she had little or no say in her marriage (Schaps 1998: 178), though she 
could initiate its dissolution (Schaps 1998: 166, 170). It also seems likely that the 
inclusion of the dowry and its relative size afforded the woman at least some 
small amount of power within the household. In Plato’s Leg. dowries are 
abolished because they lead to arrogance in women in servitude in men (774c). 
Similarly, Plutarch warns a husband to “pay heed to her position” instead of 
trying to humble a wife of noble birth or wealth as one might try to break in a 
horse (Conj. praec. 139b). In other Greek city-states from as early as the Classical 
period and in Rome women had varying levels of participation in the 
organisation of their marriage, including choice of partner (Brulé 2003: 153; 
Henry & James 2012: 88-89). Papyri from the early Hellenistic period onwards 
show marriages contracted directly between the bride and groom, even in 
Athens (Schaps 1998: 178n86). Nevertheless, it is believed that marriage for the 
most part is primarily an arrangement between men for political, social and/or 
                                                
more complex than simply their ability to bear children, as women also produced textiles, 
acted as midwives, wet-nurses and medical practitioners, etc. 
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economic gain; love certainly has no place in it (Brulé 2003: 154).37 This furthers 
the view that many marriages were loveless partnerships akin to that of 
Socrates and Xanthippe, in which the wife hardly plays a role in the greater 
scheme of her husband’s life. In Plato’s Phd., Socrates sends Xanthippe home 
with their son and prefers to spend his last hours in the company of his male 
companions (60a). 
Socrates and Xanthippe seem like the perfect example of the traditional view 
that men did not care for their wives. That this is a reliable inference to make 
from what is known about Socrates and Xanthippe’s relationship is however 
uncertain, and in fact even in the most critical source, Xenophon, Socrates 
appears appreciative of his wife despite her disagreeable nature, or rather 
because of it: 
I observe that men who wish to become expert horsemen do not get the most 
docile horses but rather those that are high-mettled, believing that if they can 
manage this kind, they will easily handle any other. My course is similar. 
Mankind at large is what I wish to deal and associate with; and so I have got 
her, well assured that if I can endure her, I shall have no difficulty in my 
relations with all the rest of human kind.  
(Symp. 2.10; tr. Marchant & Todd 1968) 
Men in fact seemed to have a great deal of affection for their wives, daughters 
and other female relatives in very many instances, so much so in fact that 
fighting for their women was often used as a rallying cry in times of war 
(Schaps 1982: 196-97).38 Protecting their women was one of the primary things 
                                                
37 The possibility that affection might develop does of course exist, but it is never of primary 
concern, and even when it is present the man does not make it public for fear of taunting (Brulé 
2003: 155-57). 
38 The question may be asked what the men are protecting their women from, and here the 
simplest answer may be the right one: in many cases the women on the losing side of a war 
would be raped and then sold into slavery, where they might have to work as pornai (Schaps 
1982: 203-04). It would therefore be reasonable to argue that in protecting the women the men 
were protecting themselves and their property, which their sons by their wives were to inherit. 
Cole’s discussion of the Greek verbs used in relation to sexual assault does however suggest 
that there was in some cases a genuine concern for the effect of the crime on the victim: in the 
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men saw themselves as fighting for, and sometimes protecting women even 
caused the friction, as in the case of the Macedonians and Persians. Herodotus 
claims that the King of Macedon slaughtered the Persian ambassadors because 
they got too close to the women, creating a diplomatic dilemma (Hist. 5.18-21). 
Schaps carefully evaluates the literary evidence and surmises that in some cases 
the women managed to persuade the men to take a certain action, but that this 
doesn’t translate into women’s active participation in the dialogue (1982: 198). 
It certainly does give the impression that the men weren’t all as cold towards 
their wives as Socrates often appears to have been. 
Regardless of marital affection, the established view holds that almost all major 
decisions within the household were made by the father or husband, including 
whether to expose an unwanted child, most often a girl (Pomeroy 1975: 62; Lane 
Fox 2006: 178). Exposing a girl was initially and primarily a financial decision. 
The father had to provide a dowry for each of his daughters according to his 
means and larger dowries meant better (or “more desirable”) suitors (Pomeroy 
1975: 63). According to this argument, it was therefore better to have fewer 
daughters (i.e. to expose some daughters but not sons as often), but neither the 
material nor the literary record supports this claim. Votive reliefs from Classical 
Athens often show deities (especially Apollo, Artemis and Leto) with their 
families. In these reliefs female offspring are often as numerous or even more 
so than male offspring. Ridgway asserts that this may reflect the reality of the 
Athenian household, and as a result concludes that the material evidence in this 
case does not support an argument for female infanticide (1987: 406). 
Furthermore, considering the high mortality rate in the ancient world (roughly 
half of all children born did not make it to adulthood) in conjunction with the 
                                                
translation of the verbs ὑβρίζειν (outrage), αἰσχύνειν (shame) and ἁρπάζειν (seize – also used 
of abduction, an equally abominable crime) with a female object(s) this type of crime is 
consistently condemned for the negative effects it has on the victim (1984: 98). 
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overwhelming literary evidence that the Greeks wanted to have large numbers 
of children and mourned their loss, Ingalls concludes that it is highly unlikely 
that they practiced infanticide with any rate of regularity whatsoever, for male 
or female newborns, even when the obligation of dowries for daughters is taken 
into account (2002: 247-52).  
Though the dowry was technically not a woman’s property (it belonged to her 
kyrios), it was intended for her support and as such it was expected to remain 
intact throughout her lifetime. In the case of divorce the groom would be 
required to return the dowry, thus ensuring that she could remarry (Pomeroy 
1975: 63; Schaps 1998: 170). According to Pomeroy, Athenian women in the 
Classical period were not allowed to own any property apart from what was 
collected in their trousseaux; this was limited by law to three dresses and a 
collection of small items such as jewellery (1975: 63). However, Pomeroy here 
quotes Plutarch’s Sol. (20.4) as the source for this law, and since Plutarch’s use 
of historical material for moral purposes is under question, we should treat this 
source with caution. In any case, outside of Athens women most likely did have 
varying levels of ownership of their property, including her inheritance and her 
dowry. This was particularly the case at Gortyn (Schaps 1979: 58-60). It is not 
uncommon for archaeologists to find jewellery, dress pins and cosmetic boxes 
(e.g. a pyxis) during the excavation of houses and grave sites. These items are 
often made from materials such as bone and ivory, and are richly decorated 
(Nevett 2010: 12-14). 
With regards to women’s property and their engagement in activities of 
exchange, Lyons identifies an ideological distinction between ‘male wealth’ and 
‘female wealth’. The latter is generally identified with soft consumable goods 
such as food and textiles (economic spheres that women were particularly 
active in; see below), while the former is identified with hard goods such as 
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metal (2003: 93-94). In her analysis of texts from the archaic and Classical 
periods, Lyons notes a certain anxiety over women crossing the boundaries 
between being exchanged and exchanging, and the power-dynamics that shift 
along with this transgression of social norms and allows women to become 
agents of exchange, a role traditionally ear-marked for men (2003: 95). The 
ability to exercise the small amount of economic power they have is directly 
related to their role in the household, and because of this Lyons identifies the 
anxiety over women’s exchanging of goods as a mechanism to incorporate the 
wife as a necessary and contributive member of the oikos she marries into. 
Another possibility, according to Lyons, is that this anxiety stems from the 
recognition of women’s inherent alienation within their families, which leads 
to distrust (2003: 127). The anxiety over women’s illegitimate exchange extends 
therefore naturally to her body. The Greek male elite has a certain obsession 
with their lineage and the legitimacy of their heirs, which imprints itself on all 
aspects of their ideology, and Lyons sees that here also (2003: 127-28). As objects 
of exchange – ‘property’, in a sense – women never truly belong to either the 
family they are born to, or those they marry into. Similarly, the property they 
exchange is not automatically theirs to exchange, even when they are its 
producers.  
In the Graeco-Roman world the aristocratic woman did not typically have the 
need to engage in tasks that supplied income for her household, as poorer 
women did, but when she did perform household duties they were the same 
tasks a slave was likely to perform, as it was their duty to supervise the 
household slaves. As a result, Pomeroy deduces that women spent most of their 
time indoors and their economic contributions were undervalued (1975: 71). 
The lavish tombstones donated to some nurses and wet-nurses indicate 
however a great deal of affection for them. On the tombstones they are often 
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depicted with their former charge and described as χρηστή and/or φίλη.39 
Nurses in tragedy are frequently depicted as caring and concerned over the 
well-being of the children in their care; the nurse in Euripides’ Medea is perhaps 
the most well-known example. Further indication of their value is the fact that 
some were freed (Brock 1998: 337; IG II2 1559.60). That women’s labour was 
considered less useful and valuable is therefore not easy to proclaim as 
straightforwardly true, especially because in many cases their contributions to 
and involvement in economic activities were necessary for the continued 
functioning of society, rather than simply being a way to keep them busy. 
Women of most (if not all) classes were involved in textile production, which 
was a major industry in the ancient world (Vivante 2007: 105).40 Weaving also 
offered women an opportunity for socialization in the home, making it an 
especially attractive – but suspicious – female task (Vivante 2007: 108).41 
According to Xenophon, Aristarchus complained to Socrates about several of 
his female relatives who had moved into his house for protection, but had 
become a financial burden for him, to which Socrates suggested they should be 
put to work as spinners and weavers, tasks they know from their training in 
slave supervision. Aristarchus apparently took Socrates’ advice to the great 
benefit of all involved (Mem. 2.7.7-12). The production of textiles could be 
divided into several categories, such as wool-working, dyeing, sewing, 
weaving, and washing.42 Some of these areas became professionalised, and the 
                                                
39 See for example IG II2 11647, 12242, 12632, 12815 and 12816 (Brock 1994: 336n4). 
40 Textile manufacture was not exclusively a female enterprise, as recent scholarship has 
shown. Men, especially male slaves, were involved in manufacturing canvas for ships’ sails, 
are referred to as “professionals” and may have been active in other areas of textile work as 
well (Lyons 2003: 104-05). 
41 Weaving becomes a metaphor for women’s deceit in literary sources (Vivante 2007: 108). 
42 See IG II2 1556.28, 11254, 1672.70-71, IG I2 473, and SEG 18-36 B62 (Brock 1994: 338n12, 
339n21). 
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products of their labour could in many cases turn a profit (Brock 1994: 338), as 
Aristarchus’ female relatives do for him.  
While upper class women probably did not need to take part in economic 
labour, they did supervise it, and women of the lower classes who did need to 
work had a variety of opportunities available to them. In keeping with their 
traditional role as care-takers and nurturers, they could work as wet nurses and 
midwives for the elite. Some of these women may have been highly educated 
and were closely involved in rearing and educating the children in their care 
(Vivante 2007: 96-99). There were at least some nurses who were Spartan, not 
all of them slaves, and it is possible that they were sought after because of their 
level of education (Brock 1994: 339).43 Women who were not suited to or 
interested in child-rearing most likely worked as textile manufacturers or as 
food producers. The latter seems to have been most suited to women of the 
lower classes, upper class women rarely partook in food preparation and sale 
(Brock 1994: 338-39). Women were probably involved in all stages of the 
process, from field work, herding and hunting animals to grinding grain for 
beer and bread and selling the finished products (Vivante 2007: 99-103). Women 
are known to have traded in the market in various foodstuffs including bread, 
beer, fruit and vegetables (Brock 1994: 339).44 There is further evidence from 
inscriptions that at least some women worked as cobblers, gilders, potters and 
groomers (Brock 1994: 342).45 As Brock notes, these occupations would in many 
cases take women out of the home (1994: 345). 
                                                
43 See IG II2 9112, the epigraph of Malicha of Cythera, which Brock argues might be read as 
evidence for nursing as a lucrative enough vocation to inspire migration to Athens (1994: 
339n22). Midwives were also likely to have some medical knowledge, and Phanostrate is 
referred to as a ἰατρός (in the masculine form) along with being a midwife. Her tombstone is 
elaborate and suggests that she was a woman of status (IG II2 6873; Brock 1994: 340 & n23). 
44 See IG II2 1554.40, 1558.67, 1561.27, 12073, 1570.73 (Brock 1994: 339n18, 339n20). 
45 See IG II2 1578.5, SIG3 1177, ARV2 571.73 and 658.29, SEG XVIII 36 B91 (Brock 1994: 342n33). 
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According to Pomeroy, wealthy women sent slaves to fetch water, they rarely 
went out of the house to the fountain or the market themselves (1975: 72). When 
they did go out, they wore veils and were accompanied by a male relative or 
slave (Lane Fox 2006: 181), though the use of the veil appears to have been 
drastically reduced in the early Roman Imperial period (Llewellyn-Jones 2007: 
252).46 It is also unlikely that women spent quite as much time inside the house 
as many scholars, including Pomeroy, would like to suggest. Women’s work 
alone would take them out of the home on occasion, the regularity depends on 
the occupation. In the textual sources there is a clear tension between an ideal 
of the secluded woman and descriptions of instances where women went 
outside the house to attend festivals, funerals (public and private), women’s 
parties, gather in the streets, visit relatives in prison, and fetch water at the 
fountain; in the latter case it seems especially likely that many free women in 
Classical Athens fetched their own water (Brock 1994: 339n16). Not all of these 
activities were guaranteed to be exclusively female and certainly some 
socialising happened (Pratt 2000: 51; Brock 1994: 346). Even if women were 
quite secluded, this is unlikely to refer to any class other than the aristocrats, 
since women of the lower classes probably out of economic necessity spent a 
large amount of time outside in the markets and fields, where they came into 
contact with a range of people, including unknown men. Outside of Greece the 
women of Hellenistic Alexandria certainly had much more freedom to move 
about the city, albeit still accompanied by slaves (Fantham et al. 1994: 141), and 
                                                
46 Llewellyn-Jones contends that the veil may be read as a liberating garment, “rendering the 
woman a ‘non-person’ beneath layers of clothes”, and as an extension of the domestic space, 
it both protects the woman from the prying eyes of outsiders and allows her to leave the oikos 
and enter the public sphere wherein she can thereby be more active (2007: 256-57). Bonfante 
disagrees that the veil was quite as ubiquitous as Llewellyn-Jones would have us think, 
asserting instead that women may have veiled their heads, but we scant have evidence for 
Greek women covering their faces in the style of the modern Islamic burqa, as Llewellyn-Jones 
suggests (2006: 287). 
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evidence of their economic activity is abundant especially in the material 
record. 
In Classical Greece it is believed that women’s economic dealings were 
generally limited to the value of a bushel of barley (Lane Fox 2006: 181), though 
their ability to make economic transactions and control property increased as 
their wealth increased during the Hellenistic era and onwards (cf. Bielmann 
2012). The so-called ‘law of the medimnus’ is however only attested in two 
sources: Isaeus 10.1047 and Aristophanes’ Eccl. 1024-1025, and has been the 
subject of some scholarly concern (Hunter 1994: 22). It is possible and even 
likely that women in Classical Athens had the ability to carry out a range of 
transactions with the implicit consent of the kyrios, which allowed them to act 
with relative economic freedom. Women’s economic contributions to society, 
while considered in the realm of menial tasks, were therefore important not just 
for their own upkeep, but also for the effective functioning of society. The same 
cannot be said of their political participation. 
In politics, Classical Athenian women were more or less side-lined. That is not 
to say that they were not of political value; on the contrary, the laws of Classical 
Athens show that women played an essential role in the political dealings of 
the time, just as their economic contributions were essential but restricted. 
Their participation in the political climate was however not one of active 
involvement, but of passive submission. In effect, women occupied the parts of 
pawns in political games. Many marriages were formed out of necessity, either 
political or economical (Henry & James 2012: 85). Athenian women were not 
full citizens (Henry & James 2012: 85), but they were essential for the bearing 
of the next generation of Athenian males, and thus they preoccupied the male 
                                                
47 ὁ γὰρ νόµος διαρρήδην κωλύει παιδὶ µὴ ἐξεῖναι συµβάλλειν µηδὲ γυναικὶ πέρα µεδίµνου 
κριθῶν. 
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imagination. Pomeroy attributes to this sense of protectiveness the seclusion of 
the woman in the 5th and 4th centuries BCE (1975: 71-72).48 
The political situation of the Hellenistic and Imperial woman is quite different, 
especially in areas outside of Greece. Egyptian queens such as Berenice II and 
Cleopatra VII wielded enormous political and economic power, as did 
Macedonian royal women such as Alexander’s mother Olympias, and the 
women of the upper classes were inspired to emulate them. Several elite women 
of the time were awarded magistracies (Fantham et al. 1994: 155). Coins from 
the early Imperial period show women in the Greek provinces who attained 
some of the highest offices; Ulpia Carminia Claudiana is commemorated as 
stephanephoros at Attuda in Turkey (CIG 2782), Secunda was prytaneus of Cymae, 
Flavia Asclepia became strategos of Germe, Marcia Aurelia Glaucia wat 
grammateus of Tralles, and Menodora of Pamphylia was gymnasiarch and 
demiourgos amongst other titles (MacMullen 1980: 213-14).49 These women who 
became public figures were often also known for their generosity as benefactors 
to the city (Bielmann 2012: 239).  
Due in part to her intended seclusion and to the impossibility of her 
participation in politics, a girl in Classical Athens received no formal education 
and was lucky to learn to read if she lived in an aristocratic household with a 
literate mother or slave willing to teach her (Lane Fox 2006: 180). Even so, there 
are well-known instances of women, both aristocratic and freed (in the latter 
case mostly hetairai), who had considerable knowledge and were respected for 
their intellectual achievements. In Classical Athens perhaps the most famous of 
these is Aspasia, a metic who became the partner of Pericles and whose 
                                                
48 This protectiveness is also mirrored in the law that regards the woman as a perpetual minor, 
in effect simply another child of her husband (Pomeroy 1975: 74). 
49 See IGRom 3.800-802 on Menodora and her family’s wealth and influence. 
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influence on him is legendary. Plutarch quotes sources that claim she had “rare 
political wisdom”, so much so that Socrates took his pupils to visit her, and he 
says that she was a respected teacher of rhetoric (Per. 24.3-4; tr. Perrin 1916). 
Plato even says that Aspasia composed Pericles’ famous funeral oration (Menex. 
249c). Plato’s own mother, Perictione, is said to have been a Pythagorean 
philosopher (Waithe 1987: 86-71).50 
Despite the ideal of the domestic woman, we also have records of some women 
who performed their poetry in public in Athens during the Classical Period. 
Women such as Telesilla, Myrtis and Praxilla were admired for their poetry in 
antiquity and wrote on a diverse array of topics. Telesilla’s reputation suggests 
that she wrote martial poetry, while Myrtis, whose works are lost to us, 
probably focused on mythological themes, and Praxilla wrote drinking songs 
in addition to choral odes and hymns (Plant 2004: 2, 33, 36, 38). These women 
were relatively well-known in the ancient Mediterranean, as the survival of 
their poetry suggests. While the Athenians were unwilling to educate their 
women during the Classical period, their attitude towards educated women 
was not unilaterally negative. Female poets were respected in antiquity; 
Sappho’s reputation even within Athens speaks for itself.51 
Outside of Athens it is often difficult to say anything definitive about women’s 
education, especially in the Classical period. We know that Spartan girls were 
by law prescribed a public education similar to those of Spartan boys 
(Deslauriers 2012: 352). During the Hellenistic period the prevalence of 
                                                
50 This theory is well-known, but has been questioned frequently (cf. Plant 2004: 76; Deslauriers 
2012: 346). See chapter 5 for more detailed discussion of Pythagorean women. 
51 Sappho was so well-known and respected in the ancient world that not only the literary 
record but also the material record attests to her popularity; there are at least four depictions 
on vases from the 5th century BCE of a poet widely believed to be Sappho, some bear 
inscriptions identifying her directly (Yatromanolakis 2001: 159-160). 
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educated women seems to have spread, and we find an unprecedented number 
of extant texts celebrating female poets, describing their participation in 
festivals, and papyri containing the work of female poets such as Erinna, Nossis 
and Corinna (Fantham et al. 1994: 163-67). There is also reason to believe that 
at least one poetess, Hedyle, originated from Athens as early as the latter half 
of the 4th century BCE (Plant 2004: 53). Though only five lines of Hedyle’s poem 
Scylla are left to us, Plant argues that it is of great literary value (2004: 53-54).52 
The content of these fragments shows that female poets were every bit as daring 
and inventive as their male contemporaries, and that they sometimes 
performed in spaces reserved for male entertainment.  
It is however considered common knowledge that women were not allowed at 
symposia or dinner parties, where men drank, told stories, played drinking 
games, and perhaps most importantly, made connections and talked about 
business. At least, no respectable women were allowed (Fantham et al. 1994: 
280). This would seem to be largely untrue, and in fact we find evidence from 
as early as the Homeric epics that aristocratic women not only attended such 
occasions, but even at times occupied roles of power within them. Burton refers 
to the fact that Odysseus has to appeal to Arete for his passage home at Od. 
7.136-43, and to Helen’s very active participation in symposia after her return 
from Troy at Od. 4.219-64 as key examples of women’s involvement in symposia 
(1998: 145). While the Classical period did include a marked restriction on the 
movement of women, there are a few notable women who did appear to have 
attended dinner parties, including Aspasia (though her presence as (former) 
hetaira certainly would have been less scandalous) and women in the 
Pythagorean communities. We know that Spartan women even in the Classical 
                                                
52 According to Plant (2004: 54), Hedyle leads the evolution of Scylla “from monster to human, 
beast to beauty” in the extant literature. 
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Period consumed wine publicly and probably attended symposia freely (much 
to Athenian distaste; Neils 2012: 161). By the late 4th century and onward the 
restrictions on women’s participation in broader society became ever fewer, 
and we know, for example, that Hipparchia (aristocrat, wife of the Cynic Crates 
and a philosopher herself) attended symposia frequently (Burton 1998: 148). 
There are also other writings (such as Theocritus’ Id.) that suggest that some of 
the women attending symposia were free women and that they did so regularly 
and voluntarily (Burton 1998: 149).53 
One aspect of public life that women participated in regularly even in the 
Classical Period and that they were considered crucial for is religious rites. The 
Brauronia at Athens, a festival in honour of Artemis during which the arkteia 
was performed by pre-pubescent girls possibly acting as bears,54 was a very 
important ritual in young girls’ lives and has been interpreted as a coming-of-
age ritual intended to prepare girls for marriage (Stehle 2012: 199). Women and 
girls were also central to the organisation and ritual of the Panathenaia in 
Athens (Stehle 2012: 201). 
The most famous of these religious festivals however, and best-attested in the 
surviving literature, is the Thesmophoria in honour of Demeter. All respectable 
citizen-wives were allowed to participate in the rites, which took place in 
Athens in the autumn (Stehle 2012: 192). Like the Thesmophoria, the Eleusinian 
mysteries was also a cult of Demeter and Persephone. Unlike the 
Thesmophoria, anyone could be initiated into the cult, even slaves, though 
                                                
53 Unfortunately the material evidence for women’s participation in symposia often focus on 
hetairai, but we do have some evidence of women as musicians on vases (Pipili 1998: 90), and 
inscriptions celebrating their fame as musicians and not as courtesans (e.g. Polygnota at Delphi 
in the 2nd century BCE; Pomeroy 1977: 54). 
54 The textual evidence for the events at the Brauronia do not make it exactly clear what the 
girls did or why, and the material evidence makes the purpose of the festival even harder to 
discern (Stehle 2012: 197). 
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generally it is also associated more with women’s participation (Nixon 1995: 
75). Both the Thesmophoria and the Eleusinian mysteries were fertility cults 
shrouded in secrecy; both lasted well into the Roman Imperial Period (Nixon 
1995: 76). It seems strange that a cult with roots in a myth that may be 
considered somewhat feminist (by ancient Greek standards)55 was relatively 
visible in the ancient world – at least four Demeter sanctuaries were located 
within city walls,56 though they were not in the city centre and relatively 
isolated (Nixon 1995: 76; Vivante 2007: 44) – but Nixon does not elaborate on 
this. She does however discuss the plants mentioned in connection with the 
cults (pennyroyal, pomegranate, pine and vitex; 1995: 85-88) and deduces that 
the cults of Demeter gave women (and in some cases men) power over their 
own fertility: all four plants were considered useful as contraceptives and/or 
abortifacients in the ancient world (1995: 91-92).  
The Athenian record dominates our discourse on the fate of the Greek woman, 
this much is true (cf. Henry & James 2012: 86), but it would be a mistake to 
ignore the 600 years that had passed between Classical Athens and Plutarch’s 
lifetime in the 1st century CE Roman Empire, and we cannot suppose that in 
that time absolutely nothing had changed. Close inspection of the various 
sources available to us does show a change in the social and economic status of 
women as time passed, although it is difficult to ascertain how far such change 
reached or how evenly it was spread out by the early Imperial period. This 
social change may perhaps be ascribed to the expansion of Alexander’s 
Macedonian empire and the creation of a Greek cosmopolis, or perhaps the later 
“romanization” of Greece after it was conquered by the Romans, or most likely 
                                                
55 The Demeter-Persephone myth is unique in that it focuses on the relationship between the 
mother and the daughter and that the mother rescues her daughter from an undesirable 
situation, a central feature of later feminist literature (Nixon 1995: 90). 
56 Corinth, Priene, Eleusis and Gela (Nixon 1995: 77-85). 
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a combination of the two.57 There are also some general similarities and 
differences between the status of women in the Classical Period and the early 
period of Rome that should be noted. Both societies saw a need to control their 
women to a certain extent (Henry & James 2012: 86-88). The dangers of women’s 
sexual desires appeared to them a very real and immediate threat and at times 
they went to extreme measures to ensure that the sons born to them were 
legitimate; in Athens laws and governing bodies were established to deal with 
women, in Rome they were brought to submission by force (Henry & James 
2012: 88-89).58  
2.3.2. Rome 
The life of the Roman woman differed significantly from that of the Athenian. 
For one thing, the Roman woman was certainly a more public figure than the 
Athenian woman. Indeed, from the very beginning of Roman mythological 
history women played an integral part in the founding and subsequent success 
of the city. Rhea Silvia, seduced by Mars and knowing that bearing his sons will 
bring her harm, does so anyway; the twins Romulus and Remus are saved and 
raised by a lupa – a she-wolf or perhaps a prostitute. The Sabine women, 
abducted by the Roman men by order of their king Romulus, willingly become 
Roman wives, thus ensuring the continuation of the Roman people. Lucretia 
submits to the will of Sextus Tarquinius rather than have her reputation tainted 
                                                
57 Cf. MacMullen (2000: 27-29), who discusses the ways in which the Roman expansion 
facilitated cultural exchange, and the willingness of the Greeks to assimilate and of the 
Romans to let the mos regionis thrive. The Greek poetess Melinno wrote a poem dedicated to 
the power of Rome, dated to the late 2nd century BCE (Plant 2004: 99-100). 
58 It should not be assumed that the establishment of laws excludes the use of force, nor is the 
use of force necessarily lawless, but rather that the two can and did coexist to varying degrees. 
On this see also Henry & James (2012: 91). 
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and in doing so she helps overthrow the corrupt monarchy and bring about the 
founding of the Roman Republic (Liv. 1.4.1-6; 1.10.1; 1.4. 1.57.7-60.3). 
The Romans certainly valued their women highly, as is evident from the 
prominent place they occupy in myth, but let us not forget that both Rhea Silvia 
and Lucretia were lauded for their purity, and both paid with their lives for it,59 
an unfortunate double punishment given the fact that their loss of chastity 
resulted directly in two of the most important historical moments in early 
Roman history. The Romans equate female chastity with male honour,60 and are 
willing to go to war to regain the latter if the former is taken by force (Joshel 
2002: 174). The importance of (pure) women to the Romans is never more clear 
than in the role of the Vestal Virgins (Rhea Silvia herself was one).61 These 
women were required to stay chaste for the duration of their term as priestesses, 
usually thirty years (Holland 2012: 208). Their involvement not only in tending 
the sacred hearth-fire in the temple of Vesta, but also in other festivals 
throughout the year such as the Fordicicia, the Lupercalia and the Vestalia 
indicates that they were central to Roman religious practice, and furthermore 
that they were highly public figures (Holland 2012: 209). 
Other religious practices in Rome also require a virgin to complete certain 
rituals, such as the worship of Juno Sospita at Latium and rituals in honour of 
Diana (Holland 2012: 210). Both of these goddesses have surprisingly male 
                                                
59 Livy does not elaborate on the fate of Rhea Silvia beyond “neither gods nor men protected 
the mother herself or her babes from the king’s cruelty; the priestess he ordered to be manacled 
and cast into prison…” (1.4), after that she simply disappears from the action. It may be safe 
to assume that she met the same fate any unchaste Vestal Virgin met: death by live burial. 
60 Male chastity is never expected in Roman society, and even Augustus’ morality laws (the lex 
Iulia et Papia, see below) never attempted to regulate male sexuality. For men relations with 
slaves, prostitutes and courtesans are part of daily life (Finley 2002: 152). 
61 The case of the lupa is one of few anomalies in Livy’s work, as it concerns an unpure woman 
doing a deed that has great positive implications for the future of Rome. 
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characteristics and are depicted in military gear; it has been suggested that this 
could signify virtus, not just in the sense of ‘virtue’, but specifically the male 
qualities of courage and bravery (D’Ambra 2007: 248). The proliferation and 
number of cults such as these and the Bacchic rites that spread after the Punic 
wars suggest that religion was a safe outlet for women, especially in female-
only cults. It would certainly explain the popularity and endurance of the cults 
of Dionysus and Isis, which offered women liberation and salvation (Finley 
2002: 155). Many of these mystery religions were not as easily accepted by the 
state62 and were banned or struggled to gain acceptance as official religions 
(Finley 2002: 156). 
While mystery religions were suppressed or relegated to spaces outside city 
boundaries, domestic religion occupied a central role in the Roman woman’s 
life. The Romans had a great multitude of deities, many of whom were 
especially of relevance for women of child-bearing age (such as Juno Lucina) 
and women in the home, such as the domestic Vesta, the lares and the penates 
(Holland 2012: 212). The Matronalia, a festival in honour of Juno, involved the 
giving of gifts from the husbands to their wives as a sign of respect (Vivante 
2007: 46). Even though many of the religious activities were led by men, women 
especially tended to be occupied with religious activities that bound them to 
the familia (Finley 2002: 154). This includes the worship of Verticordia, an aspect 
of Venus established during the Carthaginian wars that was meant to keep 
married women chaste (Vivante 2007: 47). 
Domesticity is an important aspect of the Roman woman’s identity, as she is 
the keeper of peace. The first instance of appropriate domestic behaviour is that 
of the Sabines, who place their bodies between their husbands and their kin, 
                                                
62 I use “state” to refer to patriarchal institutions and male-dominated systems, which may be 
assumed to be in opposition to modern feminist idea(l)s of liberation and gender equality. 
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creating a boundary and restoring relations between the Romans and their 
enemies. In contrast, Tarpeia63 goes outside the city wall and the boundaries of 
domesticity to let enemy soldiers in, an act she pays for with her life (Joshel 
2002: 175). The Roman woman is not bound to the home in the same way as the 
Athenian woman, she is permitted the freedom to move about the city and 
interact with her friends,64 but she is bound to domestic life. The integrity of her 
chastity is in a sense directly relatable to the harmony of her home, and its 
removal removes the boundaries between Roman men and their enemies 
(Joshel 2002: 180). The early Roman woman of mythology is thus highly 
politicised and ideologically charged. 
Sources suggest, however, that by the late Roman Republic the chaste woman 
had become legendary precisely because she could no longer be found on the 
streets and in the domiciles of Rome – or so Livy says, accusing the Romans of 
luxus, avaritia, libido, cupiditas and abundantes voluptates (praef. 11-12). This 
appears to have been a general feeling amongst (male) Romans of the late 
republic, Horace certainly felt the same (Carm. 3.24.51-54) and Augustus’ later 
lex Iulia et Papia, which were unsuccessful (Joshel 2002: 165), suggest that the 
concern did not abate once the civil war had ended. Literary-historical figures 
such as Catullus’ Lesbia and Ovid’s Corinna did nothing but add further fuel 
to the fire. 
What could have caused this radical shift from the mos maiorum to the 
debauchery decried by traditionalist Roman men? It seems that Dido is to be 
credited with the change in social structure – the prolonged Punic wars 
required women to become more active economically as more and more men 
                                                
63 According to Livy, Tarpeia was a Vestal Virgin who fell in love with the enemy leader Titus 
Tatius and betrayed Rome (1.11). 
64 Livy mentions the Bacchanalian conspiracy, which was outed via the grapevine, an 
indication that women did have opportunities to socialise (39.8-19). 
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needed to leave home to fight the Carthaginians in a war started (according to 
myth) by Aeneas. The increased economic activity of women combined with 
the independence gained as husbands and fathers succumbed in the war 
disrupted the gender power balance in Rome (Fantham et al. 1994: 260). The 
war brought with it also laws of austerity, for example prohibiting women from 
riding in carriages. After the war a repeal of this law was supported by women 
and suspected by men of being a sign of extravagance (Fantham et al. 1994: 260-
61). That carriages would hide women from the public eye never seemed to be 
a concern in the debate on this matter, as Roman women were allowed to roam 
freely as long as their actions did not transgress the boundaries of social 
convention.65 
Polybius writes that Roman women of the upper classes were accustomed to 
luxuries, and that his patron, Scipio Aemilianus, had given enormous dowries 
to his sisters’ husbands for their upkeep, as well as having kept his mother 
living in suitable splendour (Hist. 31.9.26-27). He pays special attention to their 
luxurious appearance when they appeared in processions, and the value of 
women’s property66 is clear from the context. Especially older women were 
used by their husbands as markers of affluence, while younger women were 
not encouraged to draw attention to themselves in public (Fantham et al. 1994: 
262). 
Throughout the late Republic women continued to accrue wealth through 
dowries and inheritance,67 and a sign of men’s discomfort with this state of 
                                                
65 Clark (1981: 201) mentions that Roman women, though somewhat domestically bound, had 
the ability to move around in order to work (women’s work in Rome is much the same as in 
Greece, discussed above), and to visit friends, festivals and the circus. 
66 “Property” not only in the sense of land ownership, but in the more general sense of 
possessions of any kind. 
67 Cicero’s wife Terentia apparently amassed a great amount of wealth, which allowed her to 
remarry several times and live a long and prosperous life (Plin. Nat.  7.48; Carlon 2009: 219). 
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affairs is the laws passed to curtail it. Some limited the portion of the dowry a 
woman could take back in the event of a divorce, some separated the original 
dowry from accrued interest or classified the woman’s wealth categorically, 
while others limited the property inheritance of a daughter to no more than half 
her father’s fortune (Fantham et al. 1994: 263). 
The gains continued as Caesar’s civil war loomed, perhaps even because Caesar 
himself was exploiting his mythical ancestry in order to make gains. Women 
were given the honour of a public eulogy at their funeral, and eventually some 
even gained some political power, albeit behind-the-scenes (Fantham et al 1994: 
271). By the first century CE Carlon describes the women of Pliny the Younger’s 
letters as “persistently independent and powerful players in Roman social, 
economic, and political circles” (2009: 218). These women may not be seen as 
free from the traditional gendered categories which put men in charge, but they 
are certainly not subordinate to them either; they frequently control large 
portions of their family wealth and act with a considerable amount of autonomy 
in both economic and social spheres. They even have considerable influence in 
the political sphere through the men in their lives (Carlon 2009: 218-19). 
Regardless of gender, neither political nor economic savvy generally comes 
naturally, but unfortunately sources for women’s education are scarce. 
Plutarch’s Eurydice certainly does receive some education:  
I have therefore drawn up a compendium of what you, having been brought 
up in the atmosphere of philosophy, have often heard… 
(Conj. praec. 138c) 
In earlier Roman times girls in aristocratic households probably learned what 
they could from their brothers’ instruction, including reading Greek and Latin 
poetry. Certainly by the early Imperial period references to educated women 
are abundant. Pliny has such high praise for the letters written by Saturninus’ 
wife that he can scarcely believe she wrote them herself, comparing them to 
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“Plautus or Terence freed from metrical constraint” (Ep. 1.16; tr. Carlon 2009: 
161). Some women are also (not necessarily negatively) reported to have had 
an avid interest in philosophy and to have written poetry. A famous mural from 
the Villa di Guilia Felice in Pompeii shows Terentius Nero and his wife as an 
educated couple. She holds a stylus and a tablet while he holds a papyrus scroll; 
the painting is testament to their education and therefore to their status 
(Fantham et al. 1994: 342). 
There are also those who had the confidence in both their status and their 
rhetorical skills to appear in court (Fantham et al. 1994: 273), though whether 
this can be attributed to education or to privilege is uncertain – most likely both 
aspects are at play. Merely the fact that they had the opportunity is however 
remarkable enough in comparison to the Athenian woman’s legal status. We do 
have knowledge of a few skilled female orators, such as Hortensia, the daughter 
of the advocate Quintus Hortensius Hortalus. It is possible that she learned 
rhetoric from her father; at the very least we can say that she must have had 
some education, because she apparently made an impressive speech before the 
second triumvirs in 42 BCE, arguing for the repeal of the tax on wealthy women 
imposed during the austerity of the Punic wars (Plant 2004: 104-05; Fantham et 
al. 1994: 273). 
Hortensia is not the only woman to have been active in affairs of the state. In 
Pompeii inscriptions abound in which a woman, a husband and his wife, or a 
wife and her husband exhort passersby to vote for the candidate of their choice 
for office. These women can often be identified by name as slaves or 
freedwomen working as waitresses or in bakeries, and were thus most likely of 
the lower classes (MacMullen 1980: 209-10).68 Their participation in politics, 
given what (we think) we know of the gendered political climate of the day, is 
                                                
68 See for example CIL 4.913, 171, 1083, 3291, 3403 and 3527. 
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quite astonishing. As MacMullen notes, they have no wealth to offer the 
political candidates and thus must have been participating because “they 
wanted to take part and no one told them it was useless and ridiculous” (1980: 
210). Those women who do have wealth and a reputation to offer seem to have 
done exactly that: on the forum in Pompeii stands a large building indicating 
the patronage of Eumachia, sacerdos publica (CIL 10.810).69 Her office was very 
public and brought her and her family very useful business and political 
advantages, advantages she in any case probably had in order to get elected 
priestess in the first place (MacMullen 1980: 209). There are also records of 
Pompeiian women as landowners and selling or renting properties, as in the 
case of Julia Felix (CIL 4.1136), and female money-lenders (e.g. Faustilla; CIL 
4.8203). Such economic transactions were often very public, involving large 
crowds and an auction (MacMullen 1980: 210). 
Despite the more widespread public participation of women in the early 
Imperial Period, the male elite continued to live in Romulus’ Rome. The laws 
of Augustus targeting the upper classes has traditionally been seen as an 
attempt to curb the moral decay of the late Republic and to restore the mos 
maiorum, partially by repopulating the senatorial and upper classes that had 
been depleted by the civil wars preceding his consulship. It is however quite 
possible that he had another goal entirely. His laws compelled Roman men and 
women to marry within their social class and to produce several children. 
Having to divide an inheritance between a larger number of children would 
eventually have weakened the power structures of the most influential families, 
leaving fewer rivals to his legitimacy as ruler of the state (Hallet 2012: 374). In 
any case his supreme control over Rome resulted in a long line of powerful 
                                                
69 A similar inscription appears on the Temple of the Genius of Augustus in Pompeii, dedicated 
and financed by Mamia (CIL 10.816; MacMullen 1980: 209n5). 
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imperial women who lived very public lives that at times deviated far from the 
ideals of the early Roman woman. 
The upper class women of the early empire are (as is the custom) noted for some 
traditional characteristics including devotion to their husbands and fertility, 
but some, like Agrippina70 and Cornelia71 were also lauded for outstanding 
military accomplishments and bravery (Tacitus, Annals 1.40-41; Hallet 2012: 
376). The poetry of Sulpicia gives us a glimpse of the life of an aristocratic 
woman who finds pleasure in an illicit affair, while simultaneously showing 
great literary skill on a par with the poetae novi.72 The poetry is especially notable 
for its distinct sense of independence and its (traditionally unfeminine) passion 
and sexuality: 
 Venus has fulfilled her promises: let them talk about my delights,  5 
 as they will, if they do not have any of their own. 
 I would not want to entrust anything to sealed tablets 
so that no one could read it before my lover, 
 but to err is fun, to maintain appearances because of the scandal 
a bore; may I assert that I a worthy woman am with a worthy man. 10 
    (tr. Plant 2004: 107) 
Given the reputations of these women, and the many others that came before 
or after them, it’s perhaps not surprising that the (male, elite) literary record 
glorifies the virtuous women of legend. 
2.3.3. The Social Atmosphere of the 1st Century CE 
Evidently the socio-economic and the political position of women had changed 
quite drastically in the approximately 600 years between the Classical Period 
and Plutarch’s lifetime in the latter half of the 1st century CE. The society of 
                                                
70 Granddaughter of Augustus through Julia the Elder. 
71 Augustus’ step-daughter by Livia. 
72 Cf. Hallet (2012: 377), who speculates that the lover in Sulpicia’s poems, called by the 
pseudonym Cerinthus, could well have been a member of the imperial family. 
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early Imperial Rome, and especially its women, who represented the virtue of 
Rome, was thought to have fallen into a state of decadence and immorality. 
Women were suspected of intemperance, over-indulgence and licentiousness 
(Joshel & Murnaghan 2001: 8). Augustus already sought to correct these 
perceived immoral tendencies at the turn of the millennium with the two lex 
Iuliae, laws that sought to punish adulterers and regulate Roman marriages. He 
later added the lex Papia et Poppaea in order to reinforce the first two laws; the 
three laws together became known as the lex Iulia et Papia, and it was under the 
first of these that he was required to exile his daughter and grand-daughter on 
charges of adultery (Henry & James 2012: 93-94). Laws alone do not, however, 
give a good indication of the state of a society. To get a better idea of the social 
atmosphere we must take into account the literature of the era. 
The Latin elegists of the late Republic and early empire are perhaps our most 
notable records of the change in the social atmosphere of Rome. Both male and 
female poets were writing deeply personal poems inspired by Sappho, and in 
doing so they were exposing the most personal details of their own and their 
lovers’ lives. Catullus’ poetry is known for taking his affair with Clodia very 
seriously. Apart from his expressions of love and jealousy (Carm. 2, 5, 7, 43, 51), 
he also wrote numerous invectives (Carm. 16, 83, 110, 111). Ovid made light of 
the rituals of courtship, but importantly also gives us an indication that women 
attended the gladiatorial games in the late Republic and early Imperial period:  
Though I am sitting here, it's not in the least because I am interested in the 
racing; all the same! I want your favourite to win. What I've come here for is to 
talk to you, to sit near you and to tell you how tremendously I love you. So you 
are looking at the races, I am looking at you. 
(Am. 3.2.1-8; tr. May 1930) 
Male poets might have dominated the scene, but like Sulpicia, some female 
writers of the larger Graeco-Roman world also became (in)famous during this 
period for taking topics of love and sexuality beyond the traditional boundaries 
of femininity. Elephantis (fl. late 1st century BCE), most likely as her name 
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suggests from Elephantine in Egypt, wrote popular erotica of which the 
emperor Tiberius was apparently quite fond (Plant 2004: 118). Pamphila (fl. 
mid-1st century CE) is also reported to have written a work on sex, although the 
remaining fragments attest rather to a keen interest in the history of philosophy 
and biography, as well as innovation in style and genre (Plant 2004: 127). 
On the other side of the coin stand the traditionalists, who respond to the social 
climate in literary and rhetorical forms. Cato the Elder already denounced the 
freedoms of women as infringing on the freedoms of men long before the fall 
of the Republic: 
It is complete liberty or, rather, if we wish to speak the truth, complete licence 
that they desire. If they win in this, what will they not attempt? Review all the 
laws with which your forefathers restrained their licence and made them 
subject to their husbands; even with all these bonds you can scarcely control 
them. If you suffer them to seize these bonds one by one and wrench 
themselves free and finally to be placed on a parity with their husbands, do 
you think that you will be able to endure them? What of this? The moment they 
begin to be your equals, they will be your superiors. 
(Liv. Ab urb. cond. 34.2.14-3.1-2; tr. Sage 1935)  
Livy goes to great lengths to present a long line of traditionally virtuous women 
to his readers, though not without the occasional anomaly (Hallet 2012: 380).73 
Virgil attempted to brush large portions of Venus’ record of sexual infidelity 
under the rug simply by not mentioning her past transgressions, while 
attempting to explain the actions of Dido as divine compulsion (Hallet 2012: 
380). Roman men made special effort to avoid being associated with women of 
low character, but they freely shared their associations with women they 
deemed of good character and training, even if these women were highly public 
figures in the socio-economic and political spheres (Carlon 2009: 218-20). 
                                                
73 Livy mentions Hispalia Faecenia, a freedwoman and former prostitute, who exposed the 
Bacchanalian conspiracy in 186 BCE (39.8-19), though the lupa who saved Romulus and Remus 
from drowning in the Tiber is perhaps the most well-known example. 
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Even so, instances of women in public, especially in the forum, are described 
by authors like Cicero, Livy and Valerius Maximus in terms that suggest that 
they are acting against social convention and that such actions are disturbing 
to the general (i.e. male) populus (Boatwright 2011: 114-16). Such accounts are 
not without problems of their own, as Livy himself also represents Verginia as 
entering the forum with her nurse to attend school as a perfectly normal daily 
activity (3.44.6). The implication, supported as we have seen by the material 
record, is that the appearance of women in public and even in the forum may 
have been an everyday sight.74 At the same time we are also faced with the 
possibility that the increased visibility and freedoms of women in areas other 
than the domestic, including economic and civic spheres, was causing friction 
for a certain segment of the (again: elite, male) Roman population.75 
2.4. GENDERED VIRTUE AND SPACE 
The traditional view of the polis maintains that in Classical Athens men and 
women occupied fundamentally different spheres of society, and as a result the 
city space can be said to have belonged in a sense to a certain gender based on 
its function. Men spent their time outside and in public, engaging in political 
and economic dealings, moving between the agora and the gymnasium, going 
to war or perhaps hunting (Brulé 2003: 159). Ischomachus declares that he does 
not spend any time in the house, because his wife “is quite capable of looking 
after the house by herself” (Xen. Oec. 7.3; tr. Todd 1968). He is concerned as 
much with the administration of the city as his wife is (and should be) with the 
running of the household. In contrast women are generally believed to have 
                                                
74 Boatwright (2011: 118) also notes that activities such as shopping would have been women’s 
tasks, and that going to the market would have meant being in public. 
75 See also Milnor (2005: 158-85) on the unease with which the male ruling class approached 
female liberty and publicity. 
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spent their time at home and in the residential areas, in other words, in private 
(Pomeroy 1975: 79). Even in the private space of a home a further division was 
made between male and female space: the women spent their time in the 
women’s quarters (gynaikonitis), usually upstairs, while the men usually spent 
time downstairs in the andron (Pomeroy 1975: 82; cf. Nevett 2002: 82-83). Men 
are considered best suited to a public life, women to a life in private.76 
Theories of such a dichotomous organisation of space are problematic, 
primarily because it is difficult to maintain arguments that a strict 
genderisation of space can be upheld in the practice of daily life, where lived 
experience is much more complex (cf. Löw 2008;77 Trümper 2012: 290; Nevet 
2010: 49). Within such a theory it becomes necessary to explain the presence of 
the symposium within the household space, and scholars often use the andron 
as evidence of gendered space even within the home. It is further problematic 
that such arguments often rest on a textual basis, and scholars concerned with 
the daily lives of Greek and Roman women have (or at least should) come to be 
distrustful of the large majority of literary sources available to us that present 
an elite male view (cf. Nevett 2010: 49; Trümper 2012: 291). The view that 
                                                
76 For the purpose of this study, “public” is defined as any space where a person comes into 
contact with other members of society outside of their domestic group (i.e. family and 
household slaves), while “private” is defined as those spheres where a person is alone or in 
contact with close relatives or household slaves. Cf. Trümper (2012: 291) on the problems of 
defining “public” and “private” in contemporary scholarship, and Nevett (2010: 6) on the 
dangers of assuming the universality of these concepts. Some scholars prefer the use of terms 
such as “civic” instead of the dichotomy suggested by public-private/male-female (e.g. 
Boatwright 2011: 108); however, as the preceding sections have shown, women were not 
excluded de facto from civic life in the 1st century CE, therefore the term does not apply in this 
case. 
77 Löw’s argument refers to the “institutionalization of spaces”, i.e. that similarity between 
spaces that generalises the space and its function based on the repetitive action associated with 
it (2008: 37). However, she questions the assumption that all insitutionalised spaces are 
approached in the same manner by all people (2008: 36-38). 
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women occupied separate areas of the home represents a Greek ideal that could 
be put into practice very rarely, and if at all, only by the very wealthy.78 
Trümper suggests that the use of space is continuously negotiated by the 
participants rather than being rigorously assigned, as has long been argued 
(2012: 295). This is supported by the archaeological evidence: many houses in 
the ancient world served an economic purpose as well as a domestic purpose. 
Houses could function in a variety of different ways, e.g. as weaving and 
spinning workshop, as food processing location, as metallurgy workshop or as 
retail shop (Nevett 2010: 7). Nevett also argues that based on depictions of 
symposia on pottery from the Classical period, it is possible that these events 
sometimes did not take place in the andron at all, but rather in the courtyard of 
the home, and that the domestic space is likely more fluid than is often 
suggested (2010: 60-61). 
Greek houses in the Roman period also underwent some stylistic changes that 
imply a less strict sense of social control over members of the household, and 
as a result could have meant more social freedom for women. During this 
period all rooms no longer connect to the courtyard by a single entrance, but 
are rather connected internally and therefore more difficult to monitor. Houses 
also tend to have a second and in rare cases even a third entrance, thus fostering 
contact between members of the family and the larger public instead of 
impeding it (Nevett 2002: 84-86). The inclusion of Roman architectural features 
such as the atrium in some Greek houses of the Roman period attest to a strong 
Roman influence on architecture, and may reflect a similar Roman influence on 
Greek lifestyle (Nevett 2002: 91). Changes in decoration of the courtyard during 
this period may also be indicative of a simultaneous change in priorities: during 
                                                
78 Trümper (2012: 292) discusses the major current scholarship on gendered public and private 
space and the problems inherent in such research. 
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the 1st century BCE some Greek houses feature a central garden and impluvium, 
while the entrance to the house is no longer screened but instead opens up 
directly onto the courtyard (Nevett 2002: 88-89). The full view of the interior 
space of the house thereby offered, as well as the added emphasis on a 
recreational space, implies that privacy is no longer as high on the agenda for 
the success of the oikos. 
As a result, when taking into account the archaeological and material record 
representations of women in public spaces present a particular problem. A 
black-figure hydria from the late 6th century BCE shows elegantly dressed 
women meeting at a water-fountain, from which it is generally concluded that 
the Archaic woman had more freedom than the Classical woman (Trümper 
2012: 288-89), though we have seen that this interpretation of women’s 
seclusion in ancient Greece is problematic. Rome poses a different question, 
because even its elite authors were less concerned with women’s seclusion than 
they were with their virtue, and during the early Imperial period images of 
women become more common in public areas. The images they do present of 
women suggest that their virtue, rather than they themselves, is on display: in 
most statues the women are shown draped in heavy clothing, rarely are they 
shown in the nude (Davies 2008: 211). The feminine virtues suggested by these 
statues are modesty and chastity, though many of them are sexualised in stark 
contrast to the many layers of clothing, showing the shape of the breasts and 
even the pubic triangle. At the same time these are women of luxury, portrayed 
especially to show off their riches (Davies 2008: 216-17). 
Davies claims that the women’s body language (arms close to the body, 
constrained by drapery, “defensive”) is one of submission, while male statues 
show men occupying social space by stretching out their limbs, an act of 
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assertion (2008: 215).79 The argument that “men wear the toga with an assurance 
that can hardly bear much relation to reality” (Davies 2008: 215), but that 
women’s statues are directly relatable to reality, is simply illogical and cannot 
be sustained. Furthermore, the female statues’ legs are often just as assertive as 
the males’, with the legs spread apart and one knee bent outwards. Some 
statues are stepping forwards actively (Davies 2008: 215).80 These statues show 
women of power, negotiating the space between social convention and civic 
action. Davies further contends that the body language of female statues played 
an important role in reinforcing ideas about traditional gender roles: “men 
appear active and dominant, the women passive and hesitant” (2008: 215). 
While this is a valid observation and in some cases may be true, I do not agree 
that it “neutralize[s] their display in public” (2008: 215). It is simply too easy to 
put forth this argument while ignoring the public power many of these women 
wielded, even if that power was by virtue of (subordination to) a generous 
husband or father.81 
Like the ideology of space, the virtues ascribed to men and women can be 
gendered, and they can be related to the space in which these qualities should 
be practiced. In the Meno, Plato argues that virtue is the same for men and 
women (72c-73d), but that the sexes should apply their virtue in the appropriate 
sphere, women in the household, men in the state (73a-b; cf. 71e-72a). According 
to Aristotle the virtue of men and women differs. Both partake in moral virtue, 
                                                
79 Cf. Münich, Glyptothek, inv. no 540, a statue of an unknown young man (ca. 20-30 CE) whose 
arms are missing, but at least one of which were clearly reaching out. This young man is also 
draped in heavy clothing and his knee is bent inwards and his feet close together, signaling 
(according to Davies’ criteria) submission. 
80 Cf. Münich, Glyptothek, inv. no 427, a statue of an unknown woman (ca. 170 CE) draped in 
heavy robes, but with her breasts and body shape accentuated. She is stepping forward. 
81 In contemporary politics many women who are elected to office are preceded by their 
husbands. The phenomenon is so wide-spread that it was coined the “widow’s mandate” 
(Gertzog 1995: 17-35). 
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but only according to his or her function, and therefore they do not share virtue 
in the same way. Temperance, courage and justice are thus essentially different 
in men and women (Pol. 1.13.1259b38-1260a20). Philosophers generally agree 
that the public sphere belongs to men, while women should remain private, 
and they relate this use of space to the practice of their virtue. 
From men courage, a thoroughly public virtue, is expected, because it is this 
virtue which guarantees success in war (Brulé 2003: 76) and helps them protect 
their property (Xen. Oec. 7.25). Women, on the other hand, are cowardly and 
therefore fearful, as are the females of all species according to Ps.-Aristotle 
(Hist. an. 8.628a35-b31; cf. Xen. Oec. 7.25). Plato agrees: 
All those creatures generated as men who proved themselves cowardly and 
spent their lives in wrong-doing were transformed at their second incarnation 
into women. 
(Tim. 90e-91a; tr. Bury 1929) 
It is unlikely that a woman can be courageous at all, since the concept is so 
bound up with masculinity that only one word is needed to encompass both 
of these ideas; at its very roots andreios signifies the male (Brulé 2003: 76). The 
only courage a woman possesses is the courage to be subordinate (Arist. Pol. 
1260a20). 
Being fearful makes a woman watchful and therefore more attentive, and due 
to a combination of this and by nature belonging to the private sphere it is her 
duty to run the household (Phyntis, On the Chastity of Women, 85; Perictione, On 
the Harmony of Women, 77; Melissa, Letter to Cleareta, 83).82 This too requires a 
certain virtue, as she must be conservative and preservative in her management 
of her husband’s property, including his slaves, to whom she must tend when 
they are ill (Theano, Letter to Callisto, 72; Xen. Oec. 7.35-37; Brulé 2003: 167). By 
                                                
82 All references to the Pythagorean women’s texts are to page numbers in I.M. Plant (tr.), 
Women Writers of Ancient Greece and Rome (2004). 
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cultivating these virtues the woman can cultivate a good atmosphere at home 
between herself and her spouse (Brulé 2003: 168). 
Furthermore, women, like slaves, are not suited to leadership (Aristotle, Pol. 
1.1254b10-25; Phyntis, On the Chastity of Women, 85). This task is left to only the 
right sort of man, the man who is erect and therefore suited to politics. Nature 
has of course not imbued certain men with this ability without a purpose, 
bodies are made according to the functions they are supposed to perform in 
society, and if nature didn’t imbue women with the ability to lead, it must be 
because they are not supposed to do so (Brulé 2003: 77). 
Because men (the right sort of men, free men) are born to live a life in public, 
involved in politics and thus to lead, they must also therefore be the beacons of 
truth, justice and order, without which one cannot rule over a city. He is 
naturally suited for these tasks, being a rational being. Because of her ease of 
understanding, Socrates tells Ischomachus that his wife has a masculine 
(ἀνδρικήν) intelligence (ἐπιδεικνύεις; Xen. Oec. 10.1). This is an extraordinary 
case, since the female is naturally the inferior version of the male, uncivilised 
and unruly (Brulé 2003: 81).83 This also makes her more lustful (Brulé 2003: 87, 
96), and as a result modesty and chastity (sōphrosynē)84 are the primary female 
virtues towards which a woman must work. These are virtues that are 
particularly suited to the life in private and can therefore be characterised as 
private virtues.85 
                                                
83 Plato’s Tim. is again in agreement: not only is the woman’s soul cowardly, it is also immoral 
(91a). 
84 Sōphrosynē is a virtue properly attributed to both men and women, but it means different 
things for each sex (North 1977: 36-37). 
85 Cf. the popular anecdote about Theano, who was putting on her cloak and accidentally 
exposed her arm. A (male) bystander commented, “Your arm is beautiful”, to which she 
replied, “But it is not public” (fr., tr. Plant 2004: 70; Plutarch, Conj. praec. 142c). 
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In Rome even more than in Greece the virtue of chastity for women was 
proclaimed loudly in their myths and the role of women in religion, but here 
chastity becomes a virtue of public importance. The tales of Lucretia and 
Verginia, who both died when their chastity was taken from them or under 
threat, and the important roles they play in the subsequent historical 
development of Rome – Lucretia as catalyst for the overthrow of the Roman 
monarchy and the establishment of the Republic, Verginia as the catalyst for 
the plebeian revolt that leads to the institution of the plebiscita – underscores 
the importance of female chastity to the most basic structure of Roman society 
(cf. Liv. 1.57.9-60.12; 3.45-50). Female chastity, a most private virtue, is thus 
publicised – not only in myth, but in religious institutions such as the Vestal 
Virgins, who also play a central role in the upholding of Roman ideals and 
whose chastity also plays a large part in the formation of Roman history and 
custom in the stories of Rhea Silvia and Tarpeia. Female chastity was so central 
to the ideological identity of the early Roman woman that they are said to have 
formed entire cults around it, including the cult of Pudicitia, Fortuna Muliebris, 
Pudicitia Patricia and Pudicitia Plebeia (Henry & James 2012: 92). 
As a virtue, chastity belongs almost exclusively to women, and in fact we find 
evidence in both Greece and Rome of prostitution and state-sanctioned brothels 
(Henry & James 2012: 91). Men are not required to stay faithful to their wives, 
and in fact are praised for visiting brothels and thereby keeping citizen women 
pure and chaste (i.e. by not interfering with other men’s wives; Hor. Sat. 1.2.30-
35). Virtue in the Classical Period and during the early history of Rome 
(including the Republic) is thus gendered in the same way spaces in Classical 
Athens were in many ways gendered (Pomeroy 1975: 78). It is thus possible to 
loosely categorise virtue in ideological terms as male-female : public-private. 
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Towards the Imperial period it becomes increasingly difficult to uphold this 
strict categorisation of gender and space, as space becomes much more loosely 
defined, and even the traditional categorisation of virtue sees a slight shift. We 
have seen cases of women lauded for bravery, intelligence, military cunning, 
medical knowledge, philosophy, and literary prowess. We have also seen the 
virtues of women enter the public sphere and carve out for themselves in 
Roman society a legitimate (though strongly contested) space. During the same 
time, philosophies such as Stoicism and Epicureanism that view the place of 
women in society quite differently to the groundwork lain by their predecessors 
gain influence in the Graeco-Roman world. These philosophical traditions 
inevitably play a role in Plutarch’s own formation of the image of the ideal 
woman.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
PLUTARCH’S PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK 
It is well known and oft-proclaimed that Plutarch was a Platonist (Baltes 2007: 
416; Tatum 2012: 5364; cf. also Russell 1973). We can with relative certainty say 
that Plato was a major influence in the works of Plutarch, but claiming that 
other traditions did not also play a role in the formation of his philosophy 
would be to misunderstand the spirit of philosophy in the ancient world. It is 
abundantly clear that Plutarch was not only aware of the existence of different 
philosophical schools, but often interacted with them in his writings. As a result 
we can be certain that Plutarch was well acquainted with the theories of 
different schools of thought, especially the Stoics, Epicureans and Skeptics, and 
we can clearly see how extensive his knowledge was from works such as Virt. 
mor., Suav. viv., Stoic. rep. and Adv. Col. A number of other lost works indicate 
a far greater scope: Whether He Who Suspends Judgment on Everything is Led to 
Inaction, On What Heraclitus Maintained, On Empedocles, On the Cyrenaics, On the 
Difference between Pyrrhonians and Academics, and On Aristotle’s Topics. 
A number of Plutarch’s works also deal with Platonic philosophy, and it is clear 
that Plutarch considered himself a Platonist (Dillon 2014: 61). Works such as 
Quaest. Plat., An. procr., Is. Os. and Amat. are concerned with Plato’s 
metaphysics, whilst such lost works as Where are the Forms?, How Matter 
Participates in the Forms: It Constitutes the Primary Bodies, On the World’s Having 
Come into Beginning According to Plato, On Matter and On the Fifth Substance 
likely dealt with similar topics. Furthermore, Plutarch makes frequent reference 
to Plato and is not shy to let his readers know that he may be considered an 
expert on the subject. These references occur also in works related to women, 
and as such it will be useful to attempt to discern exactly how Plutarch 
interpreted Plato’s philosophy, and what this means for his views on women. 
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Furthermore, other aspects of ancient philosophy will likely also play a role in 
our understanding of Plutarch’s philosophy. The Hellenistic tradition of 
eclecticism must be considered carefully, as must the practical and popular 
philosophy of (especially, but not exclusively) the third century BCE onwards 
and so too the notion of “personal philosophy” recently put forward by 
Elizabeth Asmis (2014: 128). Only when we have considered the implications of 
these concepts and the practices that accompany them on Plutarch’s own 
philosophy can we with any degree of success attempt to reconstruct his 
intellectual framework. 
3.1. ECLECTICISM, PRACTICAL-, POPULAR- AND PERSONAL PHILOSOPHY 
The separation of eclecticism, practical philosophy, popular philosophy and 
personal philosophy is not a clear and well-defined one, and often one or more 
of these terms overlap in the service of a goal. This goal is to be free from 
disturbance and to attain a state of eudaimonia (in some traditions characterised 
as ataraxia). Ethics in the ancient world is therefore very practical, as ancient 
moral philosophers were concerned with the problems of daily life, the very 
real human problems that each person must face (Nussbaum 1994: 3). In the 
ancient world philosophy is not only an academic exercise concerned with 
theoretical problems, nor is it the case that only the results of the philosophical 
enterprise are applied in social context, but rather that the entire philosophical 
endeavour is from the outset a practical matter (Trapp 2014: 43). In fact, it is the 
duty of the philosopher to share the insight gained from theoretical philosophy 
with his fellow citizens in order to lead them on the path to a better life. 86 To 
this end even Epicurus, notorious for his abstention from public life, made 
exceptions (Roskam & Van der Stockt 2011: 7). 
                                                
86 This practice is known as ‘psychagogy’, and will be discussed in detail in chapter 4. 
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Practical ethics therefore attempts to popularise philosophy for the general 
public, in effect blurring to the point of completely obscuring the boundary 
between practical- and popular philosophy.87 The basis of scholarship on 
practical ethics lies, according to Lieve van Hoof, in Konrat Ziegler’s immensely 
influential Realencyclopädie article (1951), which first made the distinction 
between Plutarch’s technical and other works and what Ziegler termed his 
Popularphilosophie (van Hoof 2014: 136). The term emerged from the 
philosophical project of a group of German philosophers during the 
Enlightenment, whose aim was the moral education and spiritual growth of the 
general public. They saw themselves as directly in opposition to the rationalism 
and sense of social seclusion that dominated German academic philosophy at 
the time (Van der Stockt 2011: 19-20). Popularphilosophie had, in both 
methodology and aim, much in common with ancient popular philosophy and 
eclecticism. 
Popular philosophy is aimed at an audience with little technical philosophical 
knowledge; this audience for Plutarch primarily consists of politicians and 
educated men (Tu. san. 122d-e) who need practical advice on a variety of 
subjects including care of the self, relations with friends and family and 
professional activities (van Hoof 2014: 138). According to van Hoof, this is not 
an audience of laymen that includes slaves, but rather a highly elite group of 
men who are not philosophers (2014: 142; cf. Thom 2012: 284-85; Roskam & Van 
                                                
87 Pelling (2011: 41) notes the difficulty of categorizing Plutarch’s works as either ‘popular 
philosophy’ or ‘practical ethics’, bringing to light the close association between the two 
categories. His account of popular philosophy (2011: 41-50), while far-ranging, is narrow in 
scope, focusing only on popular philosophy in the sphere of politics. The conclusion that “any 
‘popular philosophy’ or ‘wisdom’ should not be that popular, and certainly not vulgar”, since 
“men engaged in public affairs need to exploit the people’s superstition and ensure it serves 
the public good” is therefore problematic, since it implicitly assumes that Plutarch is writing 
only for men in government and ignores the (aspects of the) texts aimed at a female audience. 
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der Stockt 2011: 8). Pelling also expands the audience to a larger group of 
educated men, but excludes the general population, especially those who will 
not take part in politics (2011: 57). Both Huizenga and Morgan disagree, 
arguing that a much wider, non-specialised audience is exposed to these texts 
(Huizenga 2013: 55; Morgan 2007: 4).88 The problems facing the audience of 
popular philosophical texts are real and immediate and the philosopher is 
considered someone with special skill in proposing practical solutions exactly 
because of his technical knowledge of philosophy and his ability to deliver this 
knowledge to a non-specialised audience. The popular philosopher is the one 
who can take his theoretical philosophical knowledge and transpose it into 
‘common sense’ wisdom – the kind of wisdom that someone may struggle to 
reach on their own because of barriers imposed by flatterers, too much wealth 
or ambition (Pelling 2011: 57). It is the responsibility of the philosopher to help 
his audience overcome these barriers which stand in the way of their 
eudaimonia, and to offer them practical advice on how to do so. 
According to van Hoof, Plutarch does not take a protreptic approach to his 
practical ethics (unlike his contemporaries such as Musonius Rufus and 
Epictetus) but rather a paraenetic approach:89 instead of attempting to convince 
his audience of their folly in pursuing a certain goal, he suggests ways in which 
the reader may achieve his goals and reach fulfilment (2014: 142). Describing 
Plutarch’s work in such binary terms is problematic, as it disregards Plutarch’s 
work on and for women in a social context. Assigning Plutarch’s work to the 
category of paraenetic assumes only what I have described in section 2.1 as the 
“primary audience”, i.e. that audience of educated elite men and women who 
                                                
88 For a more complete discussion of Plutarch’s audience, including the women some of these 
texts may have reached, see Chapter 2. 
89 In modern scholarship protreptic is generally characterised by the aim at conversion, while 
paraenetic aims at confirmation of belief (Kotzé 2011: 5-6). 
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have already been trained in philosophy and therefore likely do not need to be 
convinced of philosophical ideas on gender roles. The language of many of 
Plutarch’s popular-philosophical texts does not support such a categorisation. 
Though they are highly rhetorical, they are also easily understood, and there is 
a marked difference between the philosophical language of a work such as 
Amat. and that of Conj. praec., with the former for example containing far more 
technical philosophical language than the latter. This indicates a wider scope 
for the latter text, which also contains elements of psychagogy. 
We must therefore consider the secondary audience, those with non-
specialised, non-technical philosophical knowledge (if any at all), and the 
purpose of the text on this level. When the social context is taken into account, 
it may be that here the text functions as protreptic. Plutarch’s works may 
therefore, like many texts, function as both paraenesis and protrepsis – 
reinforcing the (philosophical) beliefs and foundations of the primary audience 
while aiming at convincing the secondary audience that philosophy has 
something useful to offer them (cf. Kotzé 2011: 7). 
It is this approach to his practical ethics that makes Plutarch’s popular 
philosophy seem somewhat ‘eclectic’. His attempt to lead his audience to a 
fulfilled life requires that he use references and ideas from various 
philosophical schools whenever he needs to and in whatever way suits him. 
The message Plutarch’s practical ethics thus conveys, both consciously and 
rather successfully, is not that one school or the other may help the reader with 
her problems, but rather that philosophy as a whole holds some benefits for 
those that study it (van Hoof 2014: 143). This should not be taken to mean that 
Plutarch engages with his sources uncritically, in fact, he is very careful to select 
only what he deems suitable. 
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Eclecticism itself rests on the idea that the philosopher selects the best and most 
worthwhile doctrines from each school and builds from them a “new” 
philosophy.90 Often this meant that the philosopher started from the general 
framework of one philosophical tradition, in Plutarch’s case Platonism, and 
then incorporated ideas from Stoicism, Skepticism and so forth into the 
formation of their own philosophy (Thom 2012: 282). The label ‘eclectic’ itself 
may not strictly speaking be applicable to Plutarch, as it is generally applied to 
philosophers who do not fit quite snugly into any philosophical school (Asmis 
2014: 127). Plutarch is easily identifiable as in the broad sense being a Platonist, 
but it is useful to keep eclecticism in mind especially when it comes to his ethics. 
The application of the concept of eclecticism to philosophies such as Plutarch’s 
has however been questioned (Frede 2015; Thom 2012: 282) and attempts have 
been made to supply more apt terms for this phenomenon. Along this line 
Elizabeth Asmis has suggested that what is generally considered ‘eclectic’ 
philosophy may be characterised rather as ‘personal philosophy’ (2014: 128). 
According to Asmis a personal philosophy is much like an eclectic philosophy 
but stands in opposition to the school and to popular philosophy and thereby 
is inherently private. In forming a personal philosophy, a person must examine 
the theories and positions of several schools and select from them what fits her 
own life according to her own judgment. Asmis identifies five features of 
personal philosophy, namely that it is critical, oriented toward the past, far-
ranging, constructive, and integrated with one’s life (2014: 129). In this way, 
she says, personal philosophy may be identified in many ways with eclecticism 
                                                
90 It is this feature of eclecticism and Popularphilosophie which gave it the reputation of 
unsystematic and non-rigorous philosophy, and by the late 18th century caused it to be 
discarded by the most influential thinkers of the time, including Kant (Ruth 2015). For a 
thorough overview of the history and development of the concept of ‘eclecticism’ from 
antiquity onwards, see Donini (1988: 15-33). 
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generally, but whereas eclecticism seems impersonal, Asmis lays special 
emphasis on the aspects of originality and individuality, which she considers 
central to personal philosophies.  
It may be useful to identify Plutarch’s gender ethics as an exercise in building 
personal philosophies were it not that the practice of psychagogy is centred not 
only on the care of the self, but also on the care of others. While a personal 
philosophy thus looks inward and is private, Plutarch’s psychagogy for women 
functions both in the former sense as well as in the outward sense and as such 
it is public. As a result we may describe it as popular, practical and ‘eclectic’, 
but it cannot be personal. It is interesting to note that Plutarch does suggest that 
one section of his audience formulate their own personal philosophies in Conj. 
praec. (“Pollianus… you already possess sufficient maturity to study 
philosophy… beautify your character with the aid of discourses which are 
attended by logical demonstration and mature deliberation”; 145b), but he 
cannot formulate these personal philosophies for them. This section of the 
audience is furthermore strictly speaking male, and Plutarch addresses his 
advice on forming and evaluating philosophies strictly to the husband (and 
presumably to the primary audience). Women are neither expected to nor is it 
recommended that they form their own personal philosophies. On the contrary, 
their philosophies are chosen for them: “for your wife you must collect from 
every source what is useful… and make the best of these doctrines her favourite 
and familiar themes” (Conj. praec. 145b-c). 
Though the notion of a personal philosophy may therefore not be directly 
applicable to Plutarch’s psychagogic practice for women, it is clear that while 
he works from a Platonic basis, the influence of eclecticism cannot be denied. It 
would be impossible to form a clear idea of what Plutarch’s view on the 
philosophical ability of women and their proper place in society is without 
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taking his other philosophical influences into account and attempting to situate 
them within his primary philosophical framework: his relation to Platonism. 
3.2. PLATO’S WOMAN 
Perhaps the most challenging aspect of Plutarch’s interpretation of Plato’s 
Woman is that even today scholars cannot agree on what exactly Plato himself 
thought of (the ability of) women.91 Research into Plato’s views on women has 
placed him on wide spectrum from liberal (Calvert 1975; Vlastos 1994) or even 
radical (Taylor 2012: 83)92 to extremely conservative and even actively harmful 
(Buchan 1999).93 Plato has been famously, or perhaps rather notoriously, 
credited with being the proto-feminist (Lucas 1973: 161; 1990: 223; Vlastos 1989: 
277; 1994: 11), and Rosenthal went so far as to declare that “the feminism of 
Plato is exemplary and unparalleled in philosophy or political theory” (1973: 
32). One of the earliest proponents of this view was Vlastos, whose argument 
rests on a social constructivist basis that holds that women aren’t inherently 
flawed but rather bred by society into flawed beings (1994: 17-18). Vlastos 
believed that this was enough to explain the variation in Plato’s views found 
between the Resp. and the Leg., and Annas agrees on the basis that the former 
text presents an ideal state and the latter text attempts to present a state which 
may be achievable. According to Annas, when Plato loses faith in the ideal 
                                                
91 “Among contemporary women’s liberationists, Plato is beginning to emerge as something 
of a hero” (Calvert 1975: 231). Annas disagrees with this view: “…it is quite wrong to think of 
Plato as ‘the first feminist’. His arguments are unacceptable to a feminist, and the proposals 
made in Resp. V are irrelevant to the contemporary debate” (1976: 307; reprinted 1996: 3ff). 
92 Taylor (2012: 83) does not necessarily agree with such an interpretation, but does suggest 
that the abolition of the family in the Resp. (book 5) is in line with contemporary radical 
feminism and thus may be construed that way. 
93 Buchan (1999: 123) argues that Plato’s guardian women are chosen for their breeding 
prospects and little more, and that ultimately his position radically disempowers women by 
denying them their femininity and sexuality and consigning them to the role of glorified child-
bearers. 
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state’s attainability, his view on the possibility of a radically higher level of 
social participation for women changes too (1996: 12). 
Annas does not however agree with Vlastos that Plato’s views can be brought 
in line with the ideas of contemporary feminism. In her view, he assigns equal 
education and equal roles in government to women and men in the guardian 
class not because he is concerned about human rights, but because he is 
concerned with the well-being of the state (1996: 3-12). Plato does not even 
attempt to argue that his proposals for women’s participation in society are just, 
nor does he expand his proposals beyond the guardian class (Annas 1996: 9-
10). Taylor points out that Plato came of age in a time when political factions 
within Athens’ elite caused great civil strife, the rule of the Thirty Tyrants and 
ultimately the death of his mentor, Socrates. Abolishing private property 
(which in the Resp. includes women and children)94 and families is Plato’s way 
of attempting to stabilise the political climate of the polis (Taylor 2012: 82).95 
Taylor is not the only scholar to have noted that Plato takes issue with the 
agonistic culture of the Athenian elite. Brown discusses it extensively as well, 
along with Plato’s polemic against sophism, and argues that he is attempting 
to subvert the traditional masculine discourse of the polis (1988: 594-97). He 
does this by speaking of philosophy as a lover, and referring to the love of 
philosophy as a passion (Brown 1988: 606).96 Brown also argues that Plato’s 
                                                
94 “…concerning the acquisition of wives and marriages and the begetting of children… friends 
have all things in common.” (Resp. 423c-424a; tr. Shorey 1937). 
95 Taylor (2012: 85) argues that the ultimate goal of Plato’s ideal state is individual self-
fulfillment (eudaimonia) through the principles of justice and the preservation of the state, but 
that he is wrong to believe that the state of the Resp. can attain that goal because it ignores the 
need for individual autonomy. 
96 See Phdr. 249d-e, Resp. 490b, and Symp. 175. 
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characterisation of philosophy as a woman97 is an important part of his 
subversive tactic. Herein the highest pursuit, love of wisdom and truth, has 
become feminine. The acquisition of wisdom and truth is facilitated by loving 
another’s beauty, which in Athens tends to imply homosexual/ pederastic love, 
but this love cannot consummate true love. Plato thus makes the entire 
philosophical endeavour female, just as Socrates is taught about erōs by a 
woman, Diotima, in the Symposium (1988: 607-08). By doing this he leaves 
behind the Western philosophical rationalism, traditionally characterised as 
masculine, he is said to have founded (Brown 1988: 608-09).98 This subversive 
attitude towards the Athenian construction of masculinity, says Brown, stems 
from a concern for “ethical politics and philosophy, not its consequences for 
women” (1988: 599). 
As a result of this ambiguity that seems inherent in Plato’s political philosophy, 
his assessment of the nature of Woman seems more nuanced than it is in much 
of the contemporary literature. Levin argues that Plato does not simply take a 
negative view on women, but instead allows for types of women, some good 
and some bad (1996: 22-23). In accordance with his theory of the tripartite soul, 
Plato does admit that Woman has the ability to be rational, i.e. for the rational 
                                                
97 Brown (1988: 595) does not elaborate on how she sees Plato’s characterization of philosophy 
as being female, nor does she explain why she thinks that it is female souls that finally gain 
access to the forms; one assumes that this case rests on the gender of the nouns ἡ ϕιλοσοϕία 
and ἡ ψυχή. Dillon (1985: 107-108) warns against reading too much into grammatical 
femininity, since it does not always translate into what he calls ‘functional femininity’. 
98 While I find Brown’s characterization of philosophy as female problematic and 
underdeveloped, there is an interesting aspect which she seems to allude to here, namely that 
she considers Plato against homosexual love: “Plato ultimately proscribes male homosexual 
intercourse and Socrates refuses the sexual advances of his beloved Alcibiades (Symp. 219)” 
(1988: 607). The logical inference is that the only valid intercourse is that between a man and 
a woman, presumably for procreation. The Resp.’s policies on sexual relations support this 
inference (458e, 461a-e). Plutarch expands on this in Amat. by attempting to legitimise female 
erōs within the Platonic framework.  
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element in the soul to be dominant, just as it is possible for male souls to be 
ruled by the appetitive or spirited elements. In the ideal polis of the Resp., 
women and men alike will be educated in philosophy so that they may learn to 
control these elements of their souls (Levin 1996: 24-25). Because souls are 
inherently sexless (and in fact not bound to human beings), Levin believes that 
Woman must have the same ability to attain virtue as Man does (1996: 29-30). 
Like many arguments on Plato’s Woman, Levin makes good points, but some 
aspects do not sit as easily as others. While it is true that Plato could easily have 
rendered Diotima a man (Levin 1996: 30), he could also easily have left out the 
concession at Resp. 455d that men are better at all tasks than women. The 
suggestion that Plato therefore does consider Woman equal to Man still seems 
somewhat unlikely. 
The debate on Plato’s Woman is by no means settled, but there is one aspect of 
his treatment of the subject which is very difficult to deny: he believes that 
women are fundamentally inferior to men, even though their souls possess the 
same capacity for virtue. In both the Resp. and the Leg. as well as elsewhere 
Plato explicitly expresses this view. Tim. 90e-91a states that men who choose 
cowardly or immoral lives in their first incarnations are reincarnated as women 
in their second lives. Women are therefore born at a disadvantage by having 
souls that have shown moral weakness. The Resp. builds on and complexifies 
this notion of women’s inferiority (reinforced at Resp. 451d-e and 455c-d) by 
claiming that the differences between Man and Woman are biological, but they 
have the same moral capacity as men because they have the same souls (Resp. 
545e). The implication is that the path to virtue is much more difficult for 
Woman, though Plato does not state that it is impossible. The Leg. also 
proclaims unequivocally that women are in all things weaker and inferior to 
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men (781b, 805a, 813e).99 At the same time, the argument that women as a class 
is inferior to men as a class does allow for the caveat that “many women… are 
better than many men in many things” (Resp. 455d), and it is this concession 
which allows them entry into the guardian class and equal education. 
Ethically, Plato’s views are further complicated. In the Meno, Socrates expounds 
on the definition of virtue by arguing that virtue is the same in all people of all 
ages and genders (72c-73d). This argument is used within the framework that 
each person should apply her or his virtue within the proper sphere; Man’s 
virtue is to govern a state, Woman’s virtue is to manage a household (73a-b; cf. 
71e-72a).100 Whether virtue is available to Woman in the same degree as it is to 
Man is another question altogether. Scaltsas argues that according to Socrates 
(who she believes in this case especially was a major influence on Plato) virtue 
does not allow for degrees; one either possesses virtue fully or one does not 
(1992: 126-27). On this basis she argues that virtue is degendered in Plato, and 
therefore that Woman’s virtue can be applied in the public sphere. It is this that 
allows Plato to give the women of the Resp. access to the guardian class (1992: 
127-28). 
Not everyone agrees that Plato is so generous towards women, and some have 
taken the position of women as inferior to men as the starting point for a 
reconciliation of his views on women. According to Allen such a conciliation is 
quite possible: women have the same souls as men and therefore they have the 
same moral capacity. As such they should be educated in the same way as men, 
not only because they have the same moral capacity, but because these souls 
                                                
99 Eide (2002: 107-08) proposes that the passage at Leg. 781b is commonly misunderstood when 
it is taken to mean that including women in public life will double the lawgiver’s task. Instead, 
he suggests on the basis of textual evidence that it means that the lawgiver’s task will be more 
than doubled by the inclusion of women because of their nature, which is shy and unequipped 
for public life. 
100 Cf. Xen. Oec. 7.14-15. 
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have shown a natural weakness and therefore need instruction the most. To 
deny them education is harming the state more than the legislators realise 
(1975: 132-136). Furthermore, Allen argues that Plato considers guardian 
women above worker men, even though a guardian man would still be superior 
to a guardian woman (1975: 136). This is certainly not ascribing a feminist view 
to Plato, but it does seem a reasonable conciliation of at least some of the 
disparate views on women found in Plato’s work. 
Allen’s interpretation highlights the complexity of the male-female status-
relationship, and it is reasonable to think that Plutarch would have carefully 
considered these aspects in his reading of Plato and the subsequent formation 
of his own philosophy. It may therefore be possible, and certainly the attempt 
must be made, to reconstruct Plutarch’s reception of Plato’s Woman as 
narrowly as possible from the information available to us. Two of Plutarch’s 
works may be especially useful in this regard: the Amatorius101 and De Iside et 
Osiride. 
3.3. THE FEMININE PRINCIPLE: DE ISIDE ET OSIRIDE AND THE AMATORIUS 
While many of Plutarch’s works contain references to the Platonic corpus, he 
appears to favour some of Plato’s dialogues over others. We know, for example, 
that he held the Timaeus in high regard, and used it extensively to form his 
understanding of Platonic philosophy (Karamanolis 2010). Elsewhere, 
Plutarch’s work is filled with references to Plato, including Conj. praec., which 
makes special reference to the passage in the Resp. which states “that the state 
is most prosperous and happy in which the people hear the words ‘mine’ and 
‘not mine’ most rarely uttered” (Conj. praec. 140e, cf. Resp. 462c, also quoted in 
Amat. 767e). Conj. praec. also refers i.a. to Leg. 729c and 839a. Leg. 729c is a 
                                                
101 Also known as the Eroticus. 
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particularly popular passage in Plutarch; he refers to it again at Mor. 14b, 71b 
and 272c. The passage highlights the importance of living in plain sight 
according to the advice one would have others follow. The Amatorius, a 
‘dialogue’ on the nature of homosexual and heterosexual love (erōs), contains 
further numerous references to Plato’s Phdr., Symp., Leg., Phd., Resp. and the 
Tim., as does De Iside et Osiride. 
Plutarch was clearly very familiar with Plato’s work, and his efforts at 
presenting a unitary interpretation of Plato during a time when the Academy 
was struggling with the legacy the Athenian philosopher had left behind are 
admirable. This project involved using many inherited ideas, but Plutarch’s 
originality should not be underestimated (Bonazzi 2012: 140). Plato’s biggest 
influence on Plutarch is metaphysical. Plutarch shares Plato’s view on the 
immortality of the soul; in the Cons. ux. he tells Timoxena that the soul is 
“imperishable”, and “affected like a captive bird, if it has long been reared in 
the body and has become tamed to this life by many activities and long 
familiarity” it becomes “entangled in the passions and fortunes of this world 
through repeated births” (611e; tr. De Lacy & Einarson 1959; cf. Amat. 764e).102 
He repeats this view again in Is. Os., stating the Platonic belief that immoral 
men are reincarnated into the bodies of certain animals. In this case he is 
discussing sacrifices to the Egyptian demi-god Typhon (Seth), saying that the 
Egyptians do not sacrifice animals if they have a single black or white hair 
because of their belief that “unholy and unrighteous men” are reincarnated 
only into suitable animals (363b-c; tr. Babbit 1936).103  Plutarch warns Clea that 
                                                
102 Cf. for example Gorg. 493a and Crat. 400b-c, both of which refer to the Orphic doctrine of 
σῶµα σῆµα, and Phaed. 70a-72d, which argues that souls are immortal but bodies perishable. 
103 Apparently, because of his ‘red’ colouring, Typhon would only be incarnated into red 
animals, particularly the ass and cattle. The ass apparently deserves to be sacrificed not only 
because of his resemblance in colour to the god, but also because of his behaviour (Is. Os. 363a-
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the myth is obviously not literally true, but allows us a glimpse of the Truth 
(358e-f; cf. Stadter 1999: 175). 
Plutarch identifies Osiris indirectly with the element of water (i.e. order, 
Reason, wisdom and truth; 371b, 377a, and the “active and beneficent power”; 
366b), the ἀρχή which created the elements of fire, earth and air from itself 
(365c). This assigns to Osiris the creative and generative power (364b) and 
essentially conflates his function with that of the demiurge (Brenk 1988: 464). 
Being akin to the element of water, Osiris is also identifiable with moisture, and 
his antithesis is drought. Typhon is therefore associated with fire and any type 
of dry condition such as dry winds (365e) as well as the ocean, which is saline 
and therefore unsuitable for reproduction (i.e. Typhon is disorder, 
intemperance, excess and defect; 371b, 377a). The Nile is the domain of Osiris 
and the land that it fertilises is the body of Isis (i.e. Isis is generation and the 
Receptacle of matter, as well as the reflection of the Forms, Reason and order; 
368b, 377a).104 This union brings forth Horus (air; 366a, and the physical world; 
373e). 
Plutarch refers to Osiris as the creative element, Typhon as the destructive 
element, and Isis as the nurturing element (374d-375a). Both Osiris and Typhon 
are male principles, the former benevolent and the latter malevolent. The 
actions of Osiris are in accord with reason and perfect wisdom, while Typhon 
acts irrationally and impulsively (367e, 371b). Isis, the feminine principle, 
stands between these two and therefore she is neither (367a). At Is. Os. 370f, 
Plutarch refers specifically to Leg. (896e-897d) as the passage he considers to be 
                                                
c). As the evil principle of the World Soul (369e; see below), mortals therefore desire to get rid 
of Typhon by sacrificing his incarnation. 
104 Cf. 365c, where Plutarch says Isis could not find Osiris’ dismembered penis and so instead 
reconstructed it. He uses ὕλη to describe the substance of the penis, which recalls Aristotle’s 
prime matter (ὕλη – also at An. procr. 1022f). Identifying ὕλη with the Receptacle had become 
common in Plutarch’s time (Phillips 2002: 233). 
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Plato’s final word on the principles of creation, rejecting the Timaeus as an 
earlier theory. Here he says Plato sees at least two components of the World 
Soul, one malevolent and one benevolent. A third nature exists and can be 
moved by either of these two, though it leans towards the Good.105 Plutarch 
then attempts to interpret the nature of Isis within this framework. As the 
“female principle of nature”, she is “receptive of every form of generation” and 
the “gentle nurse” (372f). She is neither benevolent nor malevolent, but the 
force of Reason continually acts on her and she is always moving towards the 
Good (cf. 383a).106 As the “all-receptive” nurse, she is also the incubator for evil, 
and therefore she tries to avoid it, since it too has the ability to act on her 
(372f).107 
It is inadvisable to attempt to apply ideas about women directly from the text 
of Is. Os., but it is perhaps possible to extrapolate Plutarch’s conceptualisation 
of female nature. It seems reasonable, for example, to infer that Plutarch 
considered Woman capable of attaining the highest good. If he was indeed in 
agreement with Plato’s theory of metempsychosis, as the Cons. ux. and Amat. 
strongly suggest, Man and Woman necessarily have the same souls and 
therefore the same capability of attaining virtue. By attaining the highest good 
Woman, like Man, has the ability to assimilate herself to god (Is. Os. 351c-d). 
                                                
105 Cf. Tim. 35a, where Plato says that the demiurge blended the third nature, Being, from the 
divisible and indivisible souls, and then blended the three together with the use of Being. 
106 Cf. also 373c, where Plutarch says that Isis bore Apollo, also known as the elder Horus, 
while she was still in Rhea’s womb. The god she bore was imperfect, but for Plutarch this 
indicates again that the female principle always strives towards the Good (Dillon 1985: 212; 
Stadter 1999: 176). 
107 Dillon (1985: 119, 123) argues that Plutarch (along with other Platonists) attempts to 
reconcile the views in the Tim. and the Leg., which are problematic and the cause of much 
debate. He furthermore views Isis as an essentially irrational principle capable of accepting 
the ordering of Reason (i.e. Osiris) (2002: 232-33). Plutarch’s description of this principle 
however suggests that she is not only capable, but prefers the ordering of Reason. 
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Yet he also considers Woman by nature more susceptible to temptation, being 
constantly caught between Good and Evil. For this reason, he says Isis is 
“helpless and without means” and clings to her partner, who is “perfect and 
self-sufficient” (374d).108 Being linked to her male partner keeps her on the path 
to logos, but even so Typhon may force his way in and corrupt her. When this 
has happened she may be regarded as sad and in search of Reason (375a). The 
metaphysical argument in Is. Os. and to a large extent also that of An. procr. 
(both of which identify a good and evil aspect of the world soul) forms the basis 
of Plutarch’s moral psychology. Strong emphasis is placed on the imposition of 
order on the irrational and chaotic element of the soul, though it can never truly 
be defeated (Is. Os. 358d). The aim of the moral life is rather to bring the 
elements into a harmonious relation, as the demiurge did upon creation of the 
World Soul (cf. Opsomer 2007b: 386). 
Opsomer makes the observation in his analysis of the psychological dualism of 
De virtute morali that Plutarch regarded the soul as fundamentally constituted 
of two parts, the rational and irrational, following Plato’s account. The 
irrational aspect of the soul can be further divided into the appetitive and the 
spirited parts, while the rational aspect is indivisible (Opsomer 2007b: 387; cf. 
Tim. 35a; Virt. mor. 441f-442a). In his analysis of Is. Os. Opsomer places little 
focus on the role of Isis. However, from the extent of Plutarch’s description of 
her activities and role in the myth, it would be fair to say that he deemed the 
feminine principle important. It seems probable that Plutarch, in his attempt to 
unify the various doctrines of Plato, considered the World Soul to have the 
same tripartite division as all souls according to the Resp. (435c), a dialogue we 
know he held in high esteem. The bipartite division he discusses in Virt. mor. 
                                                
108 Plutarch uses Plato’s myth on the birth of Love from Poverty and Plenty (Symp. 203b) here. 
In this case ἡ πενία does translate to functional femininity, as the female-ness of Poverty plays 
an integral part in the myth. 
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incorporates elements from the passages in the Resp., but in Is. Os. he makes it 
clear that he favours the Leg. when it comes to the World Soul. For Plutarch, 
Osiris, as Reason, therefore corresponds to the λογιστικόν, while Typhon, as 
Chaos, stands in opposition to him as the ἐπιθυµητικόν (cf. Resp. 439d). Plato 
identifies the third part of the soul, the spirited part, as the θυµοειδές (Resp. 
440e; Virt. mor. 442a), which is caught between the ἐπιθυµητικόν and the 
λογιστικόν (Resp. 439e, 440b). In the just soul it sides with the latter, but in 
unjust souls it sides with the former (Resp. 440b). Plutarch places the θυµοειδές 
closer to the appetitive part of the soul in Virt. mor., but in Is. Os. he views this 
principle as leaning towards the Good.109 
As aspects of the same divisible soul, the description of Isis in Plutarch’s Is. Os. 
is in keeping with the activities of the spirited part of the soul, while Typhon is 
referred to as ἄλογος (e.g. at 371b). Isis throws herself on the coffin of Osiris 
with “such a dreadful wailing” that the youngest son of the king (a bystander) 
dies (357d). In a separate incident shortly afterwards she caresses the coffin 
while weeping, and when a young boy approaches her she gives him such a 
look of anger that he too dies of shock (357e). Horus defeats Typhon, but it is 
Isis who prevented his death and instead set him free (358d, 368f; cf. 371a). 
Plutarch thus equates Isis with the role of “Mediator”110 between good and evil 
(369f). He describes her as leaning towards Reason, but susceptible to the 
influence of the irrational and chaotic, i.e. Typhon. For this reason she does not 
vanquish Typhon, but weakens him, because she desires to maintain a state of 
harmony between the elements, which would not be possible without disorder 
                                                
109 Cf. Adul. amic., which also divides the soul into two parts, and places the spirited part with 
the irrational element (61d).  
110 In this section Plutarch draws on Persian religion and refers to the sage Zoroaster, who 
called good Oromazes and evil Areimanius, while midway between the two stood Mithras, 
also known as “Mediator” (369b). 
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in a moderated form (367a). Plutarch does however at times conflate the traits 
of Isis and Typhon, so that it seems that they could be aspects of the same 
divisible soul, e.g. at 371b, where he says that Typhon is τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ 
παθητικὸν καὶ τιτανικὸν καὶ ἄλογον καὶ ἔµπληκτον (“the part of the soul 
which is impassioned, impulsive, irrational and capricious”). 
As the feminine principle, Isis is repeatedly referred to as the receptacle of the 
creative and generative power of Osiris and of the destructive and chaotic 
power of Typhon. Plutarch does say that she has the ability to move herself to 
action (373c), but only when she is in search of the Good. It’s tempting to see 
Isis as the bearer of offspring, and in some sense that is certainly what Plutarch 
has in mind (e.g. at 366a). Here it is however quite difficult to say that Plutarch 
therefore sees Woman simply as the bearer of children, as Isis’ role is 
metaphysically much more complex than that. She is an essential partner to 
Osiris, who imparts to her the Forms so that she can give them matter and 
distribute them to the world (cf. 375a, 382d). The treatise suggests that Plutarch 
considers Isis as fundamental to this process despite not being the guardian of 
the Forms herself. He also does not discount the essential role of Isis in the birth 
of Horus (the physical world; 373e). Another equally important matter for 
Plutarch is the union of Isis and Osiris, which he sees as part of a divine triad 
with Horus (373ef).111 This theme of male-female union recurs in Amat., where 
Plutarch further discusses Woman’s generative power and the benefits that can 
be gained from heterosexual love. 
Plutarch’s main aim in Amat. is the expansion on and further development of 
some of the central ideas of Platonic erōs. In the dialogue Plutarch develops a 
systematic argument for Woman’s ability to generate erōs (766d-767a) against 
                                                
111 This triad is more akin to the family structure, but within it Isis is the antithesis to Osiris. 
The malevolent aspect of the World Soul no longer features here, but we must assume that the 
Good doesn’t either (Dillon 1985: 119). 
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his opponents’ views that erōs can only occur between men (750c-f). The most 
balanced of the opponents, Protogenes, argues that true (i.e. pederastic) erōs 
brings about a state of virtue through friendship, while the feelings between a 
man and a woman amount to little more than desire (ἐπιθυµία) for pleasure 
(ἡδονή; 750e). Such relationships, like those between men and slaves, are 
devoid of friendship and inspiration, because women (like slaves) are base 
creatures incapable of reaching the state of virtue that erōs inspires (751a-b). 
When Daphnaeus steps in in favour of heterosexual love, he argues that if love 
between men and boys does not destroy friendship, love between a man and a 
woman, which is τῇ φύσει (“natural”), surely does not either (751d). The 
argument for conjugal erōs does not attempt to show that homosexual love is 
illegitimate, but it does assign to it a lower rank (751f). Daphnaeus argues that 
erōs without aphroditē is unfulfilling and will weary quickly (752b). At this point 
Pisias exclaims against the notion that aphroditē is necessary for erōs, and 
maintains that decent women cannot give or receive passionate love (752c). 
Here Plutarch joins the discussion to disagree that marriage should be a union 
devoid of erōs. 
Plutarch does not lay out any arguments against pederasty or homosexual love, 
but from the dialogue it is clear that he favours conjugal (i.e. heterosexual) 
love.112 His arguments for heterosexual love firstly claim that erōs is a divine 
agitation of the soul (756e). Secondly, he focuses on the benefits that can be 
gained from it, which he maintains are the same and even more than can be 
gained from homosexual love: the latter can provide philia, erōs and wisdom, 
but the former can provide those things as well as offspring, therefore it is more 
beneficial. The argument relies on Plutarch showing that Woman is capable of 
                                                
112 Cf. Opsomer (2007a: 156-58, 161-62), who pays some attention to the importance of 
moderation, especially as characterised in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, for Plutarch’s moral 
psychology and the implications this carries for his theory of erōs. 
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philia, erōs and wisdom too, and in doing so he expands on the Platonic doctrine 
of the four types of philia (Tim. 86e-87a; Phdr. 244a; Symp. 179a) to include a 
fifth: philetikon (friendship or affection) which is affection for boys and “decent 
women” (758e-759a; Tsouvala 2014: 196). 
By arguing that women are capable of philia, erōs and wisdom, Plutarch reveals 
to us how he has interpreted Plato’s views on women. Amat. relies heavily on 
Plato’s metaphysics to arrive at some of its most fundamental conclusions, and 
in doing so it characterises erōs as anamnēsis (ὁ Ἔρως ἀνάµνησίς ἐστιν; 764e). 
Plutarch says that the soul gains access to the Realm of Truth through Love, 
which persuades it that Beauty exists in a realm other than the physical. Before 
Love’s intervention, the soul is blinded by the light of the sun (as if it becomes 
drugged or falls into a dream) and therefore forgets what it once knew, thinking 
that the Earth is the only place where beauty and value exists (764e-765d). By 
ascribing to Woman the ability to generate erōs, he ascribes to her a soul capable 
of the greatest good, namely attaining knowledge of the divine Realm of Ideas 
(cf. 769c: “So it is ridiculous to maintain that women have no participation in 
virtue”).113 That women have souls capable of virtue in the same way as men’s 
souls are capable of virtue is also a Platonic idea (cf. Pl. Meno 72c-73d). By 
denying women the capability of attaining virtue Plutarch’s opponents are 
making the mistake of “masculinizing” ethics, an interpretation that Plutarch 
necessarily corrects through his arguments (Barberà 2007: 124). The Realm of 
Truth, Plutarch argues, is genderless and does not discriminate (Barberà 2007: 
129). 
Plutarch also briefly discusses the complex gendered hierarchy by admitting 
that an older, more experienced woman such as Ismenodora, who has 
                                                
113 Plutarch says that there are many instances of women having displayed masculine 
(ἀνδρεῖον) daring and courage, therefore they should not be excluded from displaying 
(presumably also masculine) friendship (769c). 
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kidnapped the young Bacchon with the intention of marrying him, may be 
useful to a younger husband if she is intelligent, virtuous and wise (Amat. 
754d). In all other cases, however, Plutarch asserts that the husband should be 
the leader of the couple (Conj. praec. 139c-d, 142d). Ismenodora’s action in 
kidnapping Bacchon defiantly goes against accepted custom, and in doing so 
effectively shows that women are in fact inspired by divine erōs just as men 
are.114 Throughout Amat. Plutarch continuously assigns to erōs a transformative 
power, and he particularly discusses how erōs makes lovers “gentle and 
amiable” (cf. Conj. praec. 138c; Amat. 757d, 762d). Plutarch does not however 
discuss how (if at all) Man is transformed by erōs. Tsouvala suggests that this 
may be because Plutarch sees an inherent weakness in Woman that can be 
corrected by the power of erōs (2014: 202). If Plutarch interprets Plato’s views 
on women as Allen suggests they could be interpreted, it would seem 
reasonable to assume that Plutarch sees some inherent weakness in Woman, 
and certainly there are other texts which support this claim, most notably the 
psychagogic text Conj. praec., a book of advice for newlyweds that is aimed 
mostly at the bride, suggesting that she needs to work much harder at the 
marriage (and by extension at attaining virtue) than the groom. That he does 
believe that female souls can achieve the same moral standard as male souls is 
however clear. 
The metaphysics of De Iside et Osiride and the Amatorius complement each other 
here. Isis, the feminine principle of nature, is styled as emotive and susceptible 
to forces of chaos, destruction and irrationality, but as the lover of Osiris she 
constantly seeks his presence. When read in conjunction with the Amat., the 
feminine in this case is functional, in that Isis is representative not only of the 
                                                
114 Barberà (2000: 41) argues that Ismenodora’s actions are a radical political statement against 
the sexualisation of ethics, that it is a will to freedom that in effect frees men from the “prison 
they have built themselves with the help of their erratic noûs”. 
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transformative power of Love, but also of Reason. In both Amat. and Is. Os. 
Plutarch identifies Egyptian elements with the heavenly spheres. Isis’ actions 
are motivated by love, and accordingly the Egyptians identify her with the 
moon and consider her a love goddess (Is. Os. 368d-e, 372b; Amat. 764b), while 
Osiris/Eros is identified with the sun because of his creative and generative 
power (Is. Os. 372a-f).115 In Amat. Plutarch makes a clear connection between 
the heavenly bodies and Beauty, which can be attained through the co-
partnership of erōs and logos (764d). By giving Isis the keys to the kingdom, so 
to speak, Plutarch unequivocally makes it clear that the feminine has the ability 
and the moral imperative to attain the greatest good. Yet at the same time his 
reservations are hard to disguise. 
Isis is fundamentally ambivalent at best, even if not wholly irrational (Is. Os. 
374d; Dillon 1985: 119-20). If Isis is the fertile soil for the generation of the Good, 
so too she is receptive of the growth of Evil if she does not take care to avoid it 
(Is. Os. 372f). Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of Plutarch’s account in De Iside 
et Osiride is that Isis and Osiris were deified, while Typhon remained a daemon 
(Is. Os. 362f-363a). Isis (as did Osiris) received her apotheosis because of her 
virtue: αὐτὴ δὲ καὶ Ὄσιρις ἐκ δαιµόνων ἀγαθῶν δι᾽ ἀρετὴν εἰς θεοὺς 
µεταβαλόντες (361e). In the just soul, the feminine principle is therefore 
capable of attaining a state of assimilation to the gods, which is the primary aim 
of psychagogic practice. As male principles, Seth and Osiris may at first glance 
seem to be equals, but Plutarch tells us that Osiris was born to rule (355f, 356b, 
383a; cf. An. procr. 1016b). Reason therefore has an innate ability to triumph 
                                                
115 There is a lacuna in the MSS. of Amat. here, but it is generally accepted that the missing 
section would have identified Aphrodite with the moon. Cf. also Brenk (1988: 462 & 470), who 
notes Plutarch’s reference to the harmonious relationship of the sun (male) and the moon 
(female). The sun is however not identical to Osiris/Eros, but only akin to him insofar as his 
relationship with Isis/Aphrodite facilitates access to the Realm of Truth (Is. Os. 764e).  
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over Disorder and Irrationality, because of its superiority. Only in unjust souls 
where the feminine principle leans towards chaos is Reason overpowered. 
While in Virt. mor. Plutarch places the spirited part of the soul in opposition to 
reason, Is. Os. he describes the activities of the just soul, in which the feminine 
principle chooses the Good over Evil. 
Plato’s metaphysics certainly plays a central role in the formation of Plutarch’s 
ideas about women, ideas he develops on a theoretical level in Is. Os. and Amat. 
The result is an interesting mix of Platonic ideas with Plutarch’s own 
conservative gender ethics, and he finds himself attempting to reconcile these 
ideas in works such as Conj. praec. and throughout the Lives by incorporating 
ideas from other philosophical traditions in order to form a systematic 
programme of moral guidance. 
3.4. PHILOSOPHICAL TOPOI IN PLUTARCH’S WORK 
Middle Platonism had already seen considerable influence from other 
intellectual traditions by the 1st century CE, which may appear to be 
‘eclecticism’, but this label has been rejected recently by scholars (Dillon 2014: 
61). That Plutarch assimilates ideas from Aristotelianism, Stoicism, the 
Pythagoreans and even at times the Cynics is clear from the wide scope of his 
work and the way in which his thought is developed. Dillon claims that 
Plutarch’s ethics follows a fairly consistent Peripatetic doctrine, although “his 
true views are frequently obscured in his more popular ethical treatises, where 
the tradition that he is following is predominantly Cynic-Stoic” (2014: 63). 
Plutarch’s popular-philosophical works do incorporate views from other 
traditions, and therefore his relationship with these other philosophies is 
crucial to our understanding of his views on women, or at least the view he 
aims to popularise. However, it should not be understood that his popular-
philosophical works can be separated from his high-philosophical works on the 
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basis of some methodological or philosophical difference.116 The views Plutarch 
develops in the latter form the basis of the former, while he uses different 
traditions carefully and judiciously to create his psychagogic programme for 
women. As a result, his Platonism plays a fundamental role in his popular-
philosophical works as well, and his engagement with the philosophical 
tradition is careful and critical. The philosophical framework within which 
Plutarch operates often reveals itself unobtrusively, and we find that the only 
philosophical school that Plutarch regularly makes positive reference to is 
Platonism. Despite this, many of his ideas find broad resemblances in other 
traditions, especially Stoicism. Giving advice to women had been a feature of 
popular philosophy from the start of the tradition, and Plutarch certainly had 
an established philosophical basis from which to launch his own psychagogic 
programme. Psychagogy for women often focused on common topoi, adapting 
and expanding the advice within the appropriate philosophical framework. 
Plutarch is no different, as he uses his Platonic foundations to build his own 
version of the ideal Woman. This philosophical framework is evident in ideas 
held about the proper application of virtue. 
In both the Moralia and the Lives, Plutarch develops his conceptual framework 
for the proper virtue of men. Successful men in the ancient world must be 
respectable, and for that he needs a wife who is respectable too. Plutarch 
therefore finds it necessary to develop a concept of virtue that encompasses 
both sexes and their relationship with one another. How should their virtue 
interact in service of a common goal? How is Woman’s virtue different to 
                                                
116 Cf. Bonazzi (2012: 140), who argues that Plutarch throughout his works stressed the 
importance of a combination of theoria and praxis, and did not believe that either one or the 
other should be afforded philosophical primacy. For Plutarch theoria and praxis cannot 
function separately and are in fact ultimately an epistemic unity. It is this notion that 
distinguishes him from the Peripatetics, who regarded things and activities as either theoria or 
praxis (Bonazzi 2012: 147). 
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Man’s? It is impossible for the practical philosopher to subscribe to a strictly 
Platonic doctrine on Woman’s virtues, not only because we have seen the 
difficulty encountered when attempting to reconcile the different views, but 
also because the zeitgeist simply did not allow for it. What we therefore find in 
Plutarch is an attempt to reconcile his broadly Platonic views with the needs of 
his audience. In doing so, he focuses on several topoi common to the philosophy 
of women of his time: harmony, temperance, grief, education, and public 
action.117 Plutarch considers these five aspects crucial to the proper 
development of virtue in Woman. These topoi are common to women’s moral 
education in almost every ancient philosophical tradition. 
3.4.1. Harmony 
Harmony is one of the most frequently recurring themes in Plutarch’s works on 
women. For him, it is especially important for a woman to maintain harmony 
in her home: the theme of Conj. praec. is harmony (ἐµµέλεια; 138c) in the 
household and in marriage, which can be achieved διὰ λόγου καὶ ἁρµονίας 
καὶ φιλοσοφίας (138c). Harmony in the household is the responsibility of both 
parties, but Plutarch approaches the methods by which they may attain marital 
harmony in different ways. For the husband, harmony first and foremost is a 
question of leadership (139d-e, 142e), while it is the wife’s duty to be obedient 
and agreeable (140a). This division of marital obligation extends to the 
bedroom, where the husband takes action and the woman follows – a reversal 
of roles would be considered shameful for both (140d). If her husband has sex 
with prostitutes, concubines and slaves, he must preserve the peace by not 
approaching his wife reeking of another’s perfume (144d), but if he does not 
show this consideration for her, it is her duty to speak nothing of it, and to 
assume that he is acting in her best interest (140b, 144a-b). The virtuous wife is 
                                                
117 These topoi are treated in relative order of importance. I expand on this notion in chapter 5. 
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above all agreeable at all times; by being pleasant and never annoying her 
husband she creates a tranquil atmosphere for the marriage to flourish (141b-c, 
141f, 142a, 143c, 143e, 144a). 
Plutarch’s views on women’s harmony finds parallels elsewhere. According to 
Aristotle, as also to some extent for Plato in the Meno, men and women’s virtues 
differ, that is to say courage in a man is not the same as courage in a woman 
(Politics 1.13.1259b38-1260a7). Similarly, Plutarch seems to suggest that men 
and women do not possess harmony in the same way. For men, harmony 
consists in successful leadership of the state, which must be reflected in the 
harmony of his home (Conj. praec. 144c), while for women harmony is a virtue 
of subservience. Xenophon’s Socrates puts forth a similar view when he argues 
that a household can only function well when both the husband and the wife 
perfom their duties adequately (Oec. 3.16). The husband’s duties involve being 
outdoors, involved in the state and war, while women should spend their time 
indoors. Men who are too involved with women’s work eventually become 
“womanish” (θηλυνοµένων) in body and soul (Oec. 4.2-4). 
The Stoics, the most influential school in the early Imperial period, do not hold 
the same view. For them, harmony in the household is achieved through co-
partnership and collaboration between the husband and wife. The burden of 
harmonious living falls on both parties, though the wife must play her role in 
the household and the husband must play his in the public sphere. Together, 
they make each other’s lives easier (Asmis 1996: 79-80; Muson. fr. 13a-b, 89-
91).118 Hierocles the Stoic shares this view with Musonius (On Marriage, 75-77; 
Household Management, 93-95).119 This is a natural consequence of the Stoic belief 
                                                
118 All references to Musonius are to page numbers (and, where applicable in the case of quotes, 
line numbers) in C.E. Lutz, Musonius Rufus: The Roman Socrates (1947). 
119 All references to Hierocles are to page numbers in I. Ramelli, Hierocles the Stoic: Elements of 
Ethics (2009). 
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that men and women have the same abilities and the same capacity for virtue 
(Muson. fr. 3, 39-40), a view influenced in part by an interpretation of Plato’s 
Resp. (Asmis 1996: 80-81).120 According to Stoics like Musonius, studying 
philosophy will equip women with the skills to be excellent housekeepers. In 
fact, he argues that both husband and wife should be trained in philosophy so 
that they may have understanding, self-control, temperance and justice 
(Muson. fr. 4, 46-47). If both are not naturally disposed to virtue, a marriage 
cannot be harmonious (Muson. fr. 13b, 90-91). 
Plutarch is certainly aware of the Stoic stance on women and their abilities, in 
fact, he refers to a Stoic theory on the mixing of elements in Conj. praec. (142f-
143a). In the passage he says that a married couple should be like the mixture 
of water and wine, inseparable after the fact, and they should consider all 
things between them shared in common. This is reminiscent of Plato’s Resp. 
462c, and the early Stoics such as Zeno and Chrysippus took a view akin to the 
Resp.’s radical proposals, but these views are generally thought to be closer to 
Cynic than Stoic philosophy (Asmis 1996: 68). In any case, Plutarch certainly 
doesn’t think that the husband and wife should regard all things in common in 
quite the same way as the Stoics do; at Conj. praec. 140f he also refers to the 
mixture of water and wine, but here he adds the caveat that “as we call a 
mixture ‘wine’, although the larger of the component parts is water, so the 
property and the estate ought to be said to belong to the husband even though 
the wife contributes the larger share.” For Plutarch, harmony is therefore 
clearly attainable only through the husband’s leadership and the wife’s 
                                                
120 Musonius does not believe that men and women should share all tasks equally, as Plato 
apparently does in the Resp. Instead, he argues that men should do the heavier tasks and 
women the lighter ones, purely on the basis of strength, although he does make room for 
exceptions. Importantly, this only applies to work where strength is an issue, in cases where 
the work is based on virtue, Musonius is clear about his view that he believes both men and 
women are equally suited to the task (Muson. fr. 3, 47). 
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obedience. This sentiment is echoed in Xenophon’s Oeconomicus, where 
Ischomachus praises his wife’s readiness to be obedient in the same breath as 
he praises her masculine intelligence (10.1-2, cf. 10.13). Clearly a masculine 
mind does not free a woman from the constraints of gendered propriety, neither 
for Xenophon, nor for Plutarch. 
Plutarch also makes it very clear that he is aware of the Pythagorean women 
and holds them in high esteem. He uses Theano as an exemplum of moral 
excellence in Conj. praec. (142d), but he focuses specifically on temperance. As 
one of the most woman-friendly schools of ancient philosophy,121 the 
Pythagorean school has left us one of the largest collections of ancient 
philosophical texts by women from any one tradition, although the authenticity 
of many of the works attributed to Pythagorean women, including Theano, 
Phyntis and Perictione, is still a topic of debate. Despite this it is generally 
accepted that the texts would have been recognisable as credible applications 
of Pythagorean philosophy to women’s lives (Plant 2004: 68-69). Cosmic 
harmony, mirrored in moral life, occupied an important place in the 
Pythagorean philosophical doctrine. Thus Perictione and Phyntis write of the 
harmony of the woman: 
It is necessary to consider the harmonious woman full of intelligence and 
moderation. For it is necessary for a soul to be extremely perceptive regarding 
virtue to be just and brave and intelligent and well-decorated with self-
sufficiency and hating baseless opinion. 
Perictione, On the Harmony of Women, 77 
…each virtue is appropriate to a different thing and improves what is receptive 
to it: the virtue of the eyes the eyes, the virtue of the hearing the hearing, the 
virtue of the horse the horse, and the virtue of a man a man. Thus too the virtue 
appropriate to a woman improves a woman. And a woman’s greatest virtue is 
chastity. 
Phyntis, On the Chastity of Women, 84-85 
                                                
121 Initiation into the school was the same for both sexes (Lambropolou 1995: 122). 
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Feminine harmony in Pythagorean terms thus consists of moderation 
(sōphrosynē), intelligence, prudence and temperance (enkrateia). The virtuous 
woman is one who maintains harmony in her soul by seeking and obtaining the 
necessary virtues. By seeking these virtues she can also attain justice, 
reason/intelligence and courage, qualities that men and women share (Phyntis, 
On the Chastity of Women, 84-85; Lambropolou 1995: 124, 129). The true test of a 
woman’s harmony is in her household, which she must keep in a good state by 
being prudent and doing things that are pleasing to her husband, even if this 
means turning a blind eye to his adulterous acts (Theano, Letter to Nicostrate, 
73; Perictione, On the Harmony of Women, 77). 
The Pythagorean theory of harmony extends well beyond the life of the 
virtuous woman, and is well-developed. In other parts of Plutarch’s 
philosophy, especially in Conj. praec., we can see the extent to which ideas of 
harmony from Pythagorean sources has influenced him. He especially regards 
temperance as an important characteristic of the virtuous woman, and an 
invaluable trait if she is to keep her household and her marriage in good order. 
3.4.2. Temperance 
Plutarch’s views on women’s temperance also find parallels in the 
philosophical tradition, particularly in that of the Pythagorean women’s letters. 
In Conj. praec. he tells Eurydice that adornments such as luxurious clothing and 
jewellery will spoil her, and that she should rather decorate herself with her 
character (“dignity, good behaviour, and modesty”; 141e, cf. 142c-d, 144e, 
145b). In these passages he recommends that she stays away from all forms of 
extravagance, including cosmetics, brightly coloured clothing and jewels. Plain 
living features prominently in the philosophy of the Pythagoreans as well. They 
believed that prudence and temperance leads a woman to avoid actively 
seeking out wealth and beautiful material goods, though if she has these 
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already she does not refuse them (Perictione, On the Harmony of Women, 77; 
Lambropolou 1995: 125). The frequent recurrence of temperance in the 
Pythagorean women’s letters makes it clear that it is an important female 
virtue, and women are often discouraged from wearing anything ostentatious 
(Melissa, Letter to Cleareta, 83).122 It is furthermore her duty to manage her 
household in such a manner that she will pass on her sōphrosynē and enkrateia 
to her children, so that her virtue may be reflected in them and so in society 
(Theano, Letter to Euboule, 70).  
Sōphrosynē is the virtue par excellence of women from the Classical Period 
onwards (North 1977: 35). It is telling that Babbit almost always translates the 
noun and its cognates as ‘virtue’, e.g. at Conj. praec. 142a: ἡδέως συνοικῇ καὶ 
µὴ ὀργιζοµένη ὅτι σωφρονεῖ, “she may live pleasantly with him and not be 
cross all the time because she is virtuous”; and at Conj. praec. 142c: οὕτω 
λογίζεσθαι περὶ τῆς σώφρονος καὶ αὐστηρᾶς γυναικός, “so the husband 
must reason about his virtuous and uncompromising wife”. As a female virtue, 
sōphrosynē thus comes to mean more than just “moderation” or “soundness of 
mind”. Instead, it broadly encompasses everything the virtuous woman ought 
to be: quiet, reasonable, a good housekeeper, and temperate (North 1977: 35-
48). Virtue, for a woman, is moderation. 
In philosophy, the concept of sōphrosynē retains the primary meaning of self-
control, soundness of mind, prudence and temperance (LSJ A.II). For Musonius, 
sōphrosynē is a virtue appropriate to both men and women, because if women 
do not possess self-control, they cannot be good housekeepers (Muson. fr. 3, 
41). Having self-control also applies to sexual desires, and thus Musonius says 
that the wife trained in philosophy will be chaste with respect to “unlawful 
love” (ἀφροδισίων παρανόµων; Muson. fr. 3, 41.18). Epictetus similarly 
                                                
122 See also Phyntis, On the Chastity of Women, 85 and Perictione, On the Harmony of Women, 77. 
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criticizes Roman women for misreading Plato’s Republic and using its 
“community of women” as a licence for licentiousness (fr. 15; tr. Oldfather 
1928). He, like Musonius, is not only against adultery in the case of women, but 
even condemns it in the harshest terms in the case of men (Diatr. 2.4; Muson. 
fr. 4, 44-45; Muson. fr. 12, 85-89). The Pythagorean Phyntis also considers 
chastity a virtue more properly attributed to the woman, while courage and 
intelligence are male virtues. This does not exclude the other sex from these 
virtues, but rather assigns virtues according to gendered categories of 
propriety. So a woman’s chastity must be visible through the resemblance of 
her children to her husband (Phyntis, On the Chastity of Women, 85). Plutarch 
seems undecided on this matter; he certainly agrees that women should be 
chaste, but he wavers on the case of male fidelity.123 
The temperate woman also does not indulge in luxuries such as expensive 
clothing, but whereas the Pythagoreans permitted it when they were available, 
some philosophers rejected luxury outright. Perhaps the most extreme example 
is the Cynic Hipparchia, who gave up her wealth and the comfort of her home 
to live a Cynic’s lifestyle on the streets with her husband, the philosopher 
Crates (Diog. Laert. 6.7.97-98; Kennedy 1999: 49). Musonius also says the 
temperate woman avoids luxury ([εἶναι] µὴ πολυτελῆ, µὴ καλλωπίστριαν; 
Muson. fr. 3, 41.19-20).124 Seneca, on the other hand, while clearly of the opinion 
that some women can exercise self-control, sees lack of it as particularly 
womanly (Helv. 14.2). Ischomachus commends his wife’s ability to control her 
appetite (σωφρονεῖν, Xen. Oec. 7.14), and calls it a virtue applicable to both 
                                                
123 Plutarch’s opinion on the matter of male and female adultery and sexual indulgence will be 
discussed in detail in chapter 5. 
124 Epictetus also dismisses love of finery as a vain attempt to disguise shortcomings of 
character in general, and one must assume that this applies to both men and women (Diatr. 
3.1). 
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men and women (Oec. 7.6, 7.14-15). Many of these arguments rest on the basis 
of women’s ability, and the qualities they need in order to be a good 
housekeeper. 
Plutarch’s ethics have recently been identified as following an especially 
Peripatetic doctrine (Dillon 2014: 61; Becchi 2014: 73), although an in-depth 
study on the influence of the Peripatetic tradition on Plutarch has not yet been 
done. There have so far been no studies on how Plutarch’s Aristotelian ethics 
may have influenced his views on women, and most scholars do not consider 
this a question at all. The greatest influence on Plutarch’s work seems to come 
from the development of ideas sprung from the Nicomachean Ethics, in 
particular the Doctrine of the Mean. Plutarch continuously lays emphasis on 
the importance of education for moral advancement, as in Conj. praec. 145d-f 
and in Demetr. 1.4. Through education and reason one may achieve moderation 
(Becchi 2014: 74), which not only men must master in order to rule well, but 
women must master in order to become virtuous. Conj. praec. places moderation 
in terms of modesty and temperance at the centre of a woman’s virtue, bringing 
the Aristotelian doctrine in relation with the Pythagorean principle of harmony. 
3.4.3. Education 
By the 1st century CE many philosophers do not deny that women possess at 
least some intellectual and moral ability, though the debate as to what that 
ability is and what its proper application is carries on. For most philosophers, 
as for Plato and Aristotle, women are particularly suited to running the 
household and performing domestic tasks. Women must therefore be educated 
in order to become good housekeepers (cf. Xen. Oec. 3.11), and philosophy can 
equip them better than any other type of education. 
Plutarch’s Eurydice is certainly educated, and his opinion of her knowledge of 
philosophy is positive, as he clearly believes that this will equip her with the 
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tools to run her household and serve her husband (138c-d). On this point 
Musonius agrees, saying that philosophy will make a woman σώφρονα, 
δικαίαν, and ἀνδρειοτέραν (Muson. fr. 3, 40.18-33). These are qualities that she 
needs to be a good mother and housekeeper, and philosophy will furthermore 
teach her to be content with the life she has been given (Muson. fr. 3, 42). Stoic 
attitudes towards women have historically been described as fairly egalitarian; 
they believed that men and women possessed the same virtues and moral 
capabilities (Nussbaum 1994: 322-324; Engel 2003: 269).125 It is therefore not 
entirely surprising that Seneca wrote two Consolations to women, and that both 
of them admit by their very nature that women’s education is not out of place 
in the Stoic framework. Yet Seneca seems wary of women’s ability and use of 
their education, accusing them of “wear[ing] out their eloquence in lending it 
to others” (Helv. 14.2; tr. Basore 1932) and “womanish weakness of mind” 
(Marc. 1.1; tr. Basore 1932). According to him, the great majority of women 
misuse the education they receive, and display it carelessly (Helv. 17.4). Thus 
he tells Marcia that she may be able to overcome her grief despite being a woman 
(Marc. 16.1), and one of the things that may help her do so is the study of 
philosophy (Helv. 17.3; Marc. 4.2).  
3.4.4. Grief 
Consolatio was a popular literary form in antiquity, though not many of the 
extant examples are adressed to women (Wilcox 2006: 75). Plutarch’s Cons. ux. 
is one such a rare example, as are Seneca’s letters to Helvia and Marcia. These 
letters have a single addressee, though often they have a larger audience in 
mind and as such are edited and published after their initial correspondence 
(Wilcox 2006: 75). Their aim is to lead the woman through her grief with 
                                                
125 Cf. the contrasting view of Philodemus, who appears to deem women weaker than men, 
though it is unclear whether he considers this a natural or cultural vice (Lib. 22a; Tsouna 2007: 
109). 
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minimal display of impropriety; they are consolatory, but a large part of the 
message is that if she could only bear her grief like a man, it wouldn’t be so 
hard (Sen. Helv. 16.5; Marc. 12.5-15.3).126 
As a result of their lack of self-control, grief affects women more than men (Sen. 
Marc. 7.3). Women who are educated, especially those who are educated in 
philosophy, should therefore be able to learn to be moderate in everything, 
even in grief (Muson. fr. 3, 40; Sen. Marc. 3.4; Plut. Cons. ux. 609a). Plutarch also 
asks Timoxena to control her emotions (Cons. ux. 608c) and commends her for 
her moderate display during the period since the death of their daughter (608f). 
The Cons. ux. has a strong Stoic influence and shows many parallels with ideals 
of exemplary grief (Wilcox 2006; Baltussen 2009: 78-80). Both Plutarch and 
Seneca elevate motherhood and warn their addressee against the perception 
that they regret having had children (Cons. ux. 610d; Sen. Helv. 19.7), both bid 
that they be content with their lot (Cons. ux. 610e; Sen. Marc. 12.1), and both 
caution against immoderate displays of grief (Cons. ux. 609f; Sen. Marc. 7.1, 
19.1). Furthermore, they also commend their addressee for her past exemplary 
behaviour, not only in grieving loved ones (Cons. ux. 608f, 609d; Sen. Marc. 1.2; 
Helv. 2.4-5), but also in temperance and moderation in dress (Cons. ux. 609a; 
Sen. Helv. 16.3). While Plutarch’s Cons. ux. bears strong resemblances to Stoic 
consolatory letters, aspects of other philosophical traditions are also present in 
the letter, most notably Platonism.127 
However, despite his proselytising against the Epicureans, Plutarch cannot 
help but find some small point of agreement in the Cons. ux. when he tells 
Timoxena that life before the birth of their daughter and life after her death will 
                                                
126 Despite his comments about womanish behaviour, Seneca does admit that grief touches 
some men and causes them to brood and linger on it (Marc. 1.1). 
127 Platonism, in particular metempsychosis, in the Cons. ux. is discussed more fully above. 
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be no different (610d; cf. Diog. Laert. 10.124-127). This argument is usually used 
with reference to the deceased, who did not exist before and no longer exist 
after life, but Plutarch deems it fitting to apply it to the living too (Baltussen 
2009: 87). The appeal to memory, whether fond or not, as a mechanism which 
may help one overcome grief is also an Epicurean notion (Cons. ux. 610e; Diog. 
Laert. 10.22). A common theme in Consolatio is the public perception of 
women’s actions, and thus Plutarch commends Timoxena for not having made 
a grandiose public display of her mourning (Cons. ux. 608f4). This is a recurring 
topos especially in the Lives, where how a woman grieves is often held up as a 
barometer for her virtue. 
3.4.5. Public action 
Women’s appearance in public in the 1st century CE was not an unusual 
occurrence, nor was their participation in certain systems of government, 
economic activities, and religious rituals.128 Plutarch does not however suggest 
that Eurydice goes out and joins the increasing numbers of publically and 
visibly active women. On the contrary, he strongly urges her to remain at home, 
to be quiet and to let her husband handle their public affairs (Conj. praec. 139c, 
142d30-32; cf. Xen. Oec. 7.21-22, 7.30, 11.13-20). 
 Musonius would appear to be the most likely candidate to endorse women’s 
public action, since he is eager to agree that they posess equal virtue as men 
and should also be taught philosophy. Yet he does not advocate that women go 
out and participate in public life with men, but rather that they apply what they 
have learnt through philosophy practically in order to run their household well 
and to serve their husbands (Muson. fr. 3, 41-43). He in fact anticipates the 
criticism that such an educated woman will abandon her home in favour of 
                                                
128 See chapter 2 for a thorough overview of the socio-economic and political status of women in the 
1st century C.E., specifically 2.3.2. and 2.3.3., which compares the ideological view of women with 
what is known about the historical accuracy of this view. 
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joining in the public debates of men and counters that exactly because of her 
education such a woman will know what her proper duty is. If she therefore 
does engage in discussion with men she will do so only to improve her virtue’s 
practical application: housekeeping (Muson. fr. 3, 42-43; fr. 4, 46-49). Seneca 
similarly disapproves of women who are too visible. He lauds Helvia’s sister 
for escaping a province notorious for gossip’s notice for sixteen years (Helv. 
19.7). He can scarcely think of greater praise, and makes disparaging remarks 
about women who use their sons to gain power that they ought not to have 
(Helv. 14.3), and who employ their education for public display (Helv. 17.4). 
Yet not all philosophers relegate women firmly and only to indoor work. Even 
Musonius admits that there are exceptions, cases when women might be fit to 
undertake outdoor tasks, though they are more suited to staying indoors (fr. 4, 
46-47). Hierocles also makes provision for women doing traditional male tasks 
like working in the fields, arguing that in a marriage where all responsibility is 
shared, husband and wife should be able to assist one another in all their duties 
(Household Management, 93-95). Both Hierocles and Musonius insist that where 
virtue is concerned men and women should be assigned the same tasks (Ramelli 
2009: 129). Hierocles’s focus is however geared toward the practical running of 
the household and the tasks related to it, while Musonius pays particular 
attention to the development and application of virtue (Ramelli 2009: 130). 
Engel rightly notes that Hierocles does not extend his argument to the public 
sphere at large, i.e. politics and warfare, and while some might take the passage 
to be a marker of Hierocles’ gender equity, this interpretation is unlikely. The 
only reason Hierocles extends women’s knowledge to agricultural work is in 
order to fulfil her duty as subordinate to her husband (2003: 284-285).129 In the 
                                                
129 Cf. Ramelli (2009: 134-135), who agrees with Engel. Engel eventually concludes that 
feminism and Stoicism are “not just contingently, but essentially incompatible” (2003: 288). 
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Stoic framework there is thus no place for women in politics, but this is not true 
of women in all philosophical traditions. 
Strikingly, the Pythagorean woman is not necessarily excluded from a public 
life. Perictione writes: 
From this there comes great benefit for a woman, for herself as well as her 
husband and children and her house, often too for her city, if such a woman 
rules cities and peoples, as we see in kingdoms. 
(On the Harmony of Women, 76) 
The possibility of female involvement in politics does not seem outrageous or 
far-fetched to the writer of this treatise, because the Pythagorean woman has 
the ability to curb the lustfulness which plagues her sex and thus achieve the 
same moral status as man. Even so, the household is the woman’s most 
important duty, as Perictione makes clear. According to Phyntis politics and 
public speaking are male activities, while women should concern themselves 
with the household (On the Chastity of Women, 85). The Cynics, who also 
proclaimed women’s equal ability, is the only tradition from which there is an 
example of a woman, Hipparchia, participating with her husband in all of his 
activities, including going to dinner parties and engaging other philosophers 
in debate (Diog. Laert. 6.7.97-98). Hipparchia and her husband Crates lived on 
the street, however, and involvement in politics was not for them a concern for 
them at all. Bosman suggests that  the Cynic maxim attributed to Diogenes, “[I 
am a] citizen of the world”, may be read positively as individual self-
expression, and carries some political, social and economic weight (2007: 32-
34). With this in mind, one might surmise that Cynics considered women at 
least as fit as men to participate in politics, should they deem it necessary, 
especially since they placed no emphasis on women as housekeepers. 
If we are then to surmise that Plutarch’s popular-philosophical works follow a 
predominantly Cynic-Stoic tradition, as Dillon suggests (2014: 63), how do we 
reconcile those texts aimed specifically at women with this view? Perhaps it is 
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possible that these works do not meet the criteria for “popular-ethical” texts at 
all. In order to establish whether we are truly dealing with texts aiming at the 
moral education of women, they must first be tested against the known features 
of other ancient psychagogic literature.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PSYCHAGOGY 
Thus far we have only briefly touched on aspects of psychagogy as points of 
reference in the preceding discussions. It is however necessary to gain a full 
understanding of the concept and practice of psychagogy in order to continue 
towards our goal. What then, is psychagogy, and how does its application 
influence Plutarch’s Woman? It is also necessary to determine whether 
Plutarch’s works can be classified as psychagogy, and which works do not 
qualify for such a classification. 
First and foremost, it will be useful to situate psychagogy within the greater 
context of ancient philosophy. The project of ancient philosophy may be 
characterized as an attempt to examine the structure of nature, both internal 
and external to human experience. For many philosophers this served the final 
purpose of clarifying how we ought to interact with the world, and how we 
might ultimately attain eudaimonia through aretē. It is widely acknowledged 
that ancient philosophy does not concern itself incidentally with the fulfilled 
life, but in fact is geared towards the attainment of this moral ideal (I. Hadot 
1986: 444; P. Hadot 1995: 83; Vegge 2008: 49; Thom 2012: 281). Philosophy for 
the ancient Greeks and Romans is thus as much a way of life as it is an 
intellectual exercise,130 and from the early Pythagoreans onwards we find a 
tendency towards living life according to certain guidelines that are designed 
to lead the philosopher on her journey towards fulfilment. Developing a set of 
‘guidelines’ for achieving eudaimonia seems a natural step in a tradition which 
takes great pride in the education of others, so eventually the practice of leading 
                                                
130 Foucault (2005: 316) also draws the link between practical and theoretical knowledge, both 
of which are equally necessary for philosophical training aimed at attaining virtue.  
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students to arēte developed into a therapeutic system. This practice is known in 
modern scholarship as ‘psychagogy’,131 although some scholars refer to it as 
‘psychotherapy’ (Gill 1985: 321), the ‘care of the self’ (epimeleia heautou; Maier 
1994: 719; also in Foucault 2005, 2015), and the ‘cure of the soul’ (Kolbet 2010). 
This kind of philosophy as healing praxis has been compared to the modern 
practice of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (Overholser 2010). 
Aspects of psychagogy can be found in almost all major philosophers’ work, 
and is especially prevalent during the Hellenistic era and the early Roman 
Empire, as well as in early Christian literature.132 Philosophers such as Seneca, 
Lucretius and Plutarch focus extensively on the moral education of their 
audience (Thom 2012: 281; cf. I. Hadot 1969 & P. Hadot 1995). The philosopher 
will in this respect act as the teacher, or psychagogue (‘spiritual guide’; I. Hadot 
1986: 445), in charge of his student’s moral progress (Vegge 2008: 54). In order 
to achieve their goal, a set of methods and educational strategies was developed 
over the course of several centuries of philosophical practice. These strategies 
could often be applied on a textual platform, and are especially common in 
moral epistles (Malherbe 1992: 283-84), such as Plutarch’s Conj. praec. and Cons. 
ux., but also involve some direct interaction between teacher and student. 
Where direct interaction was not possible, letters were considered a good 
replacement in the meanwhile (Malherbe 1986: 79). Plutarch’s Conj. praec.  and 
Cons. ux. may be considered examples of letters with a moral educational 
purpose, since both offer practical and philosophical advice on how to deal 
with commonplace matters such as a new marriage or the death of a young 
child. 
                                                
131 Cf. Rabbow 1954: 17 & 301n1 on the origin of the term in modern scholarship. 
132 See for example the extensive work done on the topic by Gaden (2002), Glad (1995), I. Hadot 
(1969, 1986), P. Hadot (1995), Huizenga (2013), Kloppenborg (2010), Malherbe (1986, 1992), 
Thom (2012) and Vegge (2008). 
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Inasmuch, therefore, as philosophy is the art of life,133 psychagogy is thus the 
way in which this art can be taught. Psychagogy may therefore seem akin to, 
and perhaps even identical with, pedagogy, but this is not quite the case. 
Foucault describes the distinction between the former and the latter: 
Let us call ‘pedagogical,’ if you like, the transmission of a truth whose function is to 
endow any subject whatever with aptitudes, capabilities, knowledges, and so on, that 
he did not possess before and that he should possess at the end of the pedagogical 
relationship. If, then, we call 'pedagogical' this relationship consisting in endowing 
any subject whomsoever with a series of abilities defined in advance, we can, I think, 
call ‘psychagogical’ the transmission of a truth whose function is not to endow any 
subject whomsoever with abilities, etcetera, but whose function is to modify the mode 
of being of the subject to whom we address ourselves. 
         (2005: 407) 
Psychagogy is therefore a transformational practice of philosophy that is 
concerned with the care of the self, and by extension, with the care of others. 
Ancient psychagogic practice is very close to pedagogy, since both hold its 
participants in a truth-relation to one another. The “obligations of truth”, and 
therefore of parrhēsia, fall on the teacher (the psychagogue/pedagogue), who 
stands in relation to his subject (the student) as both caretaker and role model 
(Foucault 2005: 408). Foucault considers parrhēsia as the absolute prerogative of 
the other party involved in the epimeleia heautou, that is to say the psychagogue 
has the responsibility of truth-telling, while the student has the responsibility 
of listening, and of moral improvement (2005: 334; 2015: 222).134 
Parrhēsia was a common method in ancient psychagogic practice, and it was 
widely believed that frank speech could lead the student to moral 
improvement. As a practice, it is commonly associated with the Cynics, but the 
Epicurean Philodemus wrote the only extant treatise dedicated to the topic 
                                                
133 Cf. Nehamas (1998: 20), who connects the roots of philosophy as the art of life with the 
Socratic-Platonic tradition of irony as pedagogic tool. 
134 This is only the case in ancient philosophy, and Foucault is quite interested in why later 
Christianity inverts this tradition by making parrhēsia the obligation of the supplicant by 
requiring truth-telling not just of sins, but of every thought (2015: 220-221). 
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(Tsouna 2007: 91). The practice of parrhēsia presupposes a relationship between 
the psychagogue and the student that is built on trust (Tsouna 2007: 94). Lack 
of trust corrodes the therapeutic value of parrhēsia, and therefore it is the 
psychagogue’s duty to establish the foundation of his motives clearly and to 
inspire confidence in his ability and authority.135 In Adul. amic. Plutarch warns 
against flatterers (οἱ κόλακες) who imitate the actions of friendship by putting 
on an air of parrhēsia (51c-d). In the section that follows he advises how to 
distinguish between a flatterer and a true friend. Plutarch compares parrhēsia 
to medicine, which does not damage the patient, but has a therapeutic and, 
ultimately, a healing effect (55d; 59d-e; cf. 66b). 
An important aspect of psychagogy, and therefore of parrhēsia, is epideictic 
rhetoric, in which emphasis is especially placed on praise and blame. The goal 
of this strategy is to present on the one hand an idealized vision of the student 
in order to inspire her to imitate this version of herself, and on the other hand 
to induce a sense of shame at her own shortcomings in order to inspire her to 
become a better person (Vegge 2008: 56-59). In doing so the psychagogue might 
employ parrhēsia based on the disposition of the student: those who are more 
in need of treatment or who are less inclined to accept it are given harsher 
criticisms (Phld. Lib. 7.1-10). Corrective criticism is always applied on an 
individual basis, and even in its mildest form must involve some level of 
discomfort on the part of the student in order to be effective (Tsouna 2007: 96). 
The harshest form of corrective criticism is applied when the student’s moral 
failing is particularly egregious. In this case the psychagogue does not only 
respond with criticism, but also with anger. Such a response must necessarily 
be tailored to the student, taking into account her progress thus far and her 
                                                
135 Malherbe (1992: 285) refers to Seneca’s frequent usage of himself as an example of virtuous 
behaviour. The efficacy of this tactic is fundamentally based on the authority of the 
psychagogue. 
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general emotional disposition (Tsouna 2007: 97-98).136 Philodemus believes that 
women are less inclined to accept parrhēsia graciously, because they are 
suspicious, oversensitive, and too concerned with their reputation (Lib. 22a). 
However, women who truly wish to advance morally should receive the same 
treatment as men (Tsouna 2007: 109). On the other hand, the philosopher will 
use praise, usually at the same time as blame, as a method of emotional support 
during the therapeutic process (Tsouna 2007: 98). Unlike blame, praise gives 
the good psychagogue pleasure, though he does not shy away from using blame 
if need be (Tsouna 2007: 111-13). In the Cons. ux. Plutarch warns Timoxena 
against excessive display of grief, but also praises her past moderate behaviour 
in grief and in general (608c, 608f-609b). This strategy is evident in the 
conclusion to the Conj. praec. as well. Plutarch praises Pollianus at length for 
his knowledge of wisdom and his maturity (145b-d) before turning to Eurydice 
with a brief reference to her love of philosophical sayings during her childhood 
(145e). At the same time Plutarch warns both husband and wife against the 
trappings of excess, aimed primarily at Eurydice’s cultivation of temperance 
(145a-b). The passage reads as a culmination of the preceding cautionary tales, 
and urges the couple to practice temperance and moderation through the study 
of philosophy. Epideictic rhetoric therefore invites the student to 
contemplation by presenting her with the virtues she ought to imitate, and the 
vices she ought to avoid (Duffy 1983: 85; cf. Pl. Menex. 236a-237e). 
Parrhēsia does not only consist of speaking the truth, but also of living it. The 
psychagogue must convince his student(s) that by following the advice he gives 
and the example he sets, she may reach the ultimate goal of psychagogic praxis: 
                                                
136 Malherbe (1992: 302) describes the adverse effects psychagogy can have on the student as 
“confusion, bewilderment, and sometimes depression”, and stresses the need for the 
psychagogue to analyse and treat each student individually. See also I. Hadot (1969: 154-55). 
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assimilation to god (Is. Os. 351c-d; Bonazzi 2012: 149-50).137 Along with 
parrhēsia, there are two other conditions that the psychagogue must fulfil: eunoia 
and epistēmē. Foucault identifies these characteristics from Plato’s Gorg. (486d-
487a; 2015: 229). Only those who are frank in speech, benevolent and who 
possess knowledge are suitable to be psychagogues. In order to facilitate the 
self-transformation and care of others, he must have undergone a 
transformation of his own; he must be more virtuous than his student (I. Hadot 
1986: 447-49; Glad 1995: 53-54). Plutarch disapproves of those who presume to 
admonish or teach others without themselves having advanced knowledge 
(Adul. amic. 71f-72b). While he takes the role of psychagogue for his students, 
he also asks that the husband play his role in the education of his wife by being 
her καθηγητὴς καὶ φιλόσοφος καὶ διδάσκαλος, since he is already more 
educated and therefore further along the path to virtue than she is (145c).138 It 
is therefore crucial that the psychagogue maintains his position of authority by 
being knowledgeable regarding virtue, and by living according to the precepts 
that he would have his students follow (Malherbe 1986: 34-40; 1992: 286).139 
Failure on the part of the psychagogue to maintain this standard of virtuous 
                                                
137 Cf. Sen. Ep. 95.50 (tr. Gummere 1925): “Would you win over the gods? Then be a good man. 
Whoever imitates them, is worshipping them sufficiently.” 
138 The bride would generally be about ten years younger than her husband, assuming he is 
her first. Girls were married between the age of twelve and fifteen on average in aristocratic 
circles, but somewhat later on average in Roman society generally, while men only married 
from their mid-twenties onwards (Hopkins 1965: 326; Shaw 1987: 43-44). Plutarch clearly 
assumes that these cases are the norm and makes little mention of what should happen in a 
marriage to an older woman, or in cases such as the marriage of Ismenodora to Bacchon, in 
which theoretically the bride has more authority, at least for the first few years of the marriage. 
139 Cf. Plutarch’s frequent reference to Leg. 729c (e.g. at Mor. 14b, 71b and 272c), which says that 
the most effective way to train the youth is to “practice what you preach”. Plutarch uses the 
passage to stress the importance of living publically according to the advice one would have 
others follow. 
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living will result in a loss of trust and authority, which will fundamentally and 
perhaps irrevocably damage the teacher-student relationship. 
There is a further aspect of women’s psychagogy that is often overlooked when 
the focus is placed implicitly on the spiritual guidance of men by men (cf. Vegge 
2012, P. Hadot 1995).140 While this practice originated in spheres dominated by 
male discourse, it is not restricted to them. Huizenga (2013) focuses on aspects 
of moral education for women in the Pythagorean and Pastoral Letters and 
shows that there is sufficient indication that these texts serve a psychagogic 
purpose, and thus that the practice of psychagogy can be applied to either 
gender. While this may be the case, Huizenga notes that the practice of 
philosophy is different for men and women, and thus that while the same 
methods may be used for the moral instruction of either gender, the intended 
outcome will be different (2013: 3). 
The biggest obstacle for psychagogy for women is therefore that the 
psychagogue is often not a woman, with the exception of the case of the 
Pythagorean women’s letters. Plutarch joins a long, established tradition of 
male philosophers who believe themselves fit to attend to the spiritual 
guidance of women. To this end Seneca also wrote two letters of consolation to 
women (Ad Marciam and Ad Helviam) to women, counselling them on dealing 
with grief and using the methods of psychagogy to achieve his goal. Several 
fragments of the Stoic Musonius Rufus also deal with moral and educational 
                                                
140 It is especially telling that Pierre Hadot mentions the use of psychagogic methods in 
Plutarch, and goes on to mention specific texts in which these practices may be observed, but 
neglects to include Conj. praec. or the Cons. ux., arguably two of Plutarch’s most important 
moral philosophical texts. What is even more puzzling about the omission of Conj. praec. is 
that it is aimed at both the husband and the wife. Hadot takes a similar view on Seneca and 
omits the Consolation to Marcia (1995: 86). Ilsetraut Hadot (1969: 157) does place brief focus on 
Seneca’s psychagogy for women, and concludes that he sees a fundamental inferiority in them 
which is directly opposed to Stoic doctrine. 
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issues pertaining to women (e.g. frs. 4, 13a, 13b). The psychagogue, in his 
position of power and knowledge, must act as a model of the life his student 
wishes to achieve. Plutarch is well-known and often praised for having lived 
according to his own philosophical teachings (Baltes 2007: 417). A male model 
is however not suitable for emulation by women; the expectations of gendered 
virtue are directly opposed to such a practice.141 Male virtue and female virtue 
is different, that is to say, when we speak of courage in a man and courage in a 
woman, many ancient philosophers may argue that we actually speak of 
different virtues, or they might argue that courage is not a virtue properly 
suitable for a woman. As such, men and women have different experiences of 
virtue. A man cannot be an adequate model and psychagogue for a woman 
without additional help from virtuous women for the simple reason that he 
does not have the lived experience of a woman, and therefore will always be 
unable to fully participate in the psychagogic process. Seneca already 
anticipates criticism on this front: “You forget that you are giving comfort to a 
woman; the examples you cite are of men” (Marc. 16.1). The psychagogue 
therefore finds it necessary to supplement his exemplary self with others that 
are more fitting. Seneca gives Marcia two examples of women dealing with 
grief, “the greatest of your sex and century” (Marc. 2.2), and reinforces this with 
examples of famous men dealing well with grief. 
Plutarch follows the same pattern and makes sure that he provides enough 
suitable exempla for his female audience. In Conj. praec. he offers the following 
positive exempla: an unnamed Spartan woman (140d), Penelope (141a), an 
unnamed Thessalian woman (141c), the women of Egypt (142c), the 
Pythagorean philosopher Theano (142d), Aphrodite of the Eleans (142d), brides 
in Leptis (143b), Hermione (143f), an unnamed woman (144f), his wife 
                                                
141 See chapter 2 on gendered virtue in ancient Greece and Rome, in particular section 2.4. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 109 
Timoxena (145b), Aglaonice (145d), and an assortment of well-known moral 
women (Theano, Cleobulina, Gorgo, Timocleia, Claudia, and Cornelia; 145f) He 
offers some negative examples for comparison: Circe (139a), Pasiphae (139b), 
and Helen (141a), though most of the negative exempla go unnamed (perhaps 
an implicit warning that immorality is not as often rewarded with immortality 
as virtue is). The Mulierum virtutes, a text that extolls the virtues of women, may 
be read as a compendium of exempla, though that is certainly not its only 
function.142 In the Cons. ux. Plutarch holds up his wife Timoxena as a model of 
virtue, offering praise for her past actions in order to inspire her (and his 
audience) to continue acting virtuously (609d-e).  
The use of exempla in psychagogic literature was considered one of the most 
effective methods of spiritual guidance (Malherbe 1992: 282; Quint. Inst. 
12.2.29-30). Generally, they are used to reinforce the will of the student. These 
examples could be historical or mythical, positive or negative (I. Hadot 1986: 
452; Vegge 2008: 114-15). Exempla provided the student with models worthy of 
imitation (µίµησις, ζήλωσις) as well as lively depictions of the kind of life, 
character and actions to be avoided.  The use of examples, or psychagogic 
models, was considered to be more effective when the student basically agreed 
on the moral status of the person-model from the outset (Vegge 2008: 115-17; cf. 
Langlands 2011: 104). It was widely believed that examples could have a direct 
influence on the moral education of a person, because lived experience had a 
stronger impact than mere words (Vegge 2008: 114). 
Exempla are not quite as straightforward as positive and negative, and many 
of them, even in Plutarch’s works, can be judged on a scale. This is part of the 
overall point, as the psychagogue does not simply aim to inform his student as 
                                                
142 The most well-known example in the Mulier. virt. is Cloelia, who was commemorated for 
her bravery on the Via Sacra (250d-f). See also Roller (2004: 28-50) on Cloelia as Roman 
exemplum. 
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to what is good or bad, but to instil the sense of judgement that allows her to 
decide on the moral implications of each action for herself. This use of exempla 
is well-known from historical writing, such as that of Tacitus, who is in turn 
influenced by the Stoic tradition of using exempla for moral education (Turpin 
2008: 360). Plutarch acknowledges the difficulty of judging character in Demetr. 
1.6-8, where he briefly introduces the comparison of Demetrius and Antony. It 
is however not only men whose characters are on display in the Lives. Women 
in the Roman Empire played a great role in the lives of men of power, and as 
such they appear as secondary psychagogic models in Plutarch’s Lives. As 
exempla they are supposed to urge the student to make value judgements on 
their characters. The proper value judgement is however often apparent from 
the outset, as is clear from the presence or absence of certain words which 
indicate moral status.143 
The women of the Lives are always the partners, mothers or daughters of 
powerful men who engage in politics and warfare. As a result a certain 
standard is expected of them, and more often than not their sōphrosynē comes 
under question. Olympias must endure speculation that she has used 
enchantments upon her husband, that she was “the partner of some superior 
being” (τὴν ὁµιλίαν ὡς κρείττονι συνούσης) and participated in Bacchic 
rituals (Alex. 2.2-2.6). Similar charges are made of Pompeia, who used the 
festival of the Bona Dea to consort with her lover. Naturally, these rituals are 
said to have an Orphic element (Caes. 9.1-10.2).144 Caesar divorced Pompeia 
purely on the grounds of suspicion, refusing to remain married to a woman 
whose virtue was under question (11.6). Antony’s third wife, Fulvia, is said to 
have taught Antony to obey women, to Cleopatra’s benefit (Ant. 10.3). This is 
                                                
143 These indicators are examined in more detail in chapter 5. 
144 See chapter 2, especially sections 2.3.1-2 (e.g. at pp. 43-44), on the cultural significance of Orphic 
and Bacchic rituals, which promised women liberation and salvation, and were therefore banned by 
the state. 
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clearly not a good thing, as Plutarch disapproves of women who attempt to 
gain power over their husbands, and of men who let themselves be ruled by 
women (Conj. praec. 139a-b; cf. Ant. 60.1, 62.1). 
Of Cleopatra Plutarch says that she used µαγγανεύµασι καὶ φίλτροις to 
seduce Antony and to avoid persecution (Ant. 25.4). Her opulence is described 
in great detail (Ant. 26.1-2), another trait that Plutarch manifestly disapproves 
of throughout the Conj. praec. (e.g. at 140c, 141a). His portrait of Cleopatra is not 
altogether negative, however, and he does praise her for having a certain sort 
of charm, though he stops short of calling it intellect (Ant. 26.3-4). In contrast 
to this Plutarch has nothing but praise for the beauty, intelligence and dignity 
of Antony’s fourth wife, Octavia, even going so far as calling her “a wonder of 
a woman” (χρῆµα θαυµαστὸν [ὡς λέγεται] γυναικός; Ant. 31.2-3). Cornelia, 
mother of the Gracchi, is similarly praised for being σώφρονα, φιλότεκνον and 
µεγαλόψυχον (Ti. Gracch. 1.4). Plutarch does deliver a rather more subtle 
portrait of Aspasia, who he says had a “rare political wisdom” (ὡς σοφήν τινα 
καὶ πολιτικήν) and was a teacher of rhetoric, despite having been a παλλακὴν 
and being well-known throughout Greece (Per. 24.2-7). Even so he does not go 
so far as to ascribe to her intelligence as such, and certainly not σωφροσύνη. 
The women of the Lives therefore as much as the men have a role to play in the 
psychagogic process. 
Perhaps especially because psychagogy belonged to the realm of philosophy 
and the philosophers, the practice included a selection of ‘intellectual’ methods 
through which the student may attain moral fulfilment. The use of exempla was 
one such intellectual method that necessitated the active involvement of the 
student. Other methods included exercises that the psychagogue prepared for 
the student. According to I. Hadot, the exercises intended for moral 
advancement must be undertaken daily in order to maintain a steady rate of 
progress (1986: 452-53). In fact, the spiritual exercises were designed in such a 
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way as to be suitable for everyday use. In this vein a student may have been 
taught a selection of maxims or precepts which she had to memorize (I. Hadot 
1986: 451). Maxims were considered particularly effective because of their 
concise nature. It was therefore easy for the student to memorize them and 
recall them when she needed them (Thom 2012: 284; I. Hadot 1986: 451). 
Plutarch makes use of both gnōmai and chreiai in his psychagogic works. Gnōmai 
do not refer to a specific person, but are easily generalizable according to the 
situation, while chreiai refer to specific examples and situations (Malherbe 1986: 
109, 111; Lardinois 2000: 642). The use of maxims is therefore closely related to 
the use of exempla, and in both cases it was expected that the student would 
study them so that they can be easily brought to mind when necessary (cf. Xen. 
Oec. 14.4-6). The Lacae. apoph. contains many gnōmai and chreiai that illustrate 
temperance (240e), chastity (240e, 242c-d), and duty (240f, 241a). In Conj. praec. 
Plutarch supplies Eurydice and her husband with several precepts that will 
help them have a successful marriage; this is the primary aim of the text.145 In 
order to make the maxims more easily memorable, he makes use of quotations 
from famous poets, philosophers, and other characters. Presumably Eurydice 
would have been expected to memorise some of these sayings as a shortcut to 
the general moral rule itself. These sayings include a denunciation of the use of 
spells and love potions “you have your magic charms in yourself” (141c), “what 
if I am not virtuous?” (141d),146 and “all women are the same when the lights 
go out” (144f) in reply to an adulterer. In the same vein a teacher often used 
poetry for moral purposes, as it was seen as a good way to introduce students 
to the study of philosophy and a good way to practice moral judgement 
                                                
145 “I have therefore drawn up a compendium for you… putting it in the form of brief 
comparisons that it may be more easily remembered” (138c). 
146 Plutarch suggests that the “ill-favoured” woman ask this when she looks in the mirror. The 
beautiful woman should instead ask, “what if I am virtuous as well?” 
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(Malherbe 1986: 115; cf. Adol. poet. aud. 15e-16a). Plutarch chooses to end Conj. 
praec. (146a) by quoting Sappho’s invective against a rich woman:  
Dead in the tomb shalt thou lie, 
Nor shall there be thought of thee there, 
For in the roses of Pierian fields 
Thou hast no share 
He uses this quotation to exhort Eurydice to a life of virtue through philosophy 
and asceticism, which ought to be her most prized adornments (145f). 
It was common for the psychagogue to suggest that the student refrain from 
living extravagantly by avoiding all forms of luxury and living in accordance 
with nature (I. Hadot 1986: 451; P. Hadot 1995: 83).147 By living frugally the 
student can avoid any temptations that may be a hindrance on the path to 
eudaimonia and can train the body to become less susceptible to desires and 
suffering (I. Hadot 1986: 451). In fact, this kind of suggestion is made for men 
and women generally, but Plutarch takes it to the extreme when he suggests 
that Eurydice should not speak to anyone but her husband (Conj. praec. 142d), 
should have no friends of her own (Conj. praec. 140d, 142d), should shun all 
luxuries (Conj. praec. 139e, 140b, 140c, 141e, 142c; Cons. ux. 608f-609a, 609c-d), 
and should stay indoors (Conj. praec. 139c, 142c). He does not suggest similar 
extremes for men, primarily because the men he writes for are politically active 
men who necessarily go out in public and need to keep up appearances. He 
does however suggest that they be pure and clean (ἁγνοὺς καὶ καθαρεύοντας) 
when they approach their wives (Conj. praec. 144d), or if they are going to 
indulge, they need to do it away from the company of their wives, and the wives 
should accept it as a sign of respect for their virtue (Conj. praec. 140b). Plutarch 
seems to allow for some leeway when it comes to men’s pleasures, but the rule 
                                                
147 Foucault (2005: 317) sees askēsis, the “exercise” of philosophy, as a “practice of truth” which 
does not subject the self to law or custom. Through renunciation of elements outside the self, 
the subject constitutes and affirms the self by way of askēsis (2005: 320). 
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for women is an absolute. This is also reflected in the disproportionate number 
of precepts in Conj. praec. aimed at the bride’s temperance and her virtue in 
general.148 This suggests that the bar is higher and that women must work 
harder to attain eudaimonia. 
Eudaimonia can ultimately be attained through epistēmē, which the psychagogue 
must pass on to and engender in his students (Vegge 2008: 53). Knowledge, 
both of the self, that is the condition of the individual as being in the world and 
yet exercising little control over it, and of philosophical doctrines, play a central 
role in psychagogic practice. As such, it is not enough for the student to simply 
memorize philosophical principles and moral maxims, but she must eventually 
also advance to a deeper understanding of philosophy. Knowledge will free the 
student from naïve superstitions and fear of death (I. Hadot 1986: 445, 452-53; 
Tsouna 2007: 84-85). Self-knowledge can only be gained through critical 
analysis of the self, and thus it is the psychagogue’s duty to advise the student 
to undertake this arduous task. 
Inasmuch as the psychagogue plays the part of a physician who cures the soul 
of its illnesses (Nussbaum 1994: 3),149 it was necessary to identify the nature of 
the illness before a cure could be prescribed, and it was the student’s own 
responsibility to diagnose herself (I. Hadot 1986: 453). Self-diagnosis is 
inherently related to issues of self-control and rationality, both of which are of 
particular importance in psychagogy for women. Because of pre-conceived 
notions that women are naturally less inclined to rational action and 
                                                
148 Temperance is closely connected with shame, a link Plutarch makes in Conj. praec. (144f-
145a) and in Mulier. virt. (249c-d), where the young women of Miletus stopped committing 
suicide in droves on the threat that their corpses would be carried naked through the market-
place on the way to their funerals. 
149 Cf. Plato, Charmides 156bc. The analogy of the philosopher as a physician of the soul is wide-
spread in the ancient world, and it is a link that Plutarch himself also makes in An virt. doc. 
(440a). 
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temperance, they are less likely to self-diagnose. For this reason Plutarch 
recommends that the husband play an active role in his wife’s moral 
advancement by sharing the best philosophical doctrines with her (Conj. praec. 
145a, c, e). By doing so he may be able to avoid that she, having been left to her 
own devices, hatches immoral plans, naïvely falls for superstitious ideas, and 
loses control of her emotions (Conj. praec. 145d-e). 
The process of self-examination is a meditative act that makes the student fully 
aware and in control of the present, which means that each action she 
undertakes is wholly conscious, deliberate and voluntary. Vigilance is thus a 
key factor in the spiritual life (Rabbow 1954: 23-25; P. Hadot 1995: 84-85). 
Meditation also involves imaginative acts of possible scenarios, especially those 
that might present her with moral difficulties, so that she may be ready should 
such an event come to pass (P. Hadot 1995: 85). According to Porphyry, 
Pythagoras recommended meditation twice a day, in the morning and in the 
evening. The purpose of this meditation was to reflect on the events of the day, 
first on what was planned and later on what was achieved, and always with a 
focus on the principles that guided the student’s actions and reactions (I. Hadot 
1986: 453-54; P. Hadot 1995: 85). The meditative act further served to confirm 
and validate the student’s abstinence from worldly goods and cultivate in her 
a contempt for these things. Through meditation she must come to realise that 
eudaimonia cannot be attained through material things, because like all great 
men and women she too must die. The only thing of consequence is therefore 
the state of her soul (Rabbow 1954: 25, 43). 
Self-knowledge is however not sufficient for moral progress, but is dependent 
on the desire to achieve eudaimonia (I. Hadot 1969: 163). Therefore, moral 
progress is ultimately the responsibility of the student, who must participate in 
the therapeutic process actively. The role of the psychagogue in this regard is 
to advise and to reinforce and strengthen the will of the student through the 
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service of friendship (I. Hadot 1969: 165-66).150 According to Philodemus, the 
failure of therapy is ultimately not the fault of the philosopher, but that of the 
student who cannot be cured (Lib. 69.1-8). 
4.1. THE FORMATION OF THE SELF 
The psychagogic process involves a radical change in the mode of being of the 
student, and as such takes great interest in the student’s definition of her 
identity. This becomes more problematic from the Hellenistic period onwards, 
as changes in social structure complexify the status-relationships of individuals 
to others in society. Changes in tradition and public function after the Classical 
Period see marriage diminishing the level of inequality between two partners. 
In the Hellenistic and Roman period the wife gains status as she gains more 
juridical and economic independence.151 In this atmosphere of social upheaval 
it is possible for the woman to radically free herself from traditional constraints, 
even going so far as to contract a marriage with a man of her choice by herself, 
as attested in Roman Egypt (Foucault 1986: 75). In this Foucault sees a marked 
change in social attitudes towards the conjugal couple, which is mirrored in 
their private life (1986: 76). Many scholars have seen this attitude mirrored in 
Plutarch’s work, particularly in the Cons. ux., Conj. praec. and Amat. (e,g. Stadter 
1999: 182; Patterson 1999: 129; Goessler 1999: 115; Tsouvala 2014: 191). 
Furthermore, changes in the political structure of the Hellenistic and Roman 
periods, which facilitated the transition from city-states to monarchies and 
Empire, are mirrored in changes in emphases for moral reflection (Foucault 
1986: 83). Along with the newly reorganised political life came a 
problematisation of the formation of the Self as ethical subject. Now there were 
                                                
150 Rabbow 1954 also pays special attention to the role of the student in her own moral 
education. 
151 These changes in the socio-economic and political status of women in the ancient mediterranean 
are discussed in detail in chapter 2. 
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two ways for the individual to define his identity. The first is by way of a status-
relation to others, i.e. by signs that affirm one’s superiority, such as expensive 
clothing, a well-kept physique, a large and magnificently decorated house, 
conspicuous consumption, and so forth. This method results in a power-
relation over others; by denoting superiority, the individual denotes his ability 
to control. The second method is definition of the Self in relation to the Self. 
Herein the individual becomes the subject of his own actions, and defines 
himself in the sovereignty over his own person (Foucault 1986: 85). 
In the philosophical life and thus in psychagogic practice, emphasis is placed 
on the second method, while the first is rejected. In some cases, such as in 
Epicureanism and Cynicism, public life is therefore rejected in favour of a life 
in private, but it is not necessarily the case that the two are mutually exclusive. 
Rather, the man who defines himself in relation to himself thereby sets the 
conditions for participation in civic life (Foucault 1986: 86). Foucault draws on 
Plutarch’s Praec. ger. rei publ. here to argue that the free man does not engage in 
politics because his social status makes it a foregone conclusion, but because he 
actively chooses the civic life (cf. 798d-e). Engaging in the political act is therefore 
fundamentally a personal act (1986: 87). As a result, psychagogic practice 
encompasses a return to the Self in relation only to oneself, and no longer in 
relation to others. 
Foucault is perhaps mistaken in thinking that the second method of formation 
of the Self is a product of the Hellenistic and Roman forms of government, at 
least in Man (cf. 1986: 88-90). Certainly, there was already an emphasis on the 
importance of enkrateia for rulers in Plato, and Socrates is famous for his askēsis. 
There is a more radical change that happens during this period that Foucault 
leaves implicit, and that is the extension of the possibilities of self-definition to 
Woman. Theoretically, the second method of self-definition, i.e. that of the Self 
to oneself, is valid for both Man and Woman. The changes in social structure 
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during the early Imperial Period afford women more independence. Their 
increased economic activity, public visibility, legal freedom and political 
prowess emancipate them from the constraints of the traditional family life of 
earlier eras. They are no longer simply wives and daughters, but they are 
benefactors and stratēgoi, doctors and mathematicians. The Woman is therefore 
able to define her identity in the same way as the Man as either a status-relation 
to others, or as a sovereign-relation to herself. In becoming the ethical subject 
of her own actions, psychagogy gives Woman the ability to define her identity 
on her own terms, and to set the conditions for participation in public life 
according to her own criteria. According to psychagogic practice, she can only 
do so by engaging critically with philosophy. 
There is, however, a difference in the way Plutarch treats the formation of Self 
in Man and Woman. When he advises Menemachus to remember that the 
statesman is himself also a subject under the authority of the emperor and his 
delegates, he nevertheless strongly disapproves of assuming an attitude of 
servility. Instead, he counsels Menemachus to assume an appropriate air of 
authority and not to refer every small matter to his superiors. By doing so he 
makes the entire local government powerless and will cause the citizens to lose 
respect for him (814f-815c). Unlike his advice to Menemachus, which 
encourages Self-definition in relation to himself (thereby giving him the 
enkrateia to govern virtuously), Plutarch’s psychagogy for women does not 
allow much space for Woman to define her identity in the absence of Man. Her 
identity, for Plutarch, is fundamentally a status-relation to man in which the 
formation of a Self that is the ethical subject of its own actions becomes 
impossible. Woman’s identity is fundamentally linked to that of Man, and as a 
result, Plutarch’s psychagogy steers her clearly in this direction. 
Through the psychagogic process the student is expected to arrive at a new 
understanding of philosophy, and therefore of the world and her place in it. 
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Psychagogy, if it is successful, will transform her into a Woman of virtue, 
allowing her to leave all the imperfections of her sex behind. It is clear that 
Plutarch aims at such a transformative vision in the popular-philosophical texts 
aimed at women. Through the use of psychagogic methods, which are aimed at 
both men and women in these texts, a systematic methodology for the spiritual 
guidance of women is established. What is not clear is whether Plutarch is 
systematic only in methodology, or whether he has in mind some idea of 
Woman on which his psychagogic practice is built and towards which it is 
ultimately geared, and whether he truly believes that this ideal can be attained. 
In the next section we will (re)construct Plutarch’s Woman by closely 
examining the texts, and it is here that we come to the central question of this 
study: who is She?  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PLUTARCH’S WOMAN 
The goal of psychagogic practice is to lead the student to a life of fulfilment, 
which it maintains can be reached through philosophy and virtue. True virtue 
can be found in a likeness to god (cf. Plut. Is. Os. 351c), though psychagogy 
never insists that the pupil must reach this goal. The exercise and therefore the 
life of fulfilment can rather be found in the act of striving towards a life in 
emulation of godlike virtue. Plutarch believes that virtue is a skill that needs to 
be honed. In An virt. doc. he argues that virtue is no different from dancing, 
farming or rhetoric, which are all skills that men learn. That all these things are 
done in service of finding εὖ ζῆν (“the good life”), and yet to suppose that the 
good life cannot also therefore be taught, is ridiculous (439bc). Plutarch also 
places emphasis on the importance of knowledge in acquiring virtue (439d) and 
likens the one who teaches virtue to a physician (440d). For Plutarch, virtue can 
and indeed should be taught if society is to function properly. Marriage is 
mentioned four times in the short essay (439d-f), an indication that knowledge 
of virtue in the domestic sphere is just as important as it is in public affairs. 
Domestic virtue however appears to be a woman’s virtue. There are several 
virtues that Plutarch ascribes to women specifically, vices that he deems them 
particularly susceptible to, and actions that he disapproves of. These virtues, 
described and treated in the Moralia, recur in the Lives, where Plutarch finds it 
difficult to withhold his judgement. We will consider the Moralia first, and then 
turn to the women of the Lives. 
5.1. VIRTUE AND VICE IN THE MORALIA 
Plutarch consistently returns to certain topoi in both the Moralia and in the Lives 
when he writes about the proper behaviour of women. In the Moralia these topoi 
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are presented as the primary virtues that Woman must possess, and vices that 
She must avoid. The treatment of the topoi in both the theoretical- and the 
popular-philosophical texts of the Moralia place one virtue above all others: 
harmony. The role of Isis in Is. Os. is to preserve the harmony of the cosmos. 
Feminine harmony, for Plutarch Woman’s most precious virtue, can only be 
attained by first mastering the other virtues. Temperance is second only to 
harmony, but it can only be achieved through education. The educated woman 
will possess sufficient knowledge to distinguish between virtuous and 
unvirtuous behaviour, and will therefore be able to cultivate temperance and 
ultimately to attain harmony. These are the three most important tenets of a 
virtuous life. Along with this Plutarch identifies three specific actions that a 
woman must abstain from. The first two, use of spells and potions and public 
action, relate to Woman’s proper place in society. A woman who consistently 
displays these two vices manipulates men to their detriment, and is therefore 
not virtuous. Her role is to support men, not to control them. Public action and 
grief can be seen as aspects of temperance, insofar as the woman who appears 
in public and who grieves outwardly is intemperate and therefore not virtuous. 
Without attaining any of these virtues, or abstaining from these vices, Woman 
cannot attain the true female virtue: harmony. 
5.1.1. Harmony 
Plutarch ascribes special importance to two feminine virtues: harmony and 
temperance. While temperance is a familiar female virtue, the emphasis placed 
on the woman’s role in domestic harmony is quite unique in Plutarch. It is a 
theme that recurs whenever he turns to the feminine and the female sphere. 
Harmony is a virtue that Plutarch ascribes particularly to the feminine principle 
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in Is. Os. (369f), and to which he returns in the Conj. praec.152 The aim of the text 
is, according to Plutarch, to “render [husband and wife] gentle and amiable 
toward one another” and to help them attain harmony (ἐµµέλειαν) in their 
marriage through reason, concord, and philosophy (διὰ λόγου καὶ ἁρµονίας 
καὶ φιλοσοφίας; 138c-d).153 
The onus of a harmonious marriage lies almost solely with the bride, who is 
tasked with keeping her household and marriage harmonious as a supporting 
function to her husband. If he does not have to worry about domestic affairs, 
he will be better able to perform his public duties. Thus the wife should eat a 
quince before bed “that the delight from lips and speech should be pleasant and 
harmonious at the outset” (138d). Another precept commands the husband to 
be patient with his wife’s “irritability and unpleasantness” (χαλεπότητα154 καὶ 
ἀηδίαν), because she will likely grow out of it (138e). Precept 14 rather 
ominously suggests that the wife “should have no feeling of her own” but 
should match her mood to that of her husband (139f), advice supported by the 
suggestion in Precept 37 that the sensible wife keeps quiet when her husband 
is angry, but tries to soothe him when he is silent (143c).155 This advice denies 
                                                
152 Cf. Mulier. virt. 246c, where Plutarch praises the Celtic women for acting as the arbiters of 
peace between the factions of the Celts. Here Woman again occupies the role of peacemaker, 
as the feminine principle does in Is. Os. (and again at 253f-254b, 254b-f, 255b-e). 
153 Tsouvala (2014: 191) sees harmony in the marriage as a blending of sexual pleasure and 
reason. She argues that Plutarch holds love and marriage up as a harmonising political 
relationship that transcends “ancestral feuds, philosophical factions, local competitions, and 
any type of discord in the polis and the empire.” 
154 χαλεπότης is often used to described ill-tempered horses (LSJ s.v. II.2). It seems rather apt 
that Plutarch should choose this word to describe a difficult woman, in light of Precept 8, 
which compares the wife to a horse and the husband to its handler (139b). 
155 Beneker (2008: 693-95) also touches on this theme when he discusses the behaviour of Porcia 
in the Brutus. Beneker argues that the wife can be a good partner if she shares in her husband’s 
joys and troubles without being overbearing or overly curious. It is the husband’s choice how 
much he wishes to share with her, and she should respect that. 
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the woman any personhood and demands that she assimilates her Self into that 
of her husband. Precept 18 takes a similar stance in recommending that the wife 
should always be receptive of her husband’s sexual advances, though she 
should never take the initiative in the bedroom (140d), and Precept 39 suggests 
that the wife use the bedroom as a means to avoid and resolve conflict (143e). 
In so doing she may render the marriage bed always gentle and agreeable, and 
not appear either too forward or bad-tempered. 
Several of Plutarch’s maxims are aimed at the wife’s temper, and he especially 
exhorts her to put aside her bad temper and appear “accommodating, 
inoffensive, and agreeable” (141b) to her husband. Precept 40 advises the bride 
to accept her husband’s ill treatment of her on the grounds that if she acted out 
against him, it could get a lot worse (143f-144a), while Precept 27 appeals to the 
authority of Hera in a further attempt to convince the bride that it is her duty 
to be pleasant at all times (141f). Precept 28 carries on the same thread by 
appealing to Plato’s advice to Xenocrates to sacrifice to the Graces (142a). 
Precept 29 brings harmony and temperance together by advising the bride that 
even though she should shy away from all luxuries, she should not be afraid to 
join in laughter with her husband (142b-c). Plutarch takes this opportunity to 
implicitly warn the wife that if she fails in this task and is too disagreeable, her 
husband might turn to other women for comfort. The precept also reads as an 
apologia for some men’s licentious behaviour, by essentially blaming their 
unfaithfulness on their wives’ bad tempers. Precept 16 suggests that a wife 
should accept her husband’s extramarital affairs as a sign of respect for her 
(140b).156 
                                                
156 On this last point Plutarch seems somewhat undecided, as he also suggests in Precept 42 
that both parties should avoid “unholy and unlawful” intercourse, especially if they do not 
wish to gain children from it (144b), and in Precept 44 he suggests that the husband should be 
“pure and clean from all connection with others when they approach their wives” (144d). 
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At all times Plutarch suggests that the wife maintain a state of harmony by 
following the lead of her husband; Precept 8 likens the wife to a horse and the 
husband to its handler (139b; cf. 139d). Precept 20, though at first seemingly in 
favour of equal shares for both parties, also places the husband in charge of all 
matters (141e-f). It is clear that Plutarch deems marital harmony impossible 
without the complete submission of the wife (cf. Lacae. apoph. 242c).157 Even so, 
Plutarch warns the husband not to treat his wife like a piece of property, but to 
govern her with goodwill (142e) and to support her in her philosophical 
education by practicing temperance in her presence (144d).158  
5.1.2. Temperance and shame 
Another major theme of the Conj. praec. is temperance, and while Plutarch 
continuously advises the wife to practice moderation, a deep skepticism of her 
ability to do so reveals itself throughout the text. The very first mention of the 
theme in Precept 7 concerns women’s sexuality, and is not advice, but simply a 
negative statement about the tendency of some women to get bored with 
“uncompromising and virtuous men” (αὐστηροὺς καὶ σώφρονας) and instead 
spend their time with licentious men (139b). Plutarch then returns to the 
question in Precept 10, where he argues that the virtuous woman should 
become even more modest in the nude, and the implication is that she should 
not attempt anything remotely sexual even in her sexual relations with her 
husband. The marriage bed is solely for procreation, and the wife would do 
well to remember that (144b).159 Goessler argues that “there is no trace of 
                                                
157 Goessler (1999: 99), in her analysis of Conj. praec., says a woman’s husband “should be her 
main concern”. 
158 Plutarch frequently refers to Leg. 729c (e.g. at Mor. 14b, 71b) to support his claim that one must live 
publically according to the advice one would have one’s students follow. As intermediate 
psychagogue for his wife, the husband therefore cannot hope to better her education if he does not 
practice temperance in her presence. 
159 Cf. the reference to the “orderly behaviour” of the women of Ceos, who were so well-
behaved that Plutarch says there was not a single case of adultery in 700 years (Mulier. virt. 
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asceticism in Plutarch” but that he approves of sexuality in marriage as its 
natural and necessary emotional basis (1999: 112). This is in keeping with his 
statements in the Amat., e.g. at 769a. What Goessler does not take into account 
is Plutarch’s advice at Precept 18, which denies female sexual agency and urges 
her to suppress her needs yet always be receptive when her husband calls her 
to bed. Plutarch’s view is therefore less favourable to female sexuality in 
marriage than it is to male sexuality; in the case of Woman, temperance and 
restraint is the measure of virtue. 
Precept 12 advises the husband that trying to remove his wife’s luxuries by 
force will only make her more stubborn and will make her cling to them more 
forcefully. Instead he should use reason to convince his wife to practice 
moderation (139e).160 Plutarch strongly suggests that the husband lead by 
example, at least when in the presence of his wife,161 since indulging in luxuries 
himself while expecting her to refrain from them will lead to her seeking 
pleasure elsewhere (140b, 140c, 144d, 145b). Intemperance in couples causes 
strife, which Plutarch demonstrates briefly by juxtaposing Helen and Paris with 
Odysseus and Penelope (141a). The woman is advised to refrain from all 
luxuries, including expensive clothes and jewellery (ἱµάτια καὶ πλόκια τῶν 
πολυτελῶν; 141e; cf. Cons. ux. 609a), gold, emeralds and scarlet (χρυσὸς, 
σµάραγδος, κόκκος; 141e), gold-embroidered shoes, bracelets, anklets, purple, 
and pearls (ὑποδήµατα διάχρυσα... καὶ ψέλλια καὶ περισκελίδας καὶ 
                                                
249d-e). The implication of the passage is that adultery is always the fault of the woman, not 
the man. 
160 Cf. the praise for Gorgo at Lacae. apoph. 240e. 
161 Precept 16 adds the caveat that men who cannot help but indulge should do so away from 
their wives so as to protect their virtue, and advises the bride to accept his behaviour without 
question (140b). 
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πορφύραν καὶ µαργαρίτας; 142c; cf. Cons. ux. 609c, which also mentions 
perfume), and silk (σηρικά; 145f).162 
Women must also be aware that wearing elaborately dyed clothing, jewellery 
and perfumes might annoy their husbands, and therefore they would do better 
to simply refrain from such things (144e). Here Plutarch again brings 
temperance and harmony in connection with one another, and makes it clear 
that the one cannot exist without the other. The passage at Precept 45 likens 
men to bulls who are angered at the sight of red, and the tone mirrors the vague 
threat of physical violence at Precept 40. Contrary to his exclamations of a 
marriage in which the lovers are “gentle and amiable toward each other” (138c), 
these veiled threats instead hint at a domicile that is hostile to any woman who 
dares express herself on her own terms. Plutarch’s Woman is in a loving 
relationship insofar as she manages to keep the peace, but he makes it clear that 
any violent outbursts are her own fault.163 The woman who cannot mollify her 
husband or refrain from trinkets and bright colours is surely not virtuous, and 
therefore deserves whatever treatment her husband sees fit. 
Plutarch believes that a woman without these expensive luxuries will stay at 
home all day (Conj. praec. 142c), though he does not specify why. The 
implication seems to be that she will be ashamed to go out without them, 
though if she was practising temperance by choice and not because her husband 
had deprived her of luxuries, this should surely not be the case. Plutarch seems 
to blatantly ignore the fact that forcefully depriving a woman of luxuries will 
not make the woman more virtuous. Virtue is found in the temperance that is 
                                                
162 Cf. Xen. Oec. 10.2-8, where Ischomachus disapproves of his wife wearing cosmetics, equating it to 
false advertising and trickery. The rhetoric is similar to contemporary popular rhetoric surrounding 
women and cosmetic usage. 
163 Ischomachus tells Socrates that he trains people to be obedient the same way one would train an 
animal to be obedient: by rewarding them for good behaviour, and punishing them for bad 
behaviour (Xen. Oec. 13.6-12). 
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cultivated through the continuous practice of philosophy. The truly virtuous 
Woman will relinquish all thought of extravagance out of recognition that these 
things will not lead her to eudaimonia, but will instead distract her from her 
goal. Reluctant or forced deprivation of luxuries will not create this attitude in 
women, but may instead lead to resentment and wilful disobedience. 
Furthermore, the virtuous Woman will take pride in her modesty and her 
temperance, and as such will surely experience a greater sense of shame if she 
were forced to wear jewels and bright colours than if she were deprived of these 
things. Plutarch’s recommendations make it clear that he does not write with a 
female perspective in mind, nor does he care what the outcome of any female 
actions are except insofar as they affect her husband and her household. 
In any case, a good sense of shame seems in Plutarch’s opinion quite beneficial, 
as he also praises the way the women of Miletus reacted to the threat of having 
their naked bodies carried through the agora if they committed suicide: out of 
shame, they simply ceased to do so (Mulier. virt. 249c-d; cf. Lacae. apoph. 242c). 
McInerney notes that a large number of the exempla in the Mulier. virt. revolve 
around women’s bodies, and often their virtuous action is a result of shame for 
what is improper (2003: 328). As such, Plutarch is clearly of the opinion that 
staying indoors is a good thing for a woman (Conj. praec. 142c),164 since it will 
keep her away from bad influences (145e). He seems to believe that the woman 
should only be in contact with her husband for the majority of the time, and 
that he should lead her further education in philosophy, through which she can 
cultivate temperance (145c).  
                                                
164 Precepts 30 and 32 refer to women staying indoors; the latter uses the Aphrodite of Eleans 
as a symbol of women’s submission. 
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5.1.3. Education 
That Plutarch’s Woman should be educated is undeniable.165 Despite 
Ismenodora’s unconventional actions in the Amat., he has high praise for her 
knowledge and experience, and even argues that she may be useful to her 
young groom (754d). Eurydice in the Conj. praec. is clearly also educated in 
philosophy (138c), and is expected to continue her education in order to be able 
to better handle her marriage (138c-d, 145b-c, 145f).166 Plutarch assumes a broad 
range of knowledge from her on topics that include Plato (140e, 142a, 144f), the 
Stoics (142f), and the Pythagoreans (142d, 145f); mythology (139a, 141a, 141f, 
142d, 144b), history (139e, 141a, 141b-c, 141e, 142c, 143a, 143c, 144a, 144f), 
mathematics (140a) and literature (139c, 139e, 141d, 141e, 143d, 143e, 143f, 144b, 
144c, 145c, 145d, 146a). These are not things that will be unfamiliar to Eurydice, 
as Plutarch states in the opening passages of the letter: 
Of the many admirable themes contained in philosophy, that which deals with 
marriage deserves no less serious attention than any other, for by means of it 
philosophy weaves a spell over those who are entering together into a lifelong 
partnership, and renders them gentle and amiable toward each other. I have 
therefore drawn up a compendium of what you, having been brought up in the 
atmosphere of philosophy, have often heard, putting it in the form of brief 
comparisons that may be more easily remembered... 
 (138c; my emphasis)  
The husband should assist his wife in her further education by selecting 
teachings that are appropriate for her (145c), and by guiding her in every 
aspect, including in the bedroom (145a). It is clear that the woman’s education 
is therefore shaped according to what the prominent man in her life deems 
suitable and necessary for her, because her education is primarily a means to 
an end: the cultivation of the proper female virtues. These virtues are not those 
                                                
165 Cf. Stadter (1999: 173-75), who discusses the level of education of Clea, the addressee of Is. 
Os. and Mulier. virt. According to Stadter, Clea is evidence that the educated Woman is not an 
ideal, but Plutarch’s reality. 
166 Cf. Goessler (1999: 98), who discusses the importance of logos in the marriage. 
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that she may deem necessary or beneficial for her attainment of eudaimonia, but 
those that her husband considers necessary for her to serve him and their 
household most effectively. Education will also prevent the festering of 
untoward ideas and womanly scheming, and will cure a woman of the 
superstitions her gender is prone to, thereby equipping her with the skills to 
keep her marriage harmonious through reason and philosophy and without the 
aid of spells and potions. 
5.1.4. Superstition, spells and potions 
Plutarch does not only focus on aspects of her character the ideal Woman 
should cultivate, but also on vices that women are particularly prone to, and 
that he manifestly disapproves of. Of these, lack of knowledge that leads to 
superstition is a particularly harmful vice, which Plutarch disapproves of to 
such an extent that he wrote an entire treatise, De superstitione, on the subject. 
In the treatise Plutarch argues that superstition is an emotional state of false 
reason caused by fear of the gods and the subsequent belief that they are the 
cause of pain and injury (165c). This inherently makes Woman more susceptible 
to superstition, as she is more prone to irrationality and emotionality. 
Plutarch’s description of the feminine principle in Is. Os. supports such a 
reading (cf. 357d-e),167 and his advice regarding superstition in the Conj. praec. 
all but confirms it. Without education, warns Plutarch, women are prone to 
superstition: 
It is said that no woman ever produced a child without the cooperation of a 
man, yet there are misshapen, fleshlike, uterine growths originating in some 
infection, which develop of themselves and acquire firmness and solidity, and 
are commonly called “moles”. Great care must be taken that this kind of thing 
does not take place in women’s minds. For if they do not receive the seed of 
good doctrines and share with their husbands in intellectual advancement, 
they, left to themselves, conceive many untoward ideas and low designs and 
emotions. 
                                                
167 See section 3.3 for the identification of Isis as the spirited part of the soul. 
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(Conj. praec. 146e) 
The education that the husband shares with his wife therefore plays a central 
role in preventing superstitious beliefs from taking hold, and the implication 
seems to be that without the interference of male reason, the feminine principle 
will rule in the soul of the Woman and will fall under the influence of the 
irrational principle. She therefore needs a male counterpart to guide her on the 
path to virtue. Through knowledge and education she will be able to see 
through superstitious belief and discern the truth, as Plutarch demonstrates 
with the example of Aglaonice, who managed to convince the women of 
Thessaly that she was drawing down the moon because she had a keen 
understanding of the lunar cycle (145d). Women who catch men’s attention are 
easily suspected of using φάρµακα (141c) to entrap them, but if they are 
educated they will be able to show that they have no need for such things (141c). 
The uneducated woman is therefore naturally more likely to be superstitious, 
and to turn to the use of spells and potions in an attempt to manipulate the 
world and her husband. Plutarch wholeheartedly disapproves of women 
worshipping any deities that their husbands do not approve of, as is evident in 
Precept 19, where he argues that she should worship only the same gods as he 
does. Women who do secret rituals or participate in “curious rituals and 
outlandish superstitions” (περιέργοις ... θρησκείαις καὶ ξέναις 
δεισιδαιµονίαις) are heavily discouraged from doing so (140d). He especially 
disapproves of association with Dionysos (βακχεύµασι; Cons. ux. 609a) and the 
worship of Cybele (κυµβάλοις καὶ τυµπάνοις; Conj. praec. 144e) These rituals 
and spells may render their husbands weak and easy to manipulate, but it also 
makes them fools and will garner the wives no goodwill, while relying on her 
character and charm will ensure a great love (139a). As Goessler (1999: 100) 
notes, using spells and potions isn’t simply detrimental to the woman for her 
own sake, as is evident from the example of Circe and Odysseus at 139a. These 
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may make her husband dull-witted and degenerate, but at the end of the 
precept the emphasis is on the respect that Odysseus has for Circe, because she 
has not drugged him. The use of magic is therefore at least as much about the 
woman’s reputation in the eyes of men as it is about her own quality of life. By 
using spells and potions Plutarch believes that women attempt to gain power 
over men (139a), and it is clear that he not only disapproves of female 
empowerment, but also prefers to have a woman at home and removed from 
public matters. 
5.1.5. Public action 
On the issue of women’s participation in public life, Plutarch seems somewhat 
ambivalent. In Conj. praec. he clearly states that a woman should present herself 
only in the company of her husband, while at all other times remaining indoors 
and hidden (139c). At 140d he suggests that a woman should “have no friends 
of her own”, but should rather share her husband’s friends. Nevett takes this 
as a sign that Plutarch allows for married women to socialise with some degree 
of freedom (2002: 82), but either does not recognise, or does not acknowledge, 
the implication that a woman should therefore have no choice over her own 
social circle or personal bonds. She cannot make friends that are not pre-
approved by her husband, and as a result she cannot do or say anything that 
will not be known to him. Not only does he disapprove of women’s visibility 
out of the company of their husbands, but he does not want them to leave the 
house at all. So he seems to suggest that the husband deprive the wife of all 
luxuries (presumably if the force of reason was unsuccessful), in order that she 
may stay at home (ἔνδον; 142c). Not only should she stay indoors, but she 
should not speak to anyone but close relatives: 
Pheidias made the Aphrodite of the Eleans with one foot on a tortoise, to typify 
for womankind keeping at home (οἰκουρίας) and keeping silence (σιωπῆς). For 
a woman ought to do her talking either to her husband or through her husband, 
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and she should not feel aggrieved if, like the flute-player, she makes a more 
impressive sound through a tongue not her own. 
(142d) 
Plutarch uses the Pythagorean philosopher Theano as an exemplum of modest 
female behaviour, who hides her physical self from the public (142d), and 
argues from this point that the virtuous women is not only not seen, but also 
not heard. 
In the Mulier. virt.168 Plutarch takes a somewhat different stance, however, when 
he tells his friend Clea that he disagrees with Thucydides (2.45.2), who says 
that a good woman’s name, like her person, should not be for the public. For 
Plutarch, a good woman remains out of public view, but her reputation should 
be known far and wide – if she is virtuous (242e). He argues that virtue 
manifests differently in different people because of character, disposition, 
culture, and upbringing (243d), and this seems to allow him to come to the 
conclusion that while women should refrain from public action, they may do 
so in rare instances where they are given no other choice. 169 
Many of the examples of women’s virtues involve some sort of domestic action, 
such as the Trojan women deciding that it is time to settle in Italy (243f; cf. 246c, 
248a-d, 259d, 262f-263a). Other examples focus on the role of women in 
supporting their husbands,170 as the Phocian women did when they voted in 
                                                
168 Babbit’s (1931) translation of the title as “Bravery of Women” does not quite fit, nor does it 
do the content justice. A better rendering of the Greek title Γυναικῶν ἀρεταί would be 
“Virtues of Women”. 
169 McInerney (2003: 322-23) discusses the problem that Plutarch creates for himself by 
asserting at the beginning of the Mulier. virt. that men and women’s virtues are the same, but 
then having to avoid describing women as andreia in order to preserve the gendered structure 
of virtue. McInerney argues that the exempla undercut the text’s opening passages by 
portraying a conservative view of female virtue that is at odds with the statement of equal 
virtue. 
170 See also Stadter (1999: 177-79, 182) on the role of women as supporters of men in Mulier. 
virt. 
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favour of the men’s proposal to die should the battle against the Thessalians be 
lost (244b-e; cf. 245a, 246a-b; 246f-247a; 247b-c, 248f, 252a-d, 258d, 261c-d). 
Examples of women taking direct (sometimes violent) action are rare, and even 
then they usually act in defence of free men or their own chastity (245c, 249f, 
250a, 253d-e), or with the help of men (258e-f, 261a-c). At times Plutarch 
ascribes this agency to divine inspiration, as in the case of Telesilla and the 
women of Argos (245e). In doing so he, perhaps not unintentionally, devalues 
the initiative of women and transposes it instead to something beyond their 
control. What results instead is a picture of women as vessels for the actions of 
others. 
The escape of Valeria and Cloelia from the camp of Porsena is described as 
courageous, but ultimately a foolish and somewhat dishonourable act that 
caused more trouble than anything else (250c-f). Plutarch seems torn between 
praising the women for their brave deed and reprimanding them for meddling 
in men’s affairs. Ultimately, it appears that he is somewhat confused by the 
Romans’ admiration for Cloelia, who very nearly ruined their hard work. 
Contrary to this is Pieria, who convinced a suitor to make peace between their 
people in order for them to be together. Plutarch makes it clear that she is 
virtuous and pious; she attends a festival in honour of Artemis where she meets 
Phrygius (253f-254b). Pieria’s actions are not public, her words are spoken in 
private, and the public action is not hers but Phrygius’, even if it is the 
consequence of her deeds. Plutarch glosses over the fact that it is this woman’s 
initiative that has the positive public outcome, and he doesn’t touch the fact 
that in this love affair Pieria made a few very bold choices, for which her 
sexuality must take at least some credit. 
Only in extraordinary circumstances may a woman take public action, and then 
it usually ends badly for her (cf. McInerney 2003: 325). When Lampsace 
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intervenes on behalf of the Phocians, she only does so because her father, the 
king Mandron, is away (255b-c; cf. 262c-d). She dies shortly after of an illness 
(255d). The same fate befalls Polycrite, even though her deed was done in a 
private manner (254f). Aretaphila is a rare example of Plutarch condoning to 
some extent the use of charms and potions against a murderous and brutal 
tyrant (255f-257d). These measures are deemed necessary to free her people, 
and she herself suffers torture for it, which Plutarch says she bore 
courageously. At the accomplishment of her goal he lauds her for declining a 
seat in the government of the people, and instead spending the rest of her life 
“quietly at the loom” (257e).171 
The only woman in Mulier. virt. who undertakes public action for a sustained 
period and is praised for the excellent way in which she does so is the wife of 
Pythes, who remains nameless. She is ordered by her husband to take over his 
duties as ruler because they have no living sons, while he spends the rest of his 
days in his tomb awaiting death. His wife did, however, send him food (263b-
c). It is somewhat ironic that this woman should remain nameless, out of all the 
women in Mulier. virt., almost all of whom are named. Plutarch certainly feels 
that a woman may have the ability to participate in public life, but this does not 
save him from the paradox that she should not. In all things he deems it proper 
for her to be silent and unseen, and cases where she oversteps the boundaries 
of conventional behaviour are necessary exceptions, not the rule. A corrective 
measure is usually needed to redeem her reputation; sometimes it is death, 
while at other times it is the outright refusal of (further) wealth and power. 
Suffering and death, not least of all, is a punishment which she must bear with 
courage and grace, regardless of whether it is her own or that of a loved one. 
                                                
171 For a thorough discussion of Aretaphila, see Blomqvist (1997: 84-85) 
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5.1.6. Grief 
In Mulier. virt., Megisto does not blink at the threat of her child’s death, but 
rather calls on him to bear his death bravely, because it is better to die than to 
live under a despot (252d). Overt and ostentatious lamenting is a sign of 
weakness that Plutarch utterly disapproves of. He advises his wife to keep her 
emotions within bounds after the death of their young daughter (Cons. ux. 
608c), as she has done in the past (608f-609a). Like expensive clothing and 
jewellery, excessive grief should have no place in the virtuous woman’s soul 
(608c). Plutarch seems to believe that the period of grief should be almost non-
existent, since giving in to it briefly will allow it to gain a hold, which it will 
not relinquish (609f-610b). Instead he recommends an attitude of serenity and 
happiness in view of what was gained while the person still lived (608d). 
This type of attitude toward grief is praised elsewhere. Camma does not grieve 
her husband ostentatiously, but rather spends her time in the temple of 
Artemis, waiting for the right time to get revenge on his killer. When she kills 
him, she also does away with herself out of loyalty to her husband (Mulier. virt. 
257f-258c). Timocleia is commended for the noble way she bears the 
misfortunes that have befallen her (259e). A great number of the Sayings of 
Spartan Women are in the same vein, with mothers either declaring pride for 
how bravely their sons fought and died or disowning them for cowardice 
(Lacae. apoph. 240c, 240f, 241a, 241c, 242a, 242b). 
Grief, as with most of Woman’s vices, can be ascribed to a lack of moderation, 
and is ultimately the result of insufficient education. This is however not the 
only explanation that Plutarch offers. Despite his arguments in Amat. that 
Woman has the ability to generate erōs, and the implication that she is therefore 
are equal to Man in virtue, which he states explicitly at 769c, he seems unable 
to convince himself that the feminine principle of the soul will remain 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 136 
uncorrupted if she does not take strict action to avoid the temptation of the 
ἐπιθυµητικόν. That men do not face a similar problem is clear in the way 
Plutarch describes the husband’s duties in Conj. praec. Out of the 47 precepts in 
the treatise, 25 are aimed directly at Eurydice, while only 7 are aimed at 
Pollianus. The latter group mostly focuses on reinforcing the behaviours 
prescribed for Eurydice through her husband’s guidance and education. 
Furthermore, Plutarch’s use of psychagogic models in Conj. praec. is aimed 
almost exclusively at Eurydice, despite the text’s aim at both husband and wife 
(138b-c). Of the 37 exempla in the letter, the large majority (at least 28, a small 
number can be interpreted as either positive or negative) are positive, and 
almost as many are historical. 23 of the exempla are women, highlighting the 
aim of the letter in reinforcing Plutarch’s ideas about gendered virtue.172 The 
characteristics most praised in the female exempla are modesty and chastity 
(Theano twice, Timoxena, an unknown woman, the women of Egypt, the statue 
of Aphrodite of the Eleans by Pheidias, an unknown young Spartan woman), 
virtue (Penelope, Hera, a Thessalian woman) and harmony (Women of Leptis), 
whilst the exempla that are criticised display avarice and licentiousness 
(Pasiphaë, Helen of Troy), manipulation through spells and potions (Circe) and 
being difficult (the wife of “the Roman”, Hermione). The female exempla are 
supplemented by male models that prove the same point: Gorgias is scolded 
for discord, while Philip, generals in Cyrus’ army and an unknown man are 
used to further expand Plutarch’s ideas of the role of the wife in keeping marital 
harmony. At the same time Plutarch presents models of male virtues as 
exempla for Pollianus, featuring sense and reason quite prominently 
(Odysseus, Socrates, Phocion, an unknown man and Plato) and discouraging 
                                                
172 Female examples are never appropriate for men, unless they are used to shame them by 
pointing out how a woman can be virtuous/courageous etc. while the male subject is failing at 
the task. This is a particularly harsh method. 
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hedonism in the general sense (Paris, a young man of Philip’s court, Euripides, 
Gorgias), but making sure there are loopholes for adultery in case the wife 
proves disagreeable (Phocion). 
Even the virtues that are shared by the husband and wife look different when 
ascribed to Eurydice rather than to Pollianus. Harmony, Woman’s most 
fundamental domestic virtue, is also a male virtue, but he possesses it in a 
different way. For Woman, attaining harmony means marital harmony, of 
which she is the primary keeper. In order to preserve or restore harmony to the 
marriage, the wife must be submissive (142e), attentive to the needs of her 
husband (cf. the young Spartan woman who makes no advances towards her 
husband, but submits to his without protest), agreeable (cf. Plato’s advice to 
Xenocrates at 142a and the wife of “the Roman”) and silent when it is not her 
turn to speak (cf. the Aphrodite of the Eleans). For men, on the other hand, 
marital harmony is secondary to state harmony, as the example of Gorgias 
shows. Gorgias must work to keep marital harmony by taking charge of his 
household (cf. 139bd), so that faith in his ability to harmonize the public can be 
restored. Philip, on the other hand, uses reason in the service of harmony when 
he tries to appease his Greek subjects (144a). The same example of Philip is used 
to show how a woman might use submissiveness in aid of marital harmony:  
For it is told that when he was being incited by his friends against the Greeks 
on the ground that they were being well treated, but were speaking ill of him, 
he said, “What would happen, then, if we were to treat them ill?” So when these 
back-biters say, ‘Your husband treats grievously his loving and virtuous wife.’ 
‘Yes, what would happen then, if I were to begin to hate and wrong him?’ 
(144a) 
Therefore, it is Woman’s duty to maintain domestic harmony so that Man can 
maintain state harmony without interference or distress. The Woman that 
emerges from the theoretical- and popular-philosophical works in the Moralia 
is clearly defined. What initially appears to be inconsistencies across the texts 
is in fact a complex web with which Plutarch delineates what is and is not 
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acceptable behaviour for his ideal Woman. Even when he allows for 
extraordinary behaviour, he strictly defines under what circumstances such 
behaviour is appropriate. His psychagogic programme in the Moralia, 
supported by his Platonic metaphysics, aims at leading women to a formation 
of Self that is inseparable from the notion of conjugality that he develops 
alongside it.  
5.2. THE CONJUGAL SELF 
Plutarch’s conception of Woman in the Moralia sees her as being inextricably 
bound up with the conjugal relationship and the well-being of her partner. 
There is no description of a woman who is not at a fundamental level concerned 
with the men in her life. There is no option for her to define her identity in 
relation to herself, because her identity is largely dictated by external factors 
such as her husband’s wishes. Plutarch’s psychagogy sets the conditions for 
Woman’s interaction with the world and with others, it does not allow her to 
set these conditions herself. Her identity must be defined as a status-relation to 
her husband, who is the ethical subject of her actions. In such a strict limitation 
of the freedom to define the self, one must ask whether any act can therefore be 
a personal act, or whether all of Woman’s actions are by definition conjugal 
acts. 
The preservation of virginity before marriage may in this sense be considered 
a conjugal act, since the woman who is not pure will almost surely be rejected 
by her first husband. The preservation of chastity in all instances thereafter is 
always necessarily a conjugal act that preserves the right of the husband to the 
marriage bed. Plutarch denies Woman’s right to share her sexuality even with 
her husband, and demands that she repress it to such an extent that it becomes 
demonised. In this atmosphere, it becomes a radical act of personal freedom for 
the woman to have sex with anyone who is not her husband. By doing so she 
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breaks free from the conditions set for her participation with the world and 
redefines these conditions herself, according to criteria that suit her. Similarly, 
participation in cults, especially those associated with Bacchus and Cybele, 
promised initiates liberation and salvation.173 Plutarch’s psychagogy denies the 
woman any sense of liberation that may be found in these rituals. Taking part 
in mystery religions outside of the marriage does not constitute a conjugal act, 
since the gods are not those shared by the husband as well. 
The conjugal Self therefore stands in a master-slave status-relation to the 
husband. As intermediate psychagogue who must help his wife through her 
philosophical education, he necessarily occupies a position of power in relation 
to her. Because he is not bound by the same rules and is by virtue of his sex 
superior and able to define his identity for himself by himself, Man cannot be 
considered fundamentally bound to the marital unit. His connection to the 
marital unit is, for Plutarch, necessary and beneficial, but even so it is incidental 
and he may choose not to engage in it. Woman does not have the same choice. 
The only legitimate paths are those that define her in relation to Man: either she 
marries, or she becomes a virgin priestess. In marriage, every act she performs 
is for the sake of marital harmony, from mollifying her husband to studying the 
philosophy he chooses for her to grieving moderately. Refusal to perform the 
rituals of conjugality is judged in the strongest terms, and women who fail to 
conform are perceived as deviant. 
The Lives contain many examples of women of both types. With these virtues 
and vices in mind we now turn to the women of the Lives, where we will 
examine how Plutarch deals with the complexities of (female) human nature, 
                                                
173 See the discussion of mystery religions in chapter 2, section 2.3.2. 
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and how these notions of gendered virtue and vice find expression in the 
biographies. 
5.3. THE WOMEN OF THE LIVES 
The Lives are populated by women who play supporting roles to great men. 
They are never the main subject under discussion in a Life; Plutarch only pays 
attention to a woman when she influenced the life of his subject in a significant 
way. We will consider the textual position of some of the most notable women 
in Plutarch’s corpus: Aspasia, Olympias, Cornelia of the Gracchi, Octavia, and 
Cleopatra. These women occupy a range of social positions and therefore may 
offer us the most nuanced view of Plutarch’s biographical treatment of women. 
Aspasia was a metoikos and hetaira in Athens, and the mistress of Pericles. 
Olympias was a Macedonian queen, wife to Philip II and mother to Alexander 
the Great. Cornelia was Roman nobility, daughter of Scipio Africanus and 
mother of Tiberius and Caius Gracchus. Octavia was also a Roman 
noblewoman, the sister of Octavian, who would later become Caesar Augustus, 
and Cleopatra was an Egyptian ruler of Greek descent under Roman 
occupation.174 What stories does he choose to tell, and how does he present these 
influential women? 
Plutarch does not shy away from praising a woman’s intelligence. Cornelia is 
credited with being responsible for the character of the Gracchi; Plutarch says 
that “although confessedly no other Romans were so well-endowed by nature, 
they were thought to owe their virtues more to education than to nature” (Ti. 
Gracch. 1.5; tr. Perrin 1921). Aspasia had a “rare political wisdom” (Per. 24.3), 
though Plutarch does not elaborate on her intelligence, nor does he say that she 
is educated, like Cornelia and Octavia are. Instead, he says that Pericles’ 
                                                
174 Blomqvist (1999: 82) notes that Plutarch treats Aspasia, Olympias and Cleopatra as outsiders 
and barbarians, highlighting the aspects of their characters that were non-Greek. 
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attraction to her was probably erotic rather than intellectual (Blomqvist 1997: 
79), minimising the importance of her intellectual appeal and focusing instead 
on her sexual appeal. He praises Octavia for being beautiful (κάλλει), 
intelligent (νοῦν) and dignified (σεµνότητα; Ant. 31.2). When used of women, 
σεµνότης often means reserve or shyness (LSJ A.II), and thus means that she is 
being praised for knowing her place and not speaking out of turn. 
In contrast to Octavia, Cleopatra is noted for her “subtlety and cleverness in 
conversation” (Ant. 25.2; tr. Perrin 1920), although the negative connotations of 
the adjectives δεινότητα and πανουργίαν should be noted; she could easily be 
described as shrewd and forceful, neither of which are desirable qualities in a 
woman. As in the case of Cleopatra, Plutarch uses δεινότης to describe 
Thargelia, and by extension Aspasia, whom he also says was εὐπρεπής (“good-
looking”), but he does not describe her (as he does Octavia) as κάλλει175 (Per. 
25.2). This may be because her appearance is that of the ‘average’ beauty, but 
Plutarch says the same of Cleopatra and yet still calls her καλλός (Ant. 27.2). 
Perhaps a better explanation derives from Aspasia’s legal status as metic, 
compounded with her history as a hetaira, two factors that make it near 
impossible for her to be considered noble at all, and therefore virtue is for her 
even harder to attain. Seeing as Pericles is said to have attacked Samos on 
Aspasia’s behalf (Per. 24.1, 25.1), this does not reflect well on her (cf. Blomqvist 
1997: 77).176 Cleopatra is καλλός because she is noble, not because she is 
particularly beautiful, as Plutarch makes quite clear. Women who are 
commonly described with negative concepts such as these tend not to be 
                                                
175 Cf. Conj. praec. 141b-d, where Plutarch implies that noble birth and beauty is a great 
advantage to the virtuous woman. 
176 Plutarch also blames the war in Egypt, which he calls inglorious, partly on Caesar’s love for 
Cleopatra (Caes. 48.2). Beneker (2014: 507) disagrees, arguing that Plutarch withholds 
judgment and depicts Caesar as self-controlled and unaffected by the power of erōs.  
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described later on as σώφρων or with any other related concept, no matter how 
much their behaviour changes. 
Cleopatra undergoes the most dramatic transition at the end of the Life of 
Antony, yet her redemption seems small in comparison with the invectives 
against her. Plutarch seems vexed by Cleopatra, as he is forced to admit her 
beauty and nobility (καλλός; Ant. 27.2), but disapproves of her behaviour. As 
such he qualifies the statement about her appearance by remarking that it was 
not incomparable or striking. He also says that she is “haughty and 
astonishingly proud in the matter of beauty” (σοβαρὰν καὶ θαυµαστὸν ὅσον 
ἐπὶ κάλλει; Ant. 73.2), which is by no means a good thing. Plutarch calls Antony 
an appendage (προσθήκη) of “the woman” (τῆς γυναικός; 62.1), and has 
Augustus saying that he has surrendered his authority to her, that he has been 
drugged (φαρµάκων) and that he is no longer his own man (60.1). 
Plutarch’s judgment of a woman’s character becomes most clear when he 
accuses her of using potions and spells to manipulate the people around her. 
He ends the Life of Alexander by speculating that Olympias used drugs 
(φαρµάκοις) to mentally and physically harm Arrhidaeus, a contender to the 
Macedonian throne (Alex. 77.5). He also says that she was suspected of 
practising µαγείας... καὶ φάρµακα on Philip (Alex. 2.4). This kind of action 
tends to be connected to superstition and cultic practices, so Plutarch says 
Olympias pursued the Orphic mysteries ζηλώσασα and βαρβαρικώτερον 
(Alex. 2.6), and accuses her of being χαλεπότης, δυσζήλου and βαρυθύµου 
(Alex. 9.4).177 Aspasia is also described as ζηλώσασαν (Per. 24.2), which Perrin 
translates as “emulation”, though the concept carries many negative 
                                                
177  Carney (2006: 132-35) discusses Plutarch’s depiction of Olympias in the Moralia and the 
Lives in some detail, noting inconsistencies in the stories and concluding that the depiction of 
Olympias in the Alexander as meddling, troublesome witch is hyped up to highlight the 
strength of Alexander’s character. 
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connotations, including “zealous pursuit” (LSJ A.II) and “jealousy” (LSJ A.III), 
even and perhaps especially in the context used here. Even if Plutarch only says 
that Aspasia was emulating or imitating Thargelia, he still likens her to a 
prostitute who infiltrated the high courts of Greece and by means of her beauty 
and talent, sold the Persian cause to men in power (24.2-3). The implicit charge 
against Aspasia is therefore that her sexuality and political wit is the tool with 
which she manipulates men around her, and that Pericles has fallen prey to this 
device. 
Much like Olympias and Aspasia, Cleopatra is accused of manipulating Antony 
by the use of secret rites (ἐµπράττετο; Ant. 53.4) throughout their relationship. 
Plutarch explicitly refers to Antony’s passion for Cleopatra as a “dire evil” (ἡ 
δεινὴ συµφορά; Ant. 36.1), which he compares explicitly to the lowest part of 
the soul in Plato’s metaphysics.178 Cleopatra renders Antony incapable of 
rational action, and Plutarch reasons that she does so by way of “certain drugs 
or witchcraft” (φαρµάκων τινῶν ἢ γοητείας; 37.4). Her effect on Antony is so 
strong that she manages to convince him to rely on his navy instead of his land 
forces at the Battle of Actium, despite his knowing that he has the weaker fleet 
(62.1; 63.5; cf. 66.4-5). Indeed from the very beginning she is under suspicion of 
using “the charms and sorceries of her own person” to win Antony’s favour 
and escape persecution (Ant. 25.4). This in itself is not a bad thing, as Plutarch 
uses an unknown Thessalian woman as an example of good character in the 
Conj. praec. The woman is accused of using φάρµακα on Philip, but proves 
herself so virtuous that Olympias exclaims, “Away with these slanders! You 
                                                
178 “And finally, like the stubborn and unmanageable beast of the soul, of which Plato speaks, 
he spurned away all saving and noble counsels and sent Fonteius Capito to bring Cleopatra to 
Syria.” The passage in Plato referred to here is Phdr. 254a, which discusses the analogy of the 
charioteer and the two horses travelling through the Realm of Ideas. Antony’s passion is like 
the horse that tugs and jumps wildly from side to side, bringing the chariot off course. 
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have your magic charms in yourself” (Conj. praec. 141c). Olympias thus believes 
her character is so virtuous that she does not need to use spells or potions. 
Carney sees this as a positive depiction of Olympias, which stands in stark 
contrast to the negative depictions in the Alex., although she does not explain 
why (2006: 134). It is more likely, considering how negative Plutarch is towards 
Olympias in general, that he implicitly sets her up against the Thessalian 
woman, expecting his readers to know of her reputation for using potions. Since 
the Conj. praec. is from the outset meant to be a compendium of comparisons 
(138c), this interpretation gains some traction from the fact that it is one of only 
a few that are not presented as comparisons. The Thessalian woman is therefore 
the positive exemplum of the woman whose charms are encompassed in her 
own character, whereas Olympias is portrayed as making a power-grab “to get 
the woman into her power” (141c). This behaviour is manipulative and 
unseemly for a woman, as Plutarch makes clear in several other precepts. 
Cleopatra does not escape so lightly with an implicit comparison, however, as 
she is placed in direct competition with Octavia, and comes out by far the worse 
off. Plutarch says that those Romans who had seen Cleopatra sympathised even 
more with Octavia when Antony abandoned her, because they knew that 
Cleopatra was inferior both in youth (ὥρᾳ) and in beauty (κάλλει; 57.3). This 
can hardly be more than a bare-bones summation of opinions at best, while at 
worst it equates youth and beauty/nobility with virtue. 
The expectation of Octavia is that her beauty and her virtues will win Antony’s 
heart from Cleopatra, inspiring goodwill towards her and as a result also 
towards her family. If Octavia can make Antony happy, the civil war between 
him and Augustus will end. Plutarch describes her as fulfilling this role most 
virtuously (Ant. 35.2-4). Cleopatra, on the other hand, wilfully comes between 
Octavia and Antony and disrupts the harmony brought about by their 
marriage. When Octavia attempts to meet Antony at Athens, Cleopatra 
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becomes jealous and fearful lest Octavia’s character and virtue prove 
irresistible to Antony. The action she takes to keep Antony under her control is 
manipulative and disingenuous. Plutarch says she “pretended” to be in love 
with Antony (ἐρᾶν αὐτὴ προσεποιεῖτο τοῦ Ἀντονίου; Ant. 53.3), lost weight, 
feigned love-sickness and made sure Antony saw her wipe away tears as if she 
had been crying (53.3-4). Her flatterers (οἱ κόλακες) also made sure that Antony 
knew that she was in pain from her belief that he would leave her, his devoted 
mistress and queen, for a wife who was married to him by duty (53.4-5). 
Cleopatra’s attempts are successful, and Antony soon returns to her, partly out 
of fear that she would commit suicide (πρόηται τὸν βίον; 53.6).179 This action 
on Antony’s part is the ultimate catalyst for the civil war, but Octavia remains 
loyal despite his treatment of her. Augustus orders her to return to her own 
house, but she refuses and instead remains in Antony’s house as his wife, living 
as though he himself were there. She even entreats Augustus to relinquish all 
thought of civil war, lest it be said that they started a war on behalf of a woman. 
She continues to care not only for her own children by Antony, but also for his 
children by Fulvia, and in conducting herself so virtuously (καλῶς καὶ 
µεγαλοπρεπῶς), Plutarch says that she unintentionally damaged the 
reputation of her husband, who was thought all the worse for scorning a 
woman like her (54.1-3). 
Cleopatra’s death by suicide appears to be her redemption, an act of bravery 
from a woman who refuses to live in slavery, and above all a final sign of the 
loyalty she owes Antony. In fact when Antony initially mistakenly believes 
                                                
179 Beneker (2014: 508) argues that it is Antony’s lack of self-control that ultimately caused his 
ruin, and while this may be partly true, it is hard to deny that Plutarch places at least some of 
the blame on Cleopatra. When Antony abandons the Battle of Actium, Plutarch says he 
“hastened after the woman who had already ruined (ἀπολωλεκυῖαν) him, and would make 
his ruin still more complete (προσαπολοῦσαν)” (Ant. 66.5). 
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Cleopatra dead, he declares, “I am grieved that such an imperator as I am has 
been found to be inferior to a woman in courage” (Ant. 76.3). Plutarch says that 
Augustus admired her εὐγένειαν (86.4), and as a result gave her a regal burial 
alongside Antony. This admiration is perhaps rather for the spirit afforded by 
her high birth than for courage or virtue. Plutarch is reluctant to admit that 
Cleopatra has any truly virtuous characteristics, but will readily admit that she 
is of noble birth, which naturally bestows some strength of character. At the 
Battle of Actium, however, Cleopatra is condemned for her cowardice; Plutarch 
accuses her of preparing to flee even while Antony was preparing for the next 
battle (Ant. 63.5), and of abandoning the fight at a crucial moment (Ant. 66.4). 
Even her death seems somewhat ignoble when Plutarch returns to Octavia 
shortly afterwards to describe her actions in the wake of her husband’s death. 
After the death of both Antony and Cleopatra, Octavia continues to care for all 
of Antony’s children, even those he had with Cleopatra, and makes sure that 
they are married into noble families (87.1-2). She accomplishes this task so well 
that Antony’s descendants eventually come to rule the Empire (87.4). In light 
of this description of Octavia’s actions on behalf of both Antony and his 
mistress, Cleopatra’s actions appear to be condemned as yet another act of 
cowardice and negligence. Plutarch seems convinced that Cleopatra wanted the 
war to happen (56.2-3), and thus intentionally manipulated Antony into a 
position from which he could not escape. Even as she mourns Antony’s death 
and prepares to take her own life, Plutarch describes her as deceptive (83.1-5), 
and even in death she is “royally adorned” (κεκοσµηµένην βασιλικῶς; 85.4). 
As a result, her death appears to be a choice between freedom, particularly the 
freedom to rule, and slavery (cf. 84.2-3). She therefore fundamentally fails at 
cultivating some of the most basic female virtues, including acting as caretaker 
for her children, and her greatest sin is the intentional disruption of the 
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domestic and political harmony brought about by the legitimate union between 
Antony and Octavia. 
Woman’s role as peace-maker and peace-keeper is emphasised repeatedly 
throughout the Lives. Roman women especially are often married to the allies 
of their fathers or brothers; Pompey divorced his first wife Antistia to forge an 
alliance with Sulla by marrying his step-daughter, Aemelia (Pomp. 9.1-3). 
Cornelia’s father married her off to the son of his enemy (Ti. Gracch. 1.3).180 
Caesar’s daughter Julia is married off to Pompey in order to ensure a 
harmonious relationship between the two generals. Her death in childbirth, 
along with the death of the child, causes this relationship to dissolve (Caes. 23.4; 
cf. Pomp. 47.6, 53.1-5). Women who do not support their husbands by preserving 
the harmony of their marriage are represented as their undoing. Plutarch says 
that Lepidus died of despondency, not because Pompey thwarted his attempt 
at a coup, but because he found out that his wife was an adulteress (Pomp. 16.6). 
In this short mention of the cause of Lepidus’ death the role of Woman as 
supporter to her husband is emphasised, and it is framed in such a way as to 
suggest that her deviation from this role is the ultimate cause of his ruin – after 
all, Lepidus may have gone on to redeem himself were it not for his wife’s 
indiscretions. 
As a result of the negative effects of being connected to an unchaste woman, 
men generally cast them off as soon as their reputation suffers. When Caesar’s 
wife Pompeia is suspected of having an affair with Clodius, he divorces her at 
once, claiming that he believes his wife should be above reproach (Caes. 10.1-
                                                
180 See also Dixon (2007: 4-5) for a dramatic retelling and insightful commentary on the 
circumstances surrounding Cornelia’s betrothal. Carney (2006: 12-13) similarly discusses 
Olympias’ marriage to Philip as a political arrangement. Unlike Cornelia, however, Olympias 
is accused of plotting the death of her husband (Alex. 10.4) and thus fails at preserving the 
harmony of her marriage and playing the supportive role she ought to. 
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6); Pompey takes similar action by divorcing his wife Mucia on charges of 
“commit[ting] adultery during his absence” (ἐξύβρισε... παρὰ τὴν ἀποδηµίαν 
αὐτοῦ; Pomp. 42.7; tr. Perrin 1917). Aspasia’s reputation as a courtesan is so 
widely known that even Cyrus the Great named one of his courtesans after her 
(24.6-7; cf. 30.4). Plutarch says that Aspasia was the mistress of a brothel (24.3), 
and her reputation was so well known that she went on trial for impiety and 
“receiv[ing] free women into a place of assignation for Pericles” (Per. 32.1). Her 
association with Pericles in itself therefore damages his career and his 
reputation (33.7), since she is a woman of ill repute, though it is perhaps his 
inability to refuse her company that ultimately damages him most.  
The sexual experience of a woman before (and after) her association with a man 
is an important factor in the determination of her virtue. Thus, when Pompey 
marries his third wife, Cornelia, Plutarch feels the need to point out explicitly 
that she is not a virgin but a young widow, and that despite her sexual 
experience her virtues were many (Pomp. 55.1-2). Pompey himself, however, is 
not a virgin at his first marriage, nor does Plutarch seem to think it an important 
matter. He relates the story of Pompey’s dalliance with the courtesan Flora not 
to show that Pompey was unchaste, but rather that he was magnanimous, since 
he gave her to a friend despite having a certain fondness for her himself, and 
afterwards did not sleep with her again (2.3-4). In fact, Plutarch follows this 
anecdote with one that relates how Pompey treated his freedman Demetrius’ 
wife contemptuously, lest he be thought licentious (2.4-5). 
A woman who does display sexual experience and agency cannot be virtuous 
and is likely to lead those who associate with her into intemperance as well. 
Thus Cleopatra is a λαµυρᾶς (“bold coquette”) when she secretly meets Caesar 
by hiding in a bed-sack (Caes. 49.2). She also indulges and thereby exacerbates 
Antony’s taste for luxury; together they form the society of Inimitable Livers 
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(Ant. 28.2-7),181 which they disband after their defeat at Actium to form instead 
the society of Partners in Death (71.3). Both societies are built on the basis of 
luxurious indulgence and extravagance. Cleopatra indeed shows herself 
inclined towards intemperance from the outset when she arrives to meet 
Antony in a barge so splendidly decorated with gold and purple sails (ἱστίων 
ἁλουργῶν) that Plutarch compares her to “Aphrodite in a painting” (26.1-2; cf. 
26.4). Aspasia, who certainly benefitted more from her association with Pericles 
than his with her, took a lowly sheep-dealer as a lover after Pericles’ death. The 
casual mention of her continued association with whomever she chose comes 
shortly before Plutarch tells us that Pericles was almost certainly genuinely in 
love with her (24.5), making Aspasia’s affections for him seem less than sincere. 
Even barbarian kings can be led astray; Pompey discovers “licentious letters” 
that Monime sent to Mithridates, as well as his answers to her (Pomp. 37.2), 
implying that this barbarian king had succumbed to an intemperate mistress 
and was therefore all the more deserving of being conquered. In contrast to the 
behaviour of these women, Caius Gracchus praises his mother Cornelia for her 
chastity, which is so legendary that he dares to declare to an opponent charged 
with “effeminate practices”: “…all Rome knows that she refrained from being 
(οὖσαν) with men longer than you, though you are a man” (C. Gracch. 4.4). 
Female chastity is therefore used as a tool to shame men into heteronormative 
sexual relationships as well. The implication seems to be that if a virtuous 
woman can overcome the natural vices of her sex, it is all the worse if a man 
cannot do the same. 
Women are also more susceptible to grief and lamentation and thus have to 
prove themselves able to overcome the desire to give in to their base instincts 
in times of crisis. Plutarch takes the time to narrate in detail how Cleopatra 
                                                
181 Cf. Chaveau (2002: 41-46), who draws on Plutarch as a credible source for Cleopatra’s 
extravagance, as well as the craftiness of the methods she used to ensnare Antony.  
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mourns Antony’s death. While he dies in her arms she beats her breast, tears 
her clothes and smears his blood on her face (Ant. 77.2-3). After she has been 
captured, she refuses to eat and Plutarch reminds the reader that her breasts 
are bruised and swollen from her acts of lamentation (82.1). While some may 
read this as her redemption in showing Antony loyalty at the last hour,182 it is 
surely the egregious display of grief Plutarch warns Timoxena against in the 
Cons. ux. In sharp contrast to this Pompey’s wife Cornelia, who is described as 
virtuous at the outset, resists her initial urge to give in to grief and lamentation 
when she hears that her husband has been defeated by Caesar (Pomp. 74.2). So 
too Cornelia, mother of the Gracchi, is lauded for bearing her misfortunes 
“nobly and magnanimously” (εὐγενῶς καὶ µεγαλοψύχως), and remembering 
the deceased fondly without excess grief or lamentation (C. Gracch. 19.1-3).183 
The virtues and vices that Plutarch focuses on specifically in the women’s 
works of the Moralia appear again in the Lives, and Plutarch’s judgement in each 
case follows a familiar pattern. Aspasia is not virtuous, because she is a 
courtesan and a metic, who manipulates men for her own gain. Her actions and 
her reputation negatively influence the career of the man to whom she is 
connected but not married. Olympias is not virtuous, because she is 
superstitious and takes part in barbaric rituals, and she manipulates the people 
around her with spells and potions. Her chastity, and thus the paternity of 
Alexander, is questionable, and she is a difficult and vengeful woman. Cornelia 
is virtuous because she is educated and chaste, she knows her place and does 
not speak out of turn, she cares for her children in a magnificent manner and 
                                                
182 Stadter (1995: 235-36; 1999: 181) sees Cleopatra’s role after the defeat at Actium as wholly 
changed. In this stage of their lives he sees her as a loyal partner and affectionate lover to 
Antony, and thus as a woman who has finally “assumed her proper role”. 
183 Cf. Dixon (2007: 11), who discusses Cornelia’s posthumous honours, including her statue, 
and the way she honoured the memory of her sons after their deaths. 
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when they die she celebrates their lives and does not grieve them excessively. 
Octavia is virtuous because she is educated, noble, and chaste, she plays her 
proper role as harmoniser of the household and caretaker of all her husband’s 
children, even those who are not hers. Cleopatra is everything that is bad in a 
woman and then some. Plutarch does not leave room for error in the matter of 
female virtue. 
In cases where he concedes characteristics that are typical of the virtuous 
woman to one he deems unworthy, he finds a way to present them as 
incomplete or improperly utilised. As such he admits of both Aspasia and 
Cleopatra a certain level of intelligence, but does so with words that suggest 
that they are tricksters rather than truly educated women. Even when he calls 
them beautiful he says their beauty is not unsurpassable, and he even directly 
compares Cleopatra to Octavia on occasion to showcase the ways in which she 
is inferior. 
Women who step outside the boundaries of conjugality, or refuse to conform 
to Plutarch’s view of Woman’s role in the marital union, are condemned in the 
Lives just as they are in the Moralia. As psychagogic models Plutarch presents 
them to his students in order for them to consider where these women went 
wrong. Aspasia, as a foreigner and a courtesan, never really had a chance.184 In 
the case of Olympias and Cleopatra, we are reminded that nobility does not 
necessarily equal virtue. The virtuous woman is not only noble, she is also 
educated, self-controlled, temperate, loyal, and obedient. In contrast to the 
women who have been found wanting, Cornelia and Octavia are the models of 
perfect conjugal action. Even after the death of their husbands they continue to 
act according to the same standard by raising his/their children and preserving 
                                                
184 See section 1.2.2 on the importance of considering the intersections of socio-economic and 
environmental factors when studying women, and chapter 2 on the socio-economic status of women 
in different social strata in the ancient world. 
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the family name. Cornelia does not cease her actions even when her sons have 
died, but continues to speak fondly of them and preserves their name. Octavia 
cares for Antony’s children so well that their descendants eventually become 
the emperors of Rome. 
Plutarch’s psychagogic practice for women in the Moralia sets the conditions 
for interaction within the conjugal couple. His advice makes it clear that 
Woman’s proper role is as part of this unit, and that any interaction outside of 
it is strictly forbidden. In the Lives he uses the same moral language as in the 
Moralia when evaluating characters. An action that is consistently judged as 
bad in the Moralia is often connected with certain terms: φάρµακα, χαλεπότης, 
βακχεύµα, ζήλωσις, κόλακες, παλλακή etc., and these terms are often found 
in the Lives when Plutarch is describing women who transgress the boundaries 
of their sex. Similarly, positive moral terms are found in descriptions of 
virtuous women. These terms include καλλός, σώφρων, καλῶς, 
µεγαλοπρεπής, φιλότεκνος, εὐγένεια/εὐγενής, µεγαλόψυχος, etc. Women who 
are described with negative terms are rarely described with positive terms as 
well, with the exception of terms denoting nobility where applicable. Aspasia 
is never described as κάλλος or εὐγένεια/εὐγενής. In these cases it is clear that 
Plutarch is vexed by the prevalence of noble women who are not virtuous. 
Nobility is so intricately linked with beauty and virtue that often the same word 
is used to denote all three concepts. Noble women who fail to attain a proper 
standard of virtue are therefore largely described with negative moral concepts 
throughout the Lives. Plutarch’s conception of ideal Womanhood in the Moralia 
is therefore not isolated, and is clearly the measure by which women are judged 
in the Lives as well. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
Plutarch’s ideal Woman is no contradiction, at least not in theory. His views in 
the Moralia are thoroughly reconcilable with the image of Woman presented in 
the Lives. His arguments in Amat. and Mulier. virt. propose a radical 
degendering of virtue, and a shift of focus instead to the nuanced ways in which 
individual character and disposition affect the manifestation of virtue. Thus the 
masculine actions of Ismenodora in the Amat., namely kidnapping Bacchon and 
holding him hostage with the intent of marrying him, are acceptable within the 
framework of this new order. Plutarch proclaims himself convinced that 
Woman shares equally in virtue with Man, and has equal ability to attain a state 
of divinity at the end of the psychagogic process, but in Is. Os. he betrays this 
Socratic principle in favour of an Aristotelian approach which sees Woman as 
recipient and nurturer of Man’s active and creative power. 
It is clear that Plutarch struggled to get the principles to align; he seems 
genuinely convinced of his arguments in Amat. and elsewhere that women and 
men are equal in ability. Yet he seems similarly convinced that women have an 
inherent natural weakness that can only be corrected by the guidance of the 
male rational principle, i.e. through the study of philosophy and subservience 
to the leadership of her husband. This has lead scholars to some truly 
confounding conclusions, such as Blomqvist’s assertion that “[a]ccording to 
Plutarch, women are inferior as such, but once they accept their inferiority, they 
may well be regarded as men’s equals as regards moral strength. Women are 
not wicked or depraved unless they transgress the rules of their sex and strive 
to achieve privileges reserved for men” (1997: 89). This judgement of Woman 
as “equal, but inferior” has become a recurring theme in scholarship on 
Plutarch’s women, and includes the important work of Stadter (1999: 180, 182) 
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and McInerney (2003: 341-43). For Plutarch it is impossible for Woman to reach 
a state of divine virtue without the guidance of male Reason. Isis needs Osiris, 
and because she loves him, she is always in search of him. It is this erotic bond 
between them that keeps Isis free from the influence of Typhon and forms the 
just soul. Similarly, Ismenodora is a widow of noble birth who is above 
reproach in her lifestyle (Amat. 749d). There is nothing in the Amat. to suggest 
that she may have achieved this state of sōphrosynē without the firm guidance 
of her late husband. In the case of virtue in Plutarch, a concept such as “equal” 
is therefore strictly speaking not applicable. Woman may achieve a state of 
virtue comparable to Man’s, but only through Man’s guidance, rendering her 
at his mercy in matters of the soul. 
As a result, his judgment of women who do not fit into the mould of female 
virtue, particularly those women who act in their own self-interest, foment 
discord and indulge in intemperance, is swift and harsh. He offers them very 
little opportunity for redemption, but rather holds them up as examples for his 
female students: this is what vice looks like. Plutarch’s Antony stands out among 
his Lives for his treatment of two women as polar opposites. Apart from being 
a biography of Antony, I suggest that it be treated as a psychagogic text for 
women, in which the virtues of Octavia are compared to the vices of Cleopatra. 
Unlike the Lives of the men he narrates, which allow for individualism (cf. 
Nikolaidis 2014: 363) and nuance, Octavia and Cleopatra fit neatly into the 
mould of Womanly virtue and vice that Plutarch created in the Moralia. He 
judges their actions and characters according to this metric, and pits them 
directly against one another. As an added warning to the reader, the results of 
their actions are directly reflected in the events of Antony’s life. This does not 
excuse Antony as a moral agent, placing all the blame on Cleopatra, but it does 
suggest that a temperate and supportive wife without her own political agenda 
could have affected the course of his life much differently. Had he chosen 
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Octavia, Plutarch seems to imply, how different would the empire not have 
looked? 
Plutarch mentions in passing that Cleopatra styled herself as the New Isis 
during her affair with Antony (Ant. 54.6), but refrains from making any 
comparisons between her and the goddess of Is. Os. Plutarch’s characterisation 
of Cleopatra makes it abundantly clear that she has nothing in common with 
that Isis, who through her devotion to Osiris attains her apotheosis. The New 
Isis, through her refusal to submit to the authority of men,185 has succumbed to 
the temptation of Typhon and has dragged her lover down with her. Before her 
final victory over Octavia Plutarch says that Antony’s Reason was still at odds 
with his love for Cleopatra (Ant. 31.2); she is contrasted with rationality and 
offered as its counterpart. The New Isis is a potentially dangerous force that 
must be tamed. Antony’s own failure to overcome the feminine principle in his 
soul certainly contributed to his ruin, but Plutarch also uses the opportunity to 
give full form to the dangers inherent in allowing the feminine principle to run 
rampant. Untamed and naturally weak as she is, she is likely to cause 
destruction in the lives of the men who touch her. 
In order to tame the feminine principle, Plutarch’s psychagogic programme 
therefore aims to control Woman by keeping her indoors, silent, chaste, 
temperate, complacent, obedient, and above all subservient to her husband, 
who is the force of Reason in her life. The radical degendering of virtue in Amat. 
is a rhetorical exercise in Ideas, but Ismenodora is not Plutarch’s ideal Woman. 
She is an example of what might happen if Woman managed to transcend her 
natural weakness and attained virtue. That this is an unlikely scenario is clear 
from Plutarch’s attitudes towards Woman elsewhere; he is suspicious of her 
                                                
185 Cf. Ant. 60.1: Augustus wanted “to take away from Antony the authority which he had 
surrendered to a woman.” 
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ability to resist temptation, act modestly, cultivate a good character through 
education and philosophy, and not be overcome by grief. The women’s works 
in the Moralia are aimed at helping women supress the irrational principle and 
guide the feminine principle towards the Good. Amat. and Is. Os. are 
supporting texts for those endeavouring to find the good life; they detail the 
metaphysical basis for Plutarch’s ideal Woman, assuring his female students 
that virtue is an attainable goal for them too. The Lives show women as 
secondary characters to men, playing supporting roles and failing or 
succeeding because of their virtue or vice. The emphasis is always on the effect 
their actions have on the men in their lives. Plutarch suggests that virtue and 
vice does not exist in a vacuum, and Woman should pay attention to the 
consequences of her actions on those around her. Her primary duty is to serve 
her husband, and she should always keep this in mind. 
There is no reason to believe that Plutarch does not pass judgement on his 
female characters in the Lives according to the criteria set out in the women’s 
works of the Moralia. The moral language in the latter is mirrored in the former, 
and is applied systematically. Words that denote positive characteristics are not 
applied to women whose actions are deemed immoral. Women who are foreign 
or who belong to the lower classes have almost no positive characteristics 
except in extraordinary circumstances. Plutarch’s response to Cleopatra’s 
actions verges on the polemical. One might easily argue that the statements for 
or against certain actions are emotive. Certainly the ethical terms inherent in 
these moral judgements render them prescriptivist and ultimately subjective. 
The most virtuous women are those who live according to the guidelines set 
out carefully in the Conj. praec. and explored elsewhere in the Moralia. The use 
of moral language in the Lives undoubtedly reveals something about Plutarch’s 
own moral convictions. Some aspects of his ethics are not too far removed from 
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the general aristocratic state of mind evident from other writings of the time.186 
Like those elite male authors, Plutarch believes that there are an unsettling 
number of immoral, dissolute, and licentious women in the world, and that 
their actions are negatively affecting the well-being and success of the men in 
their lives. As a result, Plutarch believes that it is necessary to guide women 
towards a more prudent lifestyle in which they may find fulfilment in 
philosophy and virtue. 
The psychagogic programme that Plutarch develops for women in response to 
the perceived moral crisis is overtly conservative and as such is not tenable in 
the socio-economic reality of the 1st century C.E. It is a combination of the most 
conservative tenets of other psychagogic philosophies aimed at women, and is 
significantly influenced by Platonic metaphysics. This life would see Woman 
defined by her marriage and in relation to her husband and children only. There 
is no longer any possibility for her to define her Self in her own terms, or to set 
the criteria for interactions with the world herself. She cannot choose what 
philosophers she will read and which doctrines she will make her own. 
Metaphysically, Plutarch sees Woman as a mixture of Logos and Chaos, and as 
a result she is continuously fighting to balance these principles. The only way 
to guide her toward Logos is to force her into it; giving her the choice is too 
risky an alternative. Several of the precepts in Conj. praec. advise the husband 
to be somewhat forceful with his wife if she will not be persuaded by reason, 
while others mask veiled threats of violence and deprivation. Plutarch’s moral 
strategy therefore relies on rational argument, but includes the caveat that 
resorting to force in order to persuade women to live according to the 
philosophical way of life is acceptable. 
                                                
186 See chapter 2, especially section 2.3.3., and chapter 3, section 3.4, for women in the literary record. 
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The goal of the psychagogic project, insofar as it aims at attaining a state of 
divine fulfilment, perhaps may not seem altogether ignoble, but it is certainly 
not realistic. Philosophers from the Stoic tradition such as Musonius and 
Hierocles, as well as the Stoic Epictetus seem to have realised this, and as a 
result their views on women are somewhat more balanced. Musonius and 
Hierocles view marriage as an equal partnership between husband and wife, 
whereas Plutarch sees the husband as leading the household and claiming 
ownership over everything encompassed within it. Musonius and Epictetus 
condemn adultery in the case of both men and women, but Plutarch leaves a 
grey area for the husband’s infidelity, implying that licentiousness is a vice 
more detrimental to Woman’s virtue. In fact, Plutarch’s psychagogy seems 
closest to the ethics of the Pythagorean women, and one is left wondering 
whether he would not have rather lived five hundred years earlier. Even then, 
his Woman would have been out of place. The Classical Athenian woman, 
living in the most conservative Greek city-state we know of, was rarely as 
controlled as scholarship makes her out to be. It is likely that Plutarch takes his 
cues from the Pythagorean women, Plato, Xenophon, and at times even 
Aristotle, but the philosophers’ Woman does not correlate with what we can 
with reasonable certainty say about the average Jane. 
Plutarch’s Woman would have felt uncomfortable and lonely in Classical 
Athens. She does not exist in the early Imperial Period. The women who 
populate Rome and Greece during this time are educated, powerful and 
wealthy, some even in their own right. They marry and divorce and remarry, 
in some cases even for love. They act in public capacities as stratēgoi and 
gymnasiarchs and benefactors to the cities. They are commemorated on coins 
and celebrated with inscriptions, reliefs and statues. They travel through the 
city on day-to-day errands to the market place or religious festivals. They are 
politically active. They are sexually more liberated than they have ever been. 
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Plutarch’s Woman cannot exist in the early Imperial Period and still be called a 
free woman. 
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